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The research described in this thesis aims to improve the techniques used to analyse
volatile memory, in particular user space memory, such that more generic techniques to
identify unknown code such as malware can be produced. Current analysis techniques of
user space memory are limited to a focus on the location of specific kernel objects. This
focus on the identification of specific artifacts has also been applied in the detection of
unknown code, which relies on the location of evidence created from the use of a particular
malicious techniques. While such an approach allows the detection of unknown code, such
as common malware, it allows a sophisticated attacker the ability to intentionally modify
these artifacts to subvert detection.
This research presents a generic method of detecting unknown code that does not rely
on specific artifacts, allowing such malicious subversion to be overcome. Achieving this
has required the creation of three individual contributions to improve the analysis of user
space memory. The first is a model for identifying the common structural components
that apply to the user space memory of all processes, such that the contents of user space
memory can be better understood. The second is a model for distinguishing between
code and data in memory, to facilitate the application of code or data specific analysis
techniques. The final contribution is the technique for automatically and generically
discriminating between known and unknown code in user space memory. This technique
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Volatile memory forensics, henceforth referred to as memory forensics, is a subset of
digital forensics which deals with the preservation of the contents of memory of a com-
puting device and the subsequent examination of that memory. While the memory of a
system typically contains useful runtime information, such memory is volatile, causing the
contents of memory to rapidly decay once no longer supplied with power. Using memory
forensic techniques, it is possible to extract an image of the system’s memory while it is
still running, creating a copy that can be examined at a later point in time, even after
the system has been turned o  and the data contained within the original RAM has
dissipated.
The use of memory forensics thereby allows the creation of a snapshot of a system
at a particular point in time, known as a memory image. As memory typically contains
information that is never written to disk, this allows the extraction of various types of
forensically significant information that would otherwise have disappeared when the sys-
tem was turned o . Such information can include running processes, network connections,
passwords, encryption keys and copies of files that are encrypted on disk. The presence of
this information has made memory forensics common in overcoming hard disk encryption,
triaging systems and investigating the runtime state of a system.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Memory Forensics and Malware
One of the common goals of memory forensic investigations is to attempt to identify
whether any unknown code was running on the system. The code placed on the system
as part of the operating system and the programs installed by the user can be considered
known code, as this is commonly code that has been placed there directly or indirectly by
the user. Unknown code, on the other hand, is typically code that has been silently added
to the system without the user’s knowledge, in order to perform some specific task.
The most common example of such unknown code would be malware, which could have
been installed in a number of ways, such as remote exploitation, unauthorized physical
access, or social engineering. In other fields identifying unknown code is an exercise in
maintaining system integrity and reliability. In a forensic context however, the goal is
usually the attribution of the behaviour of the system, answering the question of whether
the actions of the system were directly caused by the user of that system.
Being able to perform such unknown code identification in memory however is di cult
with current memory forensic techniques. Although significant improvements have been
made since the beginnings of the field, whereby tools such as the strings tool were the most
sophisticated approach, research into memory forensics has focused on the identification
of specific operating system artifacts. While such information is often of little use in
identifying unknown code, it is information required for the successful abstraction of the
contents of a memory image into human readable information.
Although at the hardware level the organization of memory is well understood, how
memory is used beyond this is entirely dependent on the particular version of the operating
system being used. In storage forensics, this would be equivalent to knowing the physical
layout of the disk, but having the file system change for every version of each operating
system. This makes the abstraction of memory di cult, as without knowing the behaviour
of the operating system, the way in which it stores information cannot be determined.
With closed source operating systems such as Windows, this means significant reverse
engineering requirements are involved in order to obtain information about how memory is
used. Although the availability of the source code with open source operating system such
as Linux prevent the need for reverse engineering, they su er from the fact that there is no
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consistency between versions, resulting in each release of each distribution using memory
in a slightly di erent way. While documentation is available for these operating systems,
the information required for abstraction by memory forensics is typically lacking, as other
than the operating system itself, nothing else needs to know the exact way in which
memory is used is used in order for the system to function.
As a result, the majority of memory forensic analysis techniques have focused on the
retrieval of specific artifacts from within memory. Like other operating systems, the
memory of a process on Windows is split into two halves, the kernel space and the user
space. The kernel space is where operating system code and data is stored, and the user
space is where the code and data of the process is stored.
Recent research has focused on finding objects within kernel space memory, as these
objects apply to every process running on the system, and are reasonably similar be-
tween di erent versions of the same operating system. While this has allowed the rapid
development of techniques to obtain key pieces of information, it has not facilitated
an understanding of the rest of the contents of memory, such as user space memory.
Even though there are data structures created by the kernel in the user space of each
process, such as stacks and heaps, no techniques for extracting these common structural
components exist.
This focus on the retrieval of specific artifacts is particularly prevalent in the techniques
used to identify unknown code. Rather than focus on being able to locate the unknown
code itself, existing memory forensic techniques such as malfind [Ligh, 2009] focus on
the location of artifacts created by the use of common malware techniques, such as code
injection. The issue with this approach however is that once a technique can be detected,
it is usually altered by malware authors in order to once again avoid detection. This
causes a new detection technique to be required, leading to a constant back and forth of
creating new detection techniques and having those detection techniques be subverted.
This is commonly referred to as the malware arms race. The fact that the malware arms
race exists shows that such artifact based approaches can unknowingly become obsolete
at any time, limiting the reliability of the results generated.
Since unknown code such as malware places a large emphasis on staying hidden, being
able to categorically prove that no unknown code is running on the system is not an easy
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task. Even after applying all existing artifact based detection techniques, one cannot
be sure that unknown code was not running on the system, as the unknown code could
potentially have improved its techniques to subvert detection. For this reason, more
generic ways of detecting unknown code are required, such that it is not possible for the
unknown code to subvert detection. Only then will questions about the possibility of
unknown code on a system be able to be definitively answered.
1.2 Research Questions
The research question that informs this research, and the subquestions that are addressed
in order to answer this question, are detailed in this section.
Research Question: What techniques can be identified that can be used to
assist in discriminating between known and unknown code in user space
memory?
Being able to discriminate between known and unknown code will allow the identification
of all unknown code executing on a system. The capability to locate such unknown code
is particularly important when attempting to attribute the behaviour of a system. A
common defense in digital forensic investigations is that malware, not the user, caused
the behaviour in question. By being able to locate any unknown code, this unknown
code can then be investigated to determine if it could have caused the behaviour under
investigation. If no unknown code is found, it can be demonstrated that factors such as
malware were not involved in causing the behaviour in question.
Having the capability to perform such identification will benefit forensic investiga-
tions in two ways. Firstly, by distinguishing between known and unknown code, such a
technique will filter out the irrelevant data, reducing the volume of evidence requiring
examination. Secondly, by improving the abstraction of the code in memory into known
and unknown code, it will reduce the complexity of the investigation. Although the
technique could possibly assist in determining the integrity of the system, an aspect
important in information security, such an area is not the focus of this research.
While the creation of such a technique can be seen to significantly assist in forensic
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investigations, with the current state of memory forensics the development of such a tech-
nique is not a simple task. Being able to formulate a generic approach to discriminating
between known and unknown code requires a better understanding of the contents of
user space memory, such that more information than just specific artifacts is available to
inform this decision. Additionally, it requires techniques for distinguishing between code
and data, such that this information can then be used to separate the code into known
and unknown code.
For this reason, it can be seen that this research question can be split into three distinct
subquestions: identifying the contents of user space memory, distinguishing between code
and data in user space memory, and distinguishing between known and unknown code in
user space memory. Each of these subquestions are described below.
Subquestion 1: What are the common structural components of a user space
process, and is it possible to identify and distinguish them?
While previous research has focused on the objects found within kernel space memory,
the operating system also places numerous objects into user space memory. These objects
are the common structural components that are typically required by a process in order
to function, such as the stack. By identifying and distinguishing such components, this
research aims to better define the contents of user space, such that more sophisticated
analysis techniques can be applied to the contents of user space. This will allow the
technique created to fulfill the overall research question to be successfully applied within
user space memory.
Subquestion 2: What trace evidence exists that may be employed to auto-
matically distinguish between code and data in user space memory?
Although the modern Von Neumann architecture is designed to treat code and data as one
and the same, recent e orts in improving the security of operating systems have focused
on the explicit separation of code and data. Such developments have been as a result of the
widespread exploitation of memory vulnerabilities resulting from the incorrect handling of
data, and its subsequent execution as code. This research question investigates whether
artifacts related to these same operating system hardening techniques can be used to
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distinguish between executable code and data within a user space process. By identifying
all code, this will allow a future decision as to whether the code is known or unknown to
be made.
Subquestion 3: To what extent is the existing technique of hashing e ective
in distinguishing between known and unknown code?
The amount of code stored within the memory of a modern system is far beyond what an
investigator can hope to examine. For this reason, it is logical to filter out the known code,
for which a degree of trust may already be attached, from the examination process, such
that only unknown code remains. This remaining unknown code can then be manually
investigated, for the purposes of determining whether it could have caused the behaviour
in question. Such a filtration approach necessitates some way of identifying the known
code in memory, which is the essence of this research question. The subsequent creation
of this filtering capability in turn fulfills the requirements of the overall research question
stated previously.
Scope
As described previously however, the way memory operates is specific to the operating
system being used, making the previously mentioned goals a broad problem, one that
could potentially span numerous theses such as this. For this reason, in this research
the scope has been limited to the detection of unknown code in the user space of 32 bit
Windows systems.
Although 64 bit systems are increasing in popularity, 64 bit versions of Windows also
allow the execution of 32 bit programs. This necessitates the need to support 32 bit before
64 bit can be truly supported. Additionally, the complexity added by such scenarios as
32 bit executables in 64 bit processes would significantly increase the time required to
achieve the research question. As such, only 32 bit versions of Windows are examined.
The most common versions of Windows are Windows XP and Windows 7, and for
this reason only these operating systems are investigated. While two other versions of
Windows exist in common usage, Windows Vista and Windows 8, their market shares
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are only a fraction of the two most popular versions of Windows. For each of the studied
operating systems, the latest service packs have been used, making Windows XP SP3 and
Windows 7 SP1 the target of analysis. Whenever comments about Windows are made in
this dissertation, they refer to the 32 bit versions of these two operating systems.
The Windows operating system was selected as the focus of this research as it currently,
and has had for some time, the highest market share of any desktop operating system.
This highest market share has subsequently also made it to the most popular target for
unknown code such as malware 1. Only the user space is examined in this research as this
is where the majority of non-operating system code will execute on a Windows system,
and is an area that has been mostly ignored by previous research.
1.3 Contributions
The research questions outlined above are addressed by the contributions that form the
majority of the research described in this dissertation. These contributions are a theory
of operation for the contents of user space memory, a theory of operation for the location
of potentially executable code within user space memory, and a method of applying these
theories to perform identification of the known code within user space memory. Each of
these contributions is directly linked to a research question outlined in Section 1.2, and
are outlined in more detail in the rest of this section.
Contribution 1
The first contribution outlines a theory of operation of how Windows creates and uses
common structural components in user space memory, and defines a model that uses
this information to identify and distinguish them from other memory allocations within
user space. This theory of operation was determined through extensive study of the
data structures created by the kernel in user space memory, the interactions of many of
which had not previously been documented. When implemented as a model, this theory of
operation allowed the contents or roles of numerous memory allocations to be determined.
1While this is true at the time of writing (2013), the rising popularity of mobile operating systems
may cause this to change in the future
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The results of the evaluation of this model demonstrated that these common structural
components compromise the majority of user space memory, and allowed significantly
more of user space memory to be understood compared to previous research [Arasteh
and Debbabi, 2007, Betz, 2005, Dolan-Gavitt, 2007]. Having a more detailed knowledge
about the contents of user space memory allows significant reductions in the search space
for data of interest, such as the capability to reduce the search for a program’s data to
only the memory in which program data is known to be stored. Additionally, a better
understanding of user space memory facilitates the development of more sophisticated
analysis techniques, as achieved in the other contributions.
Contribution 2
The second contribution outlines a theory of operation of how memory protection mech-
anisms are assigned and implemented in user space memory, and defines a model that
uses this information to distinguish between potentially executable code and data in user
space memory. This theory was developed through the modification of permission values
on live systems, to determine exactly how they are used by Windows and how they a ect
execution. Specific cases were identified that required new methods of determining their
permission values, as they were stored in a previously unknown way. In numerous cases
Windows was also determined to use permissions incorrectly, complicating the process of
distinguishing between code and data.
Since correctly distinguishing between code and data requires such default Windows
behaviour to be accounted for, much of the contribution was dedicated to how to correctly
determine permissions and identify instances of permission misuse by Windows. By
accounting for these irregularities, it allows the identification of all executable code in
user space memory. Once all the code in user space memory can be identified, this code
can then be separated into known and unknown code, as in the next contribution.
Contribution 3
The third and final contribution provides an approach for identifying known code within
user space memory, through the novel application of cryptographic hashes built from
known code on disk. This was achieved through the improvement of an existing hashing
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technique using the information learned from the previous two contributions. Being able
to completely identify all known code on a normal system also required some non-standard
code loading behaviour by Windows to be overcome.
This approach provides a filtering technique for memory analysis, by allowing all
known code in memory to be removed from further analysis, such that only unknown code
requiring manual examination remains. Evaluation of a prototype implementation of this
approach demonstrated that it was capable of highlighting the introduction of malware in
all samples examined, and capable of detecting malware that existing approaches such as
malfind [Ligh, 2009] could not. These results demonstrate that this approach is capable
of locating all unknown code in user space memory.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
Including this chapter, this dissertation contains a total of six chapters. An overview of
each chapter is provided below:
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the research area, the research problem and
the research questions that are addressed by this research. The contributions that are
informed by these research questions are outlined, and finally an overview of the rest of
the dissertation provided.
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
This chapter provides a broad overview of the field of digital forensics and memory
forensics and how the existing work relates to the contributions detailed in later chapters.
It begins with an introduction to digital forensics and its key principles, and how inves-
tigations were typically performed before the advent of memory forensics. The history of
memory forensics as a field is then described, in particular the ways in which the focus of
research in the area has changed as the field matured, as well as the way in which memory
is typically organized on modern x86 systems.
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Section 2.3.2 then describes the existing user space analysis approaches related to the
contribution outlined in Chapter 3. Section 2.4 then details the way in which Windows
attempts to protect its memory from exploitation, which is related to the contribution
described in Chapter 4. Section 2.5 describes the existing approaches to detecting malware
in memory, and Section 2.6 describe the existing approaches to validation of the contents
of memory, both of which form the related work for the approach outlined in Chapter 5.
A summary of the background and related work is then provided, which highlights the
gaps in the literature identified in the previous sections.
Chapter 3: Surveying User Space Memory
This chapter details the contribution of the theory of operation and subsequent model for
identifying the common structural components of user space memory. The chapter begins
with an introduction to the problem area and an explanation of the approach used to
divide memory into discrete memory ranges. A detailed approach for the identification and
application of available metadata to the memory is then described. An implementation of
this model that can be used to identify these common structural components in memory is
then described. This implementation is then evaluated, demonstrating that it significantly
improves upon the existing approaches. This is followed by a discussion of the implications
of this research and an investigation into the ways this approach furthers the analysis of
memory, before the chapter is then concluded. The contents of this chapter were published
in:
• White, A., Schatz, B., and Foo, E. (2012). Surveying the user space through user
allocations. Digital Investigation, 9(S1):S3–S12
Chapter 4: Distinguishing Between Code and Data in User Space
Building on the previous chapter, this chapter provides a theory of operation for the use of
access control mechanisms as a means to distinguish between potentially executable code
and data in user space memory. After an introduction to the problem area, the behaviour
of Windows in terms of the use of executable permissions is examined. The way in which
these permissions can be used to distinguish between code and data is then described. A
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list of ways in which Windows complicates this process through the misuse of permissions
is then presented. An evaluation of an implementation of this approach is then provided.
The implications of the results of this evaluation are then discussed, before the chapter is
concluded.
Chapter 5: Identifying Known and Unknown Code in User Space
This third contribution chapter details the approach used to identify known and un-
known executable code in user space memory. Building upon the approaches detailed in
Chapters 3 and 4, code is located and then verified through a novel method of applying
existing memory hashing techniques to user space memory. After the approach used is
described, an implementation is then provided and subsequently evaluated using malware
samples and common applications. The implications of the results of this evaluation
are then discussed. An example of how this approach can be used to detect previously
undetectable malware techniques is then provided, before the chapter is concluded. The
contents of this chapter and parts of the previous chapter will be published in:
• White, A., Schatz, B., and Foo, E. (2013). Integrity Verification of User Space Code.
Digital Investigation, 10(S1):S59–S68
Chapter 6: Conclusion & Future Work
This concluding chapter provides a summary of the contributions and objectives achieved
in this research, and identifies areas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
While the previous chapter has provided an introduction to the context of this research,
this chapter introduces the background material and existing work related to this research.
This background material provides an overview of the fields of digital forensics and mem-
ory forensics, allowing an understanding of the motivations behind and challenges facing
these fields. The existing work forms the foundation on which each of the contributions
were made, allowing the identification of the gaps in the literature that they address.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 provides the background of the digital
forensic field as a whole and the challenges it faces. Section 2.2 outlines an introduction
into the field of memory forensics and how it has developed. Section 2.3 describes the
existing approaches for understanding user space memory, forming the related work for
Chapter 3.
Section 2.4 introduces the way in which code is used in Windows, which is related to
the contribution described in Chapter 4. Section 2.5 outlines existing rootkit and rootkit
detection techniques, while Section 2.6 describes the existing memory integrity evaluation
techniques. Both of these sections form the related work for the contribution in Chapter 5.
Finally, this literature review is then summarised in Section 2.7.
2.1 Digital Forensics
This section provides a background for digital forensics as a whole, in order to provide the
forensic context within which memory forensics operates. After defining digital forensics,
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the key principles that guide digital forensics are introduced. The typical methodology of
a digital forensics investigation is then described. A brief overview of other fields such as
storage forensics and live response is then given. Finally, the relevant forensic issues such
as malware are outlined.
Knowledge of the general principles and methodology of digital forensics allows the
constraints within which memory forensics operates to be seen. The shortcomings of
storage forensics and live response allow an explanation of why memory forensics exists
and how these existing fields influenced the early development of the field. Lastly, the
issue of behaviour attribution and malware provides the motivation for this research.
2.1.1 Definitions
Digital Forensics is the term commonly defined as the acquisition, analysis and interpreta-
tion of digital evidence. As the field has attempted to establish itself alongside traditional
forensic science, numerous definitions for this term have been created. Of these definitions,
the most comprehensive of these is from the First Digital Forensic Research Workshop
(DRWFS), which defined digital forensic science as:
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preserva-
tion, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documen-
tation and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for
the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to
be criminal, or helping to anticipate the unauthorised actions shown to be
disruptive to planned operations.” [Palmer, 2001]
This definition itself however is dependent on defining the two other key terms it intro-
duces. The first of these is digital evidence, defined as “information of probative value
that is stored or transmitted in binary form” [SWGDE, 2011] or “information stored or
transmitted in binary form that may be relied upon in court” [IOCE, 2002]. The key
aspect of these definitions is that they relate only to information stored in binary form.
The fact that the evidence in question is latent is what separates digital forensics from
the other more physical forensic sciences.
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2.1.2 Principles
All actions taken in the context of digital forensics are done so with four key principles in
mind; integrity, latent, reproducibility and completeness [Casey, 2004]. These principles
are designed to ensure that digital forensic investigations follow the scientific method, and
the conclusions formed from such investigations are admissible in court. Each of these
principles is described in further detail in this section.
Integrity
Digital evidence is mutable, and is easily capable of being altered, either accidentally
or maliciously [Casey, 2004]. This mutability of digital evidence means that measures
must be taken to ensure the integrity of digital evidence. Preservation of the integrity of
evidence is usually undertaken in two ways.
Firstly, the interaction with the original evidence is minimised by only ever working
with copies of the evidence. While this necessitates that a copy be made initially, the
digital nature of evidence typically allows more copies to then be made without accessing
the original. This prevents any modification to the evidence itself.
Secondly, these copies are shown to be identical to the original evidence. Typically
cryptographic hashes are employed for this purpose, to provide a checksum that can be
used to show that the copy of the evidence is identical to the original. This allows the
detection of any modifications to the copy between acquisition and presentation in court.
Although it is simple to show that the copy of the evidence has not been modified
during the investigation, in some scenarios it is di cult to prove that the copy is identical
to the original. Ideally the acquisition process should be able to be performed without
introducing changes to the evidence, such as imaging a magnetic hard drive with a write-
blocker. In some scenarios, such as when imaging modern solid state drives or memory,
this is not possible however, as the conditions required to create the image allow changes
to the original evidence to occur. With such scenarios, preserving and demonstrating the
initial integrity of the evidence is reliant on the best practice acquisition methodology
being employed.
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Latent
Aside from perhaps the relics of early computing, such as punch cards and print outs,
digital evidence is for the most part latent. Such evidence is latent as it is not stored in
a human readable form, requiring interpretation by software or hardware before it can
be understood. As a result, all conclusions that are drawn from the evidence are the
result of an interpretation of that evidence [Casey, 2004]. This leads to the potential for
incorrect conclusions to be made as a result of the faulty implementation or application
of an examination technique.
For this reason, legal proceedings typically require such interpretations to be presented
by an expert in the field. The requirement of an expert to present such interpretations
is designed to ensure that the interpretation technique has su cient scientific basis, and
that the correct opinions are formulated as a result of the analysis of those interpretations.
While requiring such a level of expertise lessens the possibility for such incorrect inter-
pretation, it can still potentially occur. Preventing such incorrect interpretations thereby
requires independent verification. Being able to perform such independent verification
requires the following of the next forensic principle, reproducibility.
Reproducibility
Reproducibility is concerned with interpretations being presented in such a way that an-
other expert can follow the same investigative steps and reproduce the same result [Casey,
2004]. This allows the independent verification of the conclusions formulated to ensure
that the evidence is being correctly interpreted. Being able to achieve such reproducibility
however also relies on the tools and techniques used being deterministic, such that they can
reproduce the same output for the same input. Without such reproducibility, the validity
of any results obtained are of questionable scientific merit, rendering their evidential
weight uncertain in legal proceedings.
Completeness
Ideally, ensuring that the correct conclusions are formulated during an investigation
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is not complete, or a relevant piece of evidence is missing, there is the potential that
key information could be missed that would otherwise change the conclusions being
formulated. Proving however that the evidence is complete is not a simple task, and
is highly specific to the scenario being investigated.
With a magnetic hard disk for example, there are sources of evidence that could
potentially be missed. While for many drives an image of its accessible contents forms
the complete evidence, some drives have what as known as a Host Protected Area (HPA),
which would not normally be captured during this process [Gupta et al., 2006]. This
HPA, although often used for storing vendor recovery software, could potentially be used
to intentionally hide information relevant to the investigation. Given that this is not
an area of the disk that is normally user accessible however, it is also possible that the
contents of this area of the disk are not relevant to the investigation.
Without first acquiring and examining this area of the disk, a decision regarding the
relevance of its contents cannot be made. Although it may not end up being relevant,
without assessing such evidence, an investigator runs the risk of forming a conclusion
based on incomplete information. In this scenario, the examiner would have to be aware
of the possibility of a HPA, in order to check for it and subsequently acquire and assess
its contents. This means that the completeness of the evidence in an investigation is
essentially reliant on the expertise of the examiner on the subject matter involved, and
the robustness of the acquisition methodology followed.
2.1.3 Challenges
Two key challenges are typically faced in digital forensics. The first is the complexity
problem, which deals with the fact that digital evidence is typically latent, acquired at
the lowest and most raw format which often is di cult, although not impossible, for
humans to understand [Carrier, 2003]. In order for such evidence to be interpreted, it
must be abstracted to a higher level such that it can be more easily understood. However,
given the number of ways in which data can be stored, this process of abstraction can end
up being quite complex.
The second challenge of digital forensics is the quantity problem, that the amount of
evidence in an average investigation continues to increase such that it is unmanageable or
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ine cient to analyse every single piece of it [Carrier, 2003]. This is not only a result of the
falling prices of storage devices, allowing more data to be stored more inexpensively, but
also as a result of the proliferation of digital devices and their integration into our daily
lives, producing more potential sources of digital evidence. Dealing with the quantity
problem relies on producing ways of filtering the evidence to reduce the amount of
data that requires human analysis. Such techniques are commonly known as reduction
techniques.
2.1.4 Methodology
While various models exist for the methodology that should be followed during a digital
forensic investigation [Carrier and Spa ord, 2003, 2004, Casey, 2004, National Institute
of Justice, 2001, Reith et al., 2002], such models are all variations of four main phases,
collection, examination, analysis and reporting. An overview of the goals of these typical
phases are presented in this section.
Collection
The collection phase is concerned with the preservation of all evidence involved with the
investigation. While this involves the recognition and acquisition of all potential sources
of evidence, it also involves the documentation of the evidence, such that the original state
of all evidence is explicitly recorded. This phase is thereby concerned with establishing
the initial integrity and completeness of the evidence involved in the investigation.
Examination
The examination phase is concerned with the interaction and manipulation of the evidence
to investigate its contents. This phase is concerned only with the establishment of the
trace artifacts presented by the evidence, the decision on their significance is left to the
analysis phase. The examination of digital evidence typically involves the use of three
distinct classes of techniques; filtering, search and exploration.
Filtering is the use of reduction techniques to reduce the amount of evidence requiring
manual examination. Such a reduction technique may include narrowing the evidence
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down to specific dates of interest, or removing files that are known to be irrelevant.
The use of reduction techniques are a requirement in order to overcome the previously
described quantity problem, as the amount of data typically involved in investigations
is too great for all of it to be examined individually. Modern forensic tools typically
provide the ability to use hash sets to remove all known files, such that only unknown
files requiring examination remain.
Search is the application of search techniques in order to highlight evidence of potential
interest. Typically search techniques involve matching a piece of data to an instance of
that data in the evidence. This could include searching for text, such as searching for a
filename or string inside a file, or searching for file hashes, in order to locate any instances
of that specific file. Successful use of search techniques however requires the use of the
correct search parameters, as otherwise the relevant information will not be found in this
manner.
Exploration is the manual examination of the remaining evidence to ensure that
nothing has been missed. Such exploration typically relies on exploiting the hierarchy
inherent in the evidence to guide this process, such as the file system on a disk image.
When no such hierarchy exists, it can be di cult to apply such an approach, as without
such an abstraction layer the complexity of the data may cause problems.
One key point to note is that this whole examination process is reliant on the investiga-
tor being able to understand any data that they come across, as without an understanding
of the data, no initial decision as to whether it may be relevant can be made. As such it is
important that the data be translated through one or more layers of abstraction such that
it can be understood [Carrier, 2003]. In this way, a significant part of the examination
phase is dedicated to overcoming the latent nature of digital evidence, such that it can
be examined and its significance later identified during the analysis phase.
Analysis
The analysis phase involves taking the artifacts previously identified and establishing
the significance of these artifacts. This typically involves the formation of hypotheses
about the identified artifacts, based on the reasons for the original investigation, and
returning to the examination phase in order to locate traces that either prove or refute
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these hypotheses. In this way, it can be seen that it is the hypotheses that drive the
search for traces.
Each of these hypotheses are concerned with interpreting the significance of the artifact
existing on the system, and being able to do this relies on an understanding of how that
artifact came to be. In the physical forensic sciences, such artifacts are typically explained
using Locard’s Exchange Principle, that when two objects come into contact they leave
with traces of the other [Carrier and Spa ord, 2003, Casey, 2004]. A simple example
would be a boot stepping into the mud; the mud would be left with a boot print, and the
boots would be left with mud on them.
While in the physical world it is physics that dictates what happens when these two
objects come into contact, in the world of digital forensics what happens is dependent on
the behaviour of the system involved. While digital forensic tools are adept at finding
specific artifacts, it is not the artifact itself that is useful, but the knowledge that this
artifact is the result of a specific series of events. An entry in a web browser’s history
for example is meaningless without the knowledge that this entry was caused by the user
browsing to the website in question.
For this reason, in order for any artifact to be interpreted, there must exist a theory
of operation and subsequent model that describes the behaviour that caused the artifact.
Each hypothesis that is formed during the analysis phase is therefore an attempt to test
an existing theory of operation that describes the reasons for the existence of that artifact
on the system. Once the way in which the artifact came to be can be explained, the
significance of that existence can then be evaluated. The contributions of this research
define theories of operation for previously unexplored aspects of Windows behaviour, in
order to allow the identification and explanation of new artifacts of interest.
Reporting
The reporting phase is the presentation of the results of the investigation for use as opinion
or fact. Although the conclusions stated in such a report are important, the investigative
steps taken to achieve these conclusions and their scientific basis are equally if not more
important. It is this information about the process of the investigation that allows it to
stand up to external scrutiny, and allows the results to be independently reproduced to
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verify the conclusions made. As such, it is this phase that upholds the reproducibility
principle previously outlined.
2.1.5 Historical Perspective
In order to understand why the field of memory forensics was conceived, and the reasons
behind its evolution, this section provides a brief overview of the storage forensics and
live response fields. The limitations of live response, particularly in regards to its forensic
principles, can be seen as the main factor behind the creation of memory forensics. Storage
forensics on the other hand can be seen to provide the overall methodology and several
precursors to techniques used in memory forensics.
Storage Forensics
Storage forensics is concerned with the acquisition and analysis of the contents of a
computer’s permanent storage medium. This permanent storage medium is a non-volatile
storage device, such as a magnetic hard disk, which is responsible for storing a computer’s
data after the computer has been switched o . This data typically includes anything
required for the operation of the computer, such as the operating system, and any data
created by the user.
Acquisition of a disk such as a hard drive involves creating a bit-for-bit copy of the
contents of the disk. This is typically achieved by turning o  the computer using the disk,
removing the disk from the computer, and connecting the disk to a trusted computer for
imaging using a write-blocker, a device specifically designed to prevent modification to
the disk. By preventing any further writes to the disk, the image of the disk created
can be guaranteed to be identical to the user accessible contents of the disk at the time
of acquisition. While this is true of traditional magnetic hard disks, newer technologies
such as solid state drives introduce additional challenges that complicate this process. In
particular, some solid state drives may perform tasks that alter the contents of the drive
simply by being provided with power.
Examination of the byte sequences on a disk generally relies on being able to exploit
the various characteristics of the file system that has been employed on that disk. This file
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system is what details the organization of the data on the disk, allowing the interpretation
of the contents of the disk as a series of files and folders, rather than a single large piece of
binary data. Knowledge of the hierarchy of the contents of the disk is what allows most of
the traditional disk forensic techniques to occur, such as filtering known files, undeletion
and interpretation of the files on the disk themselves.
When a file system to provide a logical view of the contents of the disk is unavailable
or incomplete, the disk becomes a series of anonymous 512B or 4KB chunks, for which no
further information is known. The need to identify relevant artifacts from the anonymous
contents of the disk has driven the development of carving and feature identification
techniques.
File carving, the technique of locating and reconstructing files based on their content
rather than their metadata [Garfinkel, 2007], exploits the structure inherent within files
in order to assemble bit sequences into files. Although file carving is generally capable
of recovering some files and subfiles on the disk, it is typically limited to common file
types for which there is a well defined structure, such as image files. File formats that are
less structured or capable of being containers can be di cult to carve successfully, as is
common with the Microsoft OLE format previously used for Microsoft O ce documents,
and for this reason file carving is still an open area of research.
While file carving works well on magnetic disks, where the fragmentation is low, solid
state drives employ wear leveling techniques that intentionally fragment the data for the
purposes of enhancing the lifetime of the drive [Pal and Memon, 2009]. Although this
high fragmentation hampers the success of the file carving approach, there exists another
class of techniques known as feature identification that take a di erent approach. These
feature identification techniques take blocks of unknown data and classify them either into
a file type based on their content [Conti et al., 2010, Fitzgerald et al., 2012], or examine
them for data of potential interest [Garfinkel, 2012]. This area of research however is still
relatively new, and aside from bulk extractor [Garfinkel, 2012], these techniques are not
yet ready for widespread use.
As introduced in Section 2.1.3, one of the biggest challenges of disk forensics however
is dealing with the quantity problem, as consumer hard drives are now typically sold
in terms of how many terabytes they can store. Such a quantity of data is far beyond
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what a single investigator can hope to process, which means that more sophisticated
methods of dealing with these large amounts of data is required. The most e ective of
these techniques are concerned with filtering the evidence to reduce the amount of data
that requires manual examination. These reduction techniques are mostly concerned with
removing files that are known to be good, such that analysis can focus on the unknown
files.
A common set of file level reduction techniques apply cryptographic hashes to produce
a hash digest for each file, such that it can be compared to a set of known files. Two
di erent classes of techniques have been proposed for such purposes. The first of these
is the use of a hash set of known files, such as the one provided as part of the National
Software Reference Library (NSRL) [National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2012] dataset. This particular dataset contains the hashes for the files that are the result
of installations of known software, such as the the components of the Windows operating
system and commonly used Windows programs. The use of such a dataset allows the
identification of all the files associated with common software, allowing these files to be
filtered out so that only other data, such as user created data, remains for analysis. The
downside of this approach however is that it relies on the completeness of the library and
the library remaining up to date, which is di cult given how often each of the software
libraries contained within the dataset are updated.
The second filtering approach, Tripwire [Kim and Spa ord, 1993], applies a similar
approach but is specific to the system on which it is installed. With Tripwire, every file
on the system is hashed, and then the file system monitored in order to detect changes
to any of these files. Such an approach allows the changes to files to be tracked, and
allows the contents of the computer to quickly be filtered to those files that have been
added or changed since the machine was in a known trusted state. The issue with such
an approach however is that it must be set up in advance, which typically limits its use
to specific environments.
These hashing approaches, while typically used for reduction purposes, also provide a
mechanism for which the integrity of files can be verified. Since cryptographic hashes are
designed to change with any change to the input, no matter how minute, if the hash of any
file that should match does not match, this demonstrates that the contents of the file have
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changed. This means that by applying these reduction techniques in the opposite way,
by specifically checking for known files, they can be used to verify the integrity of these
files. Such an approach is useful in detecting malware, as some malware will impersonate
a known file on disk in order to remain hidden.
Another class of hashing techniques exist, known as similarity hashes, which are
designed to find data similar to the input data, rather than the same. These can be
useful in attempting to find di erent versions of files such as o ce documents. Similarity
hashes are discussed in more depth in Section 2.6.1
Live Response
Storage forensics traditionally requires the machine to be turned o  to acquire the disk.
There are two problems with this approach. The first is that some data is never stored on
the disk, and only ever exists in memory. The second is that in some scenarios, the target
machine in question provides some important function that prohibits it being turned o .
Overcoming these problems required a di erent approach, which is what gave birth to the
field of live response.
Live response refers to the methods of running diagnostic tools on the target system
itself, and is related to other existing disciplines such network forensics and incident
response. These tools may be related to capturing interesting information from the
contents of memory, such as open network sockets and the list of running processes,
or acquisition of the disk itself.
Live response di ers from other forensic approaches in that there is no acquisition step,
only the examination and analysis is performed. Instead of capturing a bit-for-bit copy of
the disk and then analysing it, as with disk forensics, live response involves interpreting
the current state of the operating system on the fly and outputting the results. This
interpretation typically relies on the operating system to retrieve and interpret the data,
rather than attempt to bypass the operating system to interpret the data directly. Since
there is no acquisition step, this means that there is typically only one chance to run the
tool and receive the result. This means that if there is an error which is not discovered
until later, such as a bug in the analysis tool, there is no way to go back and retrieve the
correct result.
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While running tools on the target system overcomes the two previously described
limitations with disk forensics, it introduces a set of problems of its own. The first of
these is that running live response tools requires interference with the evidence itself,
which makes it di cult to prevent alterations that could influence the evidence produced.
The second is that there is uncertainty in the output of the tools, as the target system
could contain malware that is capable of maliciously altering the evidence produced by
the tools. The third and final issue is that live response can only occur in a narrow time
window, and is not acquired in a way that the results can be reproduced, preventing
any independent verification of the results obtained. Although live response is capable
of producing an important set of data inaccessible to disk forensics, it can be seen that
the way in which it is achieved is far from ideal. Many of the limitations inherent in live
response however have since been overcome by memory forensics, as is later discussed in
Section 2.2.
2.1.6 Relevant Forensic Issues
The ability to retrieve run time information from a system is particularly important when
dealing with arguments regarding the attribution of behaviour to a particular individual.
A common defence claim is that key aspects of the evidence from a computer were not
created by the user of the computer, but rather the behaviour of a malicious program
that was running on the computer. An example of this would be finding illegal material
on the hard drive of a defendant’s computer, and the defendant claiming that he did not
download the material, but rather some malicious program, such as a trojan, downloaded
the material without his consent. Such a claim is commonly referred to as the “trojan
defense”
Regardless as to whether such behaviour did or did not occur, the motivation beyond
the trojan defense is to introduce doubt as to whether a piece of evidence was in fact
created as a result of the behaviour of the defendant. This places pressure on the
investigator to be able to either prove or refute the claims that have been made. While in
the past a decision on such a claim could have been made purely through disk analysis,
this is no longer the case. It is entirely possible for a computer to be infected with malware
which only ever resides in memory and never touches the contents of the disk, making the
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malware invisible to traditional storage forensics [Vidas, 2006].
For this reason, methods of e ectively acquiring and analysing the contents of a
computer’s memory are of considerable value to being able to prove or refute the trojan
defense. Without such run-time information, unless specific evidence is found on the disk,
the results of any analysis of the system may be inconclusive.
2.2 Memory Forensics
From Section 2.1.5 it can be seen that both storage forensics and live response have
limitations inherent in their approach relating to the way in which they handle the contents
of memory. Storage forensics ignores memory completely, and live response can only
obtain information in memory that is exposed by the operating system. This need for the
ability to both acquire and analyse the complete contents of memory is what gave birth
to the field of memory forensics.
This section provides an introduction into the field of memory forensics. The ways
in which memory are acquired, examined and organized are described. A description
of the development of the acquisition of memory is provided such that the limitations of
memory forensics can be seen. The history of memory examination techniques is provided
to describe the evolution of the field, highlighting the trends and subsequent gaps in the
existing research. Finally, a technical primer on the workings of memory is provided, such
that the later contributions can be understood.
2.2.1 Acquisition
Memory forensics involves the acquisition of the contents of volatile memory of a running
system as digital evidence, and the analysis of this memory capture at a later stage on a
trusted system. This makes memory forensics similar to storage forensics in terms of the
separation between acquisition and analysis, but similar to live response in that it deals
with understanding the state of a live system. While memory forensics inherits desirable
traits from storage forensics such as being able to ensure the integrity of the evidence and
provide reproducibility of the analysis, it generally su ers from the downside of having
to run an acquisition tool on an untrusted system as with live response. This aspect of
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memory forensics has led the majority of the early work in the field to be devoted to
ensuring the integrity of the acquisition process.
Acquiring an image of the contents of memory poses a unique set of challenges. Firstly,
the process of capturing memory requires changing the contents of memory itself, so that
the capture tool can execute. Numerous studies have focused on reducing the e ects of
such modifications, and demonstrated that the side-e ects of running a memory capture
tool are minimal [Schatz, 2007, Vidas, 2006, Walters and Petroni, 2007]. Secondly, since
the system is still running while the capture tool is running, the contents of memory itself
is changing. This makes a memory capture similar to taking a photo of a fast moving
object, in that the end result is a “blurry” image, not the perfectly atomic snapshot
that is desired [Kornblum, 2006a, Walters and Petroni, 2007]. Lastly, since capturing
a memory image requires running code on an untrusted system, there is the possibility
that the results of the tool could be maliciously altered. Existing techniques have either
attempted to break the analysis process [Haruyama and Suzuki, 2012], or return false
data to the capture process [Bilby, 2006, Milkovic´, 2012]. Such techniques can be easily
detected however, as they will either break the analysis or cause a significant performance
impact during capture, revealing the presence of the attacks [Kornblum, 2006a]. While
the integrity and completeness of a memory image cannot always be guaranteed, it is
generally accepted that capturing a memory image is beneficial when compared to the
destruction of evidence caused by not capturing a memory image.
Although memory images are typically captured by running a software tool on the
target machine, other methods of capturing the contents of memory are possible. Research
into more secure hardware methods of capturing memory has been performed [Carrier
and Grand, 2004, Petroni et al., 2004], however like software-based approaches these were
found to be susceptible to malicious modification [Rutkowska, 2007]. If the target system
is a virtual machine, it is also possible to capture a snapshot of the contents of the target
system’s memory without interfering with the memory at all. Although such a technique
is ideal, it is of course only possible when virtualisation is involved.
Once techniques for successfully capturing the contents of memory were developed,
research shifted towards the analysis of that memory. One of the first discoveries made
was that information was capable of persisting in memory far longer than previously
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anticipated. Studies have shown that some data in memory is able to persist after the
parent process has been terminated, and depending on the type of data may persist
for days [Chow et al., 2005, Solomon et al., 2007]. Additionally, depending on the
system, it is also possible for data, such as previously run processes, to survive the reboot
process [Schuster, 2006b]. Such research demonstrated that memory forensics was not
only useful for determining the current state of the machine, but also able to infer aspects
of the past history of the machine as well.
2.2.2 Examination Techniques
The primary focus of early memory forensics work was the development of techniques that
essentially recreated live response tools for memory images. New ways in which memory
could benefit an investigation were not investigated, but rather development focused upon
improving the existing live response techniques by allowing reproducibility, the forensic
principle that live response was lacking.
The creation of these tools was stimulated by the 2005 Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (DFRWS) Challenge [DFRWS, 2005], which challenged respondents to find
evidence of intrusion in two memory images. Since at this time no tools existed that were
capable of achieving this, completing the challenge required respondents to implement
their own. This challenge produced two winning submissions, memparser [Betz, 2005] and
kntlist [Garner and Mora, 2005], which formed the very first analysis tools for memory
forensics.
Both of these tools recreated the functionality of the “ps” command for Windows,
producing a list of the running processes on the system. The memparser tool additionally
allowed the reconstruction of the virtual address space of a process, allowing traditional
techniques such as strings to be applied, while kntlist was capable of parsing the handle
table, allowing sockets and files used by processes to be found. While not a submission to
the DFRWS challenge, another tool named “Windows memory forensic toolkit” [Burdach,
2005] was also created around the same time, which achieved similar functionality to
memparser.
One of the advantages of such tools was that they allowed hooking-based rootkits,
such as Hacker Defender, to be detected [Kornblum, 2006a]. Hooking-based rootkits relied
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upon preventing access to evidence of malicious activity through the operating system,
such as hiding the existence of a file when viewing the contents of a folder. While these
techniques frustrated existing live response techniques, they did not prevent direct access
to the evidence, such as by parsing the contents of the folder from a disk image. As such,
by directly interpreting the contents of memory, the memory forensic tools were able to
detect the presence of these hooking-based rootkits.
These tools interpreted memory using a list-walking approach. List-walking approaches
essentially recreate the process the operating system uses to locate information, by parsing
data structures used by Windows and following the references to other data structures
until the desired information is located. This is similar to how the filesystem is parsed to
locate files on a disk.
While such list-walking techniques allow a wealth of information to be quickly and
easily located, they are reliant on the data structures having correct references. This
makes them susceptible to another malicious technique, known as direct kernel object
manipulation (DKOM), which hides evidence of malicious activity by removing the refer-
ences to that evidence. Such an approach is similar to hiding a file on disk by removing
the references to that file from the file system.
Overcoming techniques such as DKOM required a change in the way that information
was obtained from memory. In storage forensics, finding files that were not in the
filesystem was achieved with a technique known as file carving. File carving relied on
scanning the raw contents of the disk for file signatures, a pattern of bytes unique to a
particular type of file. These signatures were constructed such that when a match for a
signature was found, it indicated the presence of a file of that type at the current location
on disk. This allowed files to be located even if they were not in the file system. Applying
such carving techniques to memory allows data structures to be located even when no
references to that data structure exist, overcoming techniques such as DKOM.
The first tool to employ such an approach in memory analysis was PTfinder [Schuster,
2006b], which scanned a memory image to find data structures representing running
processes. PTfinder leveraged the fact that the kernel typically allocates and tracks its
data structures in special allocations called memory pools. Each data structure that is
placed in one of these pools is given a generic header, called the POOL HEADER, which
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contains metadata about the object being stored. The most useful part of this metadata
is the PoolTag, which is a 4 byte field containing a di erent magic value for each object
type. By scanning for the PoolTags of process and thread objects, and taking into account
the other constraints for the allocation of these objects, such as their alignment and the
values of fields, it allows process and thread objects to be carved from memory.
The use of this information present in memory but generally inaccessible to live
response techniques heralded the next phase in the advancement of memory forensics,
the focus on extracting useful kernel objects. Given that the memory pools were where
many of these kernel objects are located, they were the first source of analysis. Schuster
advanced upon his previous work with PTfinder by describing a generic approach that
could be used to create signatures for any pool object, giving the example of how to find
and attribute network socket objects [Schuster, 2006a].
Since one of the problems in attempting to create forensic tools for Windows was the
fact that no source code was available, the best available information source were the
debug symbol files. These symbol files contained information on data structures that
would be required by developers creating programs or drivers for Windows, to assist in
the debugging process, and were specific to each version of Windows. One of the first
tools to use these symbol files was FATKit [Petroni et al., 2006], which applied them to
memory such that an examiner could visually browse many of the kernel objects in memory
and script specific analysis tasks. However, since the focus of this tool was establishing
Linux compatibility through source code analysis, it still employed the same list-walking
techniques as live response but in a much more comprehensive fashion. A purely Windows-
focused successor to FATKit named Volatools [Walters and Petroni, 2007] was released
soon after, removing the visualization capabilities and instead focusing on providing a
reference implementation upon which to base further memory analysis.
While symbol files allowed many kernel data structures to be located, figuring out
how to use these objects was an ongoing issue. Since each object was responsible for
achieving a di erent task, each of these objects was subject to individual analysis. Stacks
were located and used to recreate a partial execution history of a process [Arasteh and
Debbabi, 2007]. File objects were used to locate memory-mapped files and extract
them [van Baar et al., 2008]. The registry’s layout in memory was determined and
2.2. MEMORY FORENSICS 31
used to facilitate traditional registry analysis [Dolan-Gavitt, 2008]. The objects used
in maintaining the clipboard were analysed [Okolica and Peterson, 2011]. Such kernel
objects were demonstrated to be capable of persisting for extended periods after execution
ends [Schuster, 2008]. The robustness of the signatures used to find these objects was also
examined, and the signatures used to find processes improved significantly over those used
in PTfinder [Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009].
While other attempts to create an all encompassing memory analysis framework
have been made [Okolica and Peterson, 2010], the successor to Volatools, known as
Volatility [Volatile Systems, 2011], has become the main vehicle for research. Many
recent contributions to memory forensics have been made as plugins for the Volatility
Framework, such as the techniques used to locate desktop related data structures such as
Windows Stations, Desktop Heaps and Desktop Objects [Ligh, 2012]. These particular
objects are used in the contribution described in Chapter 4
2.2.3 Memory Organization
While memory can potentially contain numerous important pieces of evidence that are
never stored on disk, such as encryption keys and the list of currently running programs,
extracting that evidence requires understanding the way in which memory is organized.
The di culty in locating and interpreting such information however is that the contents
of memory are largely undocumented. As the memory of one process is generally not
designed to be accessed by another, nor the internals of the operating system designed to
be accessed by processes on the system, maintaining such documentation for the purposes
of interoperability is not a concern. While this makes each process and operating system
free to use memory in their own way, and change the way they use memory at any point
in time, there are some low level memory features implemented in hardware that are
commonly used across modern systems, the most important of which is arguably virtual
memory.
Virtual memory is designed to provide each process running on the system with its
own address space, in order to isolate the process from other processes on the system.
This isolation prevents a process from reading or writing to the virtual memory of another
process, either accidentally or maliciously, unless it is specifically granted permission by
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Figure 2.1: Virtual Memory
the operating system. By allowing the kernel to be protected in this way, such a model
also prevented a single process from accidentally bringing down the whole system when
it crashed, as was possible with some earlier memory models.
Virtual memory also overcomes the issue of memory fragmentation, as although the
process is presented with a contiguous range of memory, the underlying physical memory
may not be contiguous. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.1.
While each process on the system owns its own virtual address space, not all of this
address space may be designated for use by the process. On Windows, each virtual address
space is divided into two halves, the lower half being where the process stores its code
and data, known as the user space, and the upper half being where the kernel stores its
code and data, known as the kernel space. While the user space portion of this memory
is unique to every process, the majority of the kernel space is identical between processes.
Since virtual memory potentially allows a system to present more memory than it
has available to processes on the system, this necessitates a method of dealing with the
scenario of when more memory is consumed than is physically available. This is achieved
by splitting memory into fixed sized chunks of 4096 bytes, known as pages, and only
keeping the most used pages in memory. The remaining pages are stored on disk, and
transparently swapped in and out of memory as required, such that whenever a page is
used it is in memory. While historically this process of moving data between disk and






















Figure 2.2: Address translation on the x86 architecture (4k, PAE) [Intel Corporation,
2013]
memory has been known as swapping, it has more recently become synonymous with the
term paging.
This leads us to the complex part of this process, being able to track which pages are
in memory, and being able to convert a virtual address used by a process into a physical
address such that the data can be retrieved. These aspects are achieved through the
use of a multi-level page table, which provides a mapping between virtual and physical
addresses. While the exact details of how this works varies depending on the computer
architecture, a diagram of this process for the x86 architecture with physical address
extension (PAE) enabled is shown in Figure 2.2. All modern versions of Windows utilise
PAE by default [Microsoft, 2012b], and for this reason only this translation process is
discussed.
The x86 architecture with PAE enabled uses a three-level page table system to convert
virtual addresses into physical addresses [Intel Corporation, 2013]. Although in x86 the
virtual address is only 32 bits, each entry in the tables associated with paging is 64 bits.
While this continues to limit the virtual address space of any process to 4GB, it allows
more than 4GB of physical memory to be supported. Since no consumer version of 32 bit
Windows supports more than 4GB of physical memory however, this means that these
extra bits introduced in the physical address will always be 0.
For a given virtual address, the process begins by checking the CR3 register of the
CPU, where the address to the page directory pointer table (PDPTE) is stored. The
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highest 2 bits of the virtual address are used as an index in the PDPTE to produce a
PDPTE value, of which bits 51:12 are used to locate the page directory. Once the page
directory has been located, bits 29:12 of the virtual address are used as an index into
the page directory to locate the page directory entry (PDE). Bits 51:12 of the PDE are
then used to locate the page table, and bits 20:12 of the virtual address used to locate the
page table entry (PTE). This PTE then provides the location of the physical page in bits
51:12, allowing bits 11:0 to be used as the o set into this page, producing the translated
physical address.
Although each of the entries in address translation are 64 bits, only 40 bits are ever
used in the translation process. The remaining bits are typically ignored or used to
store various flags. In the PTE for example, there are bits which control read and write
access, as well as whether the page is executable. Additionally, some of these bits can
change the flow of the translation process, such as indicate large pages or indicate that
the page is stored on disk. These flags within the PTE are used extensively in Chapter 4
to distinguish between code and data.
2.3 User Space Memory Analysis
User space memory analysis is the application of analysis techniques to the user space
portion of memory, where the code and data of a process is stored. Although it can be
seen that some of the research mentioned in Section 2.2.2 was branching into analysis of
the contents of user space, such as the stack and file analysis, the fundamental piece of
research that allowed the user space to be examined was Dolan-Gavitt’s research into the
Virtual Address Descriptor tree [Dolan-Gavitt, 2007]. This section details the existing
memory forensics research that deals with retrieving information from within user space
memory, such that the improvements to the field made in Chapter 3 can be seen.
2.3.1 Virtual Address Descriptors
The Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) Tree is the mechanism with which the Windows
memory manager tracks the memory used within the virtual address space of a process.
Such a mechanism exists because the kernel is responsible for creating, altering and
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Figure 2.3: An example of the VAD Tree for notepad.exe [Dolan-Gavitt, 2007]
removing any user space memory allocations, and keeping track of them is a necessary
requirement for achieving this. Each VAD describes a contiguous range of virtual address
space that has been allocated by the process, and these VADs are stored in a balanced
binary tree in kernel space memory.
At the very minimum, each VAD describes the start and end addresses of an allocation,
and the permissions with which it has been allocated. Although three di erent VAD data
structures exist, they all build o  this basic set of information, and di er only in the
level of detail they provide. For example, when an allocation represents a mapped file,
additional information in the VAD will allow the file details to be located. An example
of this is shown in Figure 2.3.1.
By providing the ability to parse the VAD Tree, Dolan-Gavitt [2007] allowed the
layout of allocations in user space memory as it was seen by the process to be determined.
Previously the only abstraction available was the analysis of the page directories and page
tables to determine whether a page had been mapped into memory. Additionally, in some
cases, the use of file objects allowed some inference as to the semantic meaning of that
allocation, which was not possible previously.
As the mapped files found via the VAD Tree included all loaded DLL files, this allowed
rootkits which performed DKOM on the list of loaded DLLs to be detected, such as
NTIllusion [Kdm, 2004]. The VAD itself however is also vulnerable to such DKOM
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attacks. Memory can be allocated and accessed, then the VAD entry removed from the
VAD Tree, without having an impact on the ability of the process to use that allocation.
Additionally, when a process exits, the link to the VAD tree is removed and the VAD
entries are unable to be recovered.
2.3.2 Existing Techniques
Although no existing research has specifically used the VAD Tree to attempt to understand
user space memory as a whole, there has been some research into understanding specific
artifacts contained within user space memory. These existing works can be split into two
categories, based on whether they focus on generic data structures used by all programs
or those used by specific programs.
The earliest research which allowed the location of user space data structures was the
Memparser tool [Betz, 2005]. This tool allowed the listing of the currently loaded modules
using the LDR MODULES linked list, and the location of the process parameters through
the Process Environment Block (PEB), all of which are located in the user space portion
of memory. Beyond this however, Memparser was only capable of dumping any of the
currently accessible pages within the user space memory of a process.
Arasteh and Debbabi [2007] used the user and kernel stacks to recreate the execution
history of a process, by attempting to connect stack frames to well known function calls.
As part of this research they presented a method with which to find the stacks of a
process, although the location of any other data structures was not the focus of their
research. They did however contribute an alternative method of finding the executable
of a process, through the use of a section object representing the memory mapped file of
the executable.
Other research has focused on the location of data structures created by applications,
such as encryption keys. Hejazi et al. [2009] analysed the API call traces on the stack
to attempt to find data structures of forensic interest. This approach however was
heavily limited by knowing in advance how this data was stored for that particular
API call, typically only achievable through significant reverse engineering e orts for each
individual API call. Although other research has attempted to find encryption keys in
memory, they have relied on scanning through the physical address space to locate data
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structures of interest [Halderman et al., 2008, Maartmann-Moe et al., 2009], rather than
limiting the search to address spaces of specific processes. By directing such searches
using the information supplied by the VAD, the search area of these approaches could be
significantly reduced.
The remaining research into user space has focused on the analysis of specific ap-
plications of forensic interest. Both Skype [Simon and Slay, 2010] and Pidgin [Simon
and Slay, 2011] have been studied for this purpose, in order to find information such as
chat logs. The analysis of Pidgin was performed by tracking the changes to individual
memory pages within the address space of Pidgin as the chat history was created. Such
an approach would have benefited through the use of the information in the VAD Tree,
as pages belonging to allocations known to be irrelevant, such as known DLL files, could
have been removed from the analysis process. Given the time required to perform the
analysis individual applications in this manner however, such an approach does not scale
to the range of potential applications that a target computer could be running.
The research up until this point has left a significant gap in the literature in terms
of generic methods of interpreting and examining the contents of user space memory.
Although the use of the VAD tree has allowed the layout of user space memory to be
determined, the usefulness of this layout has yet to be fully realised in the existing analysis
approaches. By making full use of the information contained within the VAD Tree,
significant improvements could be made to existing analysis techniques.
Additionally, the information within the VAD Tree could also be used to guide the
development of new analysis techniques. With current techniques it is di cult to establish
any information about a memory allocation other than its memory range and whether
it maps a file on disk. The capability to determine whether an allocation contains
code or data, or knowledge about the data structure that an allocation contains, would
significantly benefit attempts to locate useful information within the memory of a process.
This could assist an investigation either in the form of reduction techniques, to reduce the
search space for data of interest, or by providing information that facilitates the parsing
of specific allocations. An approach that achieves this is presented in Chapter 3.
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2.4 Code in Windows Memory
Detecting malware in memory, as discussed in Section 2.5 or assessing the integrity of
memory, as discussed in Section 2.6, are both methods of attempting to determine if any
unknown code has been executed on the system. Malware detection attempts to achieve
this by finding evidence of the unknown code, while verifying the integrity of memory
attempts to show that there is no evidence of unknown code. In order for either of these
approaches to work, they must understand the way in which known code on the system
operates. For this reason, this section describes the way in which code is normally loaded
into memory on a Windows system, and the protections that are in place to prevent
the exploitation of that code. This information is used extensively in the process of
discriminating between code and data as described in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 Portable Executables
Executable files on Windows are stored in what is known as the Portable Executable
(PE) format [Pietrek, 2002]. This format governs the way in which the code and data of
a program is stored both on disk and in memory. Once it is loaded into memory, the PE
format also dictates the permissions that are assigned to control access to that memory.
A PE file is comprised of several main parts, the header, the data directories, and the
sections. The header is responsible for defining the type of the PE, such as whether it is
for a 32-bit or 64-bit system, and storing information about the data directories. These
data directories are the main index into the various key data structures of the PE, such as
the functions that are imported and exported, the location of the Import Address Table
(IAT), the section directory, and the relocations directory.
The actual code and data of the PE file are stored in what are known as sections.
These sections are described by the section directory, which lists important information
such as their location, information about their contents, and the name of the section. The
most common two section names for a PE are the .text and the .data sections. The .text
section is typically where a program’s code is stored, and the .data section is typically
where a program’s data is stored. These section names however are completely arbitrary,
it is the flags of these sections that determine their properties. These flags include whether













Figure 2.4: Physical vs Virtual Layout of a PE File
the section contains data or code, whether it should be marked executable, and whether
it is needed after the program starts.
While PE files on disk and in memory are quite similar, their layout is di erent. On
disk, a PE file is stored according to its physical layout, which prioritizes using less disk
space. In memory however, the PE file is stored according to its virtual layout, which
prioritizes aligning di erent parts of the PE file to page boundaries. All the sections of
a PE file in memory are stored in a single allocation however, which means that that
allocation contains both code and data. The act of converting a PE from its physical
layout to its virtual layout when it is loaded into memory is one of the key tasks of the
Windows PE loader. An example of the di erence between physical and virtual layouts
is shown in Figure 2.4
In addition to transforming the layout of a PE file, the Windows PE loader also
performs two other important tasks, related to updating the contents of a PE file to
reflect the environment it has been loaded into [Russinovich and Solomon, 2005]. The
first of these is updating the IAT with the correct addresses of the functions imported
from other PE files, a process known as dynamic linking. While the IAT is typically filled
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with default values for the locations of these functions, these may be incorrect due to the
version of the PE the function is imported from being di erent, or the location at which
the imported PE has been loaded being di erent than what was expected. In order for
the PE to execute correctly, these import addresses will require updating.
The second of these tasks is the processing of relocations to update internal pointers
within the PE to reflect the address at which the PE has been loaded. While a PE file
has what is known as a preferred base address, an address at which the PE expects to
be loaded, a PE may be forced to load at a di erent address. This load address could be
di erent because something has already been allocated at the preferred base address, or
because it has been intentionally changed to help prevent exploitation as described later
in Section 2.4.2. While the internal pointers of a PE are initialised after compilation to be
correct for when the PE is loaded at its preferred base address, if it is loaded at a di erent
address these pointers require updating. PE files that support being loaded at a di erent
address will have what is known as a relocation directory, which is a list of pointers that
require updating, and defines how each of them should be modified. In order for the PE
to execute correctly, each of these relocations will need to be processed.
Once the Windows PE loader has mapped the PE file into memory according to its
virtual layout, and the imports and relocations have been processed, execution of the PE
can begin. The loading of PE files into memory covers all the standard ways in which
code can be executed on a Windows system, including executable files, DLL files and
drivers. Any other code that is executed by the system can be put under three di erent
categories, interpreted code, self-modifying code, and injected code.
Interpreted code is when instructions are not given in the assembly code understood by
the CPU, but in some other format that is converted to assembly code as it is executed.
This conversation may involve the use of techniques such as just-in-time compilation,
which compiles the code into assembly as it is executed, or the use of a virtual machine,
which performs assembly instructions based on the code provided. Regardless of the
technique used, it results in the actual code being executed not being stored as a PE file,
requiring it to be stored elsewhere in the address space.
JIT code occurs when instructions to be executed are not given in the assembly code
understood by the CPU, but in some other format that is capable of being converted into
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assembly code. A common example of such interpreted code are programming languages
such as .NET and Java, which take higher-level code and convert it to assembly for
execution on the fly. Since the code to execute is not stored as a PE file, the converted
assembly code to execute must be stored elsewhere in the address space.
Self-modifying code occurs when a process modifies its own code after loading, such
that the code stored on disk and in memory end up being di erent. Such techniques
are typically employed to hinder attempts at reverse engineering the program, whether
to prevent piracy or prevent analysis of malware. These techniques, such as obfuscation
and encryption, typically result in the new code replacing the existing code in memory,
or result in the actual code being written to another section of the PE defined for that
purpose. Programs known as “packers” exist to automate the inclusion of such techniques
in existing executables, producing a “packed” executable that contains the self-modifying
code.
The last category of non-PE code is code that has been injected into the address
space of the process. Such injected code is typically written into its own allocation, and
is designed to replace or supplement the existing functionality of the process. While
often such injection is performed maliciously, it is also possible for such injection to occur
legitimately, such as to provide a patch to legacy software, as part of anti-virus software
or for the purposes of intrusion detection.
2.4.2 Protection Mechanisms
The act of exploiting a piece of software is entirely reliant on being able to cause the
software in question to execute code that it was not designed to execute. Conventionally
this has been achieved by abusing memory corruption in a predictable way to write
executable code, known as shellcode, into the address space of the vulnerable process, and
then switching the control flow of the process to execute that malicious code. Depending
on the nature of the memory corruption vulnerability, this shellcode may end up being
stored on the stack, on the heap, or at an arbitrary location within memory.
Windows operating systems since XP Service Pack 2 (SP2), aim to prevent the
execution of such shellcode in two di erent ways, through permissions and layout ran-
domization. The first technique is designed to stop the shellcode from executing at all,
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and the second is designed to stop the shellcode executing in a reliable manner. These
techniques influence the way in which code is loaded within Windows, which are taken
into account by the contributions described in Chapters 4 and 5.
Memory Permissions
Windows employs memory permissions at two di erent levels, at the allocation level and at
the page level. Although at first glance it may seem as though these two sets of permission
values serve the same purpose, this is in fact not the case. Allocation level permissions
are used by Windows to model the way in which permissions should be allocated, while
the page level permissions are used to actually implement these permissions in a way that
is respected by the processor.
Allocation level permissions are achieved through the use of a Protection field in the
VAD that represents an allocation. There are four main types of permissions that an
allocation can typically have, which are read, write, write-copy and execute. As the
names suggest, read and write permissions determine whether the process has permission
to read the contents of that allocation, and permissions to make changes to the contents
of that allocation. Read permissions are typically given to all allocations except for some
created by the kernel in user space, and write permissions are typically given when an
allocation contains data that will change over the course of the program’s execution, such
as a heap or a stack.
Write-copy is a special permission typically used for the PE files loaded by a process.
To save on memory usage, Windows typically maps PE files into memory as shared
memory, such that the same PE can be loaded into multiple address spaces at once.
However, as previously described, that PE file may require modifications to correctly
execute in the address space of that process. This is where the write-copy permissions
come in, as this instructs the Windows memory manager to watch for any changes to pages
within those allocations, and instead of making these changes directly, copy the page to
a new location in memory and make the changes there. This mechanism minimizes the
amount of memory used for shared code and data, as only pages that are di erent from
the original ever occur in memory more than once. Only legitimately loaded PE files
typically use this permission, which makes them instantly distinctive compared to any
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other allocations.
The execute permission determines whether code located in this allocation should be
able to be executed by the processor. This permission is designed to only be granted
to allocations containing code, such that allocations containing data are not marked
executable. Since early memory corruption vulnerabilities relied on writing shellcode
to the stack or heap and executing the code from there, the lack of execute permission on
the stack or heap was designed to prevent the shellcode from executing.
The issue with such allocation level permissions however is that by themselves, they do
not influence the access to memory by the processor itself, only the page level permissions
are able to do this. Instead, Windows uses these allocation level permissions as the model
in which page level permissions should be applied. This means that an allocation without
executable permissions should not have executable pages, and an allocation without write
permissions should not have writable pages.
Page level permissions in the x86 architecture are implemented at the hardware level,
and directly influence the ability of the processor to access a memory page. Traditionally,
these permissions only included read and write permissions, which could be used to prevent
any non-privileged code from having read or write access to the page. These permissions
were stored as flags in the Page Table Entry (PTE) that described that page.
Recently however the NX (Never eXecute) bit has been introduced into the x86
architecture, which allows executable permissions to be assigned at the page level, and
enforced at the hardware level. This permission flag, like the read and write permissions,
is stored as one bit of the PTE. However, for this bit to exist in the PTE, Physical Address
Extension (PAE) mode must be enabled. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, this changes the
page tables to use 64 bit PTEs, and has been supported in Windows since Windows XP
SP2 [Microsoft, 2006].
The use of page level execute permissions allows a granular approach to preventing
unwanted execution. Having permissions on a per page basis is particularly important
when dealing with PE files, as they are typically a combination of code and data pages
within the one allocation. Through the use of the NX bit, the data pages within a loaded
PE can be marked not executable, and the code pages can be marked executable, such
that the permissions mirror those listed in the sections of the PE file on disk. This allows
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the prevention of attacks that target the data sections as the location of shellcode, as with
the introduction of the NX bit, the execution of such shellcode can be prevented.
Windows calls the use of the NX bit in its operating system Hardware Data Execution
Prevention (DEP), which is turned on by default in modern versions of Windows. The
success of the NX bit however relies on its correct use by the operating system and its
processes. If a process continues to use permissions incorrectly, such as unnecessarily
marking allocations executable, or sections of the PE as executable, the NX bit will
not be able to provide any protection from malicious execution. Such incorrect use of
permissions is typically seen with legacy applications, some of which actually require
DEP to be disabled to run correctly. As such, the e ectiveness of page level permissions
in preventing malicious execution is directly tied to the correct usage of permissions by
the operating systems and its processes.
Layout Randomization
Although the correct use of executable permissions prevents the exploitation of vulner-
abilities such as bu er overflows using traditional shellcoding techniques, exploitation
techniques have evolved to overcome these hurdles. Through the use of what is known as
Return-Orientated Programming (ROP), shellcode is able to be created and executed on
the target system despite having correct executable permissions.
ROP, first seen in the return-into-libc attack [Nergal, 2001, Solar Designer, 1997],
works by finding what are known as gadgets within the address space of a process. These
gadgets are small chunks of assembly code that perform a small task, such as copying
the value of one register to another or writing a value to a location in memory, and then
return. Such gadgets are typically found at the end of existing functions, and through the
location of enough of these gadgets it allows the dynamic construction of the shellcode
in memory and its subsequent execution. This is typically achieved by constructing the
shellcode at a known location in memory, calling a function to change the permissions
of the allocation containing the shellcode to allow execution, and then executing the
shellcode as with previous techniques.
ROP sidesteps execute permissions by using data, such as stack frames, to control the
calls to gadgets, rather than attempting to execute code directly. However, it can be seen
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that the use of such ROP techniques requires knowing the location of these gadgets to
use in advance. For this reason, modern operating systems have seen the introduction of
a technique known as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR).
ASLR works by randomising the location at which allocations are created, such that
they are di erent every time the process is executed. These allocations include all
allocations made within the user space of a process, such as the location of PE files, stacks
and heaps, and this randomization can extend to parts of the kernel in kernel space as
well. This frustrates ROP by changing the location at which the required gadgets are
loaded in the address space of the process, making the exploitation process significantly
more di cult.
Such randomization however relies on the PE file being able to support being loaded at
a di erent address. While relocations are specifically designed for this purpose, sometimes
a PE may be missing such relocation data, or the address of various resources required by
the program may be hardcoded. Sometimes, the PE has simply not been recompiled to
state that it supports ASLR. This prevents ASLR from being used on the PE, allowing
ROP techniques to exploit the fact that the PE will always be loaded at the same address.
Although it is possible to overcome the use of ASLR in some instances, most current
exploits rely on abusing a loaded PE which does not support ASLR.
2.5 Malware Detection in Memory
Performing malware detection on a memory image rather than a live machine overcomes
the weakness inherent with the live response approach. Firstly, the creation of a memory
capture has been shown to have a lower impact on the target system than live response,
increasing the integrity of the evidence [Walters and Petroni, 2007]. Secondly, the contents
of a memory image have been shown to be more resistant to malicious modification than
the output of a live response tool [Kornblum, 2006a]. Lastly, since a memory image is
a snapshot of the state of the system at a particular point in time, it allows any results
obtained from the image to be easily reproduced. As such, using memory analysis is a
preferable method to detect malware from a forensic perspective. This section describes
rootkit techniques and the existing artifact based detection techniques used in memory





Figure 2.5: Using DKOM to unlink a process from the list of running processes
forensics, to illustrate why more generic detection approaches are required.
2.5.1 Rootkits
While originally the term rootkit meant a collections of tools to use after exploiting a
system [Kruegel et al., 2004], the term has now come mean the use of techniques to
hide the presence of malicious software from the system itself. The earliest rootkits hid
a process from a system by replacing the existing tools on the system with tools that
were modified to hide the process in question. Modern rootkits however employ a variety
of techniques, which can be distilled down to whether they involve direct kernel object
manipulation (DKOM) or hooking.
DKOM is the process of hiding data by direct manipulation of certain key data
structures [Butler, 2004]. An example of one of these key data structures is the list
of running processes, which is implemented using a double-linked list. By using DKOM,
one can unlink a process from this list, as shown in Figure 2.5. Such a technique allows the
process to be hidden from any list-walking tools, such as those employed in live response
and in early memory forensics.
While this makes DKOM a very powerful tool to hide the presence of malicious
software, it can be overcome through the use of scanning techniques, such as those
employed by PTFinder [Schuster, 2006b]. However, such scanning techniques rely on the
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robustness of the signatures used, as more sophisticated DKOM can attempt to subvert
the signatures used. Such techniques were demonstrated to be possible by Dolan-Gavitt
et al. [Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009] in regards to process data structures.
The other common rootkit technique employed is the process of hooking. While
hooking can be achieved in a number of ways, it works by placing an extra processing
step in between an existing chain of function calls in order to remove any malicious
evidence [Ries, 2006]. An example of the potential places a hook can be placed to hide
a file is shown in Figure 2.6. By altering the data returned at any of these points, any
evidence of a malicious file can be removed from the results, making it appear as though
it does not exist. Such an approach can be applied to any information returned by the
system. Although such hooks can be placed in user space, they are more often performed
in kernel space, as the further down the call chain the hook is, the more di cult it is to
detect.
As such techniques hide any evidence of malicious activity typically found by querying
the operating system, they are capable of subverting most live response tools. Although
a live response tool may be more sophisticated and be capable of interpreting raw binary
data to obtain its results, it generally still has to rely on the operating system in some
way in order to obtain that raw data, making it susceptible to hooking.
Techniques employed by malware are able to classified into four types based on how
they interact with the system, using the stealth malware taxonomy proposed by Rutkowska
[2006]. Type 0 is when a technique uses only operating system features, type I is when a
technique modifies static resources, type II is when dynamic resources are modified, and
type III is when a hypervisor is employed. The majority of rootkit techniques fall under
type I, the modification of static resources such as code, or type II, the modification of
dynamic resources such as dynamic data. While under this taxonomy DKOM will always
be type II as it involves modifying dynamic data, hooking can either be type I or type II,
depending on how the hook is actually implemented.
2.5.2 Artifact Detection
Current techniques to detect the presence of malware in memory however rely heavily
on the location of specific artifacts, created as a result of the use of a specific malware
















































Figure 2.6: Potential locations to hook a call to FindNextFile [Ries, 2006]
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technique. Such an approach follows the rootkit paradox, the fact that for a system to
execute the malware, the malware must be visible to the system in some way [Kornblum,
2006a]. The di culty of such an approach however, is that these artifacts that are visible
to the system can be quite diverse, making their correct interpretation an instance of
the complexity problem. Additionally, since the malicious techniques used are always
changing, there is always the possibility of new techniques being developed for which the
same artifacts are not visible.
The Volatility Framework [Volatile Systems, 2011] provides a number of plugins that
are each designed to detect the presence of a single artifact of a particular approach. These
include plugins to detect the artifacts of hooking, such as apihooks and idt, which scan
for hooks to Windows API calls and the interrupt descriptor table respectively, as well
as plugins to detect DKOM, such as psxview, which scans for running processes using
a variety of techniques. The use of each of these plugins requires significant technical
knowledge to understand the output of each plugin, as well as the time investment in
running each plugin and analysing its results.
The most generic of the malware detection tools in Volatility is the malfind plu-
gin [Ligh, 2009], which searches for evidence of injected code. For any injected code
it detects, it outputs a disassembly of the beginning of the allocation, to allow the
investigator to decide whether it is actually code or not. While this plugin works quite well
for detecting code injection, it relies on the single artifact of the code being injected into
an allocation containing both execute and write permissions. While these are certainly the
most common permissions associated with injected code, they are not the only permissions
such an allocation can take. This makes malfind reliant on detecting artifacts of crudely
injected code, as code that is able to inject and execute malicious code without such
suspicious permissions has been around longer than malfind itself [Keong, 2004].
One of the small number of the commercial tools available that performs memory
analysis is Redline from Mandiant [Mandiant, 2012]. Redline di ers from Volatility in
that it is designed as a complete incident response tool, capable of taking in factors from
other sources such as the disk and registry during analysis. As such, while it is capable
of analysing memory captures in isolation like Volatility, many of its features rely on
additional information that would be provided by its associated collection tool.
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Malware detection is achieved through two di erent techniques, using the Malware
Risk Index (MRI) and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). The MRI is a list of generic
rules that are designed to be indicative of potential malicious behaviour. Redline uses the
MRI to give each process a score out of 100 that determines how suspicious that process
is. The rules defined by default by the MRI can be very generic, such as the process
was run from the command line, or the process has a handle open to another process,
leading to the majority of the results being false positives. A clean Windows 7 system
for example lists 4 processes being highly suspicious, and a further 19 being somewhat
suspicious. This system also relies on defining whether various artifacts, such as open
handles, are trusted or untrusted. While these trust values are automatically populated,
they can be refined during analysis by the investigator, which causes the MRI scores to be
recalculated. The MRI rules themselves are also able to be redefined by the investigator,
although this appears limited to only tweaking existing types of rules rather than adding
new ones.
The second way in which malware is detected through Redline is using IOCs. An
IOC is a series of predefined rules that dictates the artifacts left behind as a result of
infection with a particular piece of malware. These IOCs are designed such that once one
computer within an organisation has been discovered to be infected, an IOC can be created
and other machines within the organisation can be quickly tested for the same artifacts.
IOCs however are by design highly specific to individual artifacts, particularly those that
are easily changed by malware authors, such as file MD5s and names of mutexes, and
largely focus on disk-related artifacts. Such an approach essentially limits analysis to
the identification of commonly known malware, as it is incapable of locating evidence of
sophisticated or novel attacks.
HBGary’s Responder tool [HBGary, 2012] is the other commercially available tool
that provides memory forensics, although it di ers quite significantly in its approach to
detecting malware. Instead of locating the artifacts of techniques such as code injection
in memory, it attempts to locate the artifacts of these techniques in the code stored in
memory. As such, using what HBGary call DigitalDNA, traditional static code analysis
techniques are employed to the code in memory, allowing issues that previously plagued
such approaches such as obfuscation and packing to be e ectively sidestepped. The result
of this analysis is a series of behavioural traits of the code, such as that it performs code
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injection, or that it employs keylogging-like techniques.
Being able to e ectively produce these behavioural traits however relies on the follow-
ing of two key assumptions. The first is that the code is stored in memory in a way that is
known to require analysis by the tool, such as injected code. The second is that the code
is able to be correctly disassembled and then interpreted by the tool. If a piece of malware
were able to break either of these assumptions, such as by limiting the decryption of the
code to only the routines currently running, then the malware would be able to subvert
the analysis process. Additionally, if the technique employed in code was one that had
not been encountered before, it may not be detected by the analysis process.
While the way in which analysis is performed di ers greatly between each tool, the
way in which they attempt to detect malware is the same. Each tool looks for specific
artifacts or signatures that are indicators of malware techniques, whether that be using
data or code in memory. While the commercial tools attempt to reduce the knowledge
requirements for achieving such analysis, the end result is that all tools are heavily reliant
on being able to discover what malware has done previously, not what malware could do
in the future.
This has left a significant gap in the existing works in terms of generic approaches
to malware detection, approaches that will work irrespective of the individual techniques
employed by the malware. One way of approaching this problem would be to identify the
memory that does not contain malware, such that only memory potentially containing
malware remains. This would significantly reduce the amount of memory requiring manual
analysis, reducing the possibility that evidence of malicious techniques would be missed.
An approach that achieves this by discriminating between known and unknown code is
presented in Chapter 5.
2.6 Memory Integrity Validation
As discussed in Section 2.1.5, identifying known artifacts on disk using hashing is a
commonly used technique within storage forensics, particularly in regards to filtering
approaches. The application of such techniques to memory however has seen limited
attention, due to the way in which the content of memory is not static as on disk. Such
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approaches have relied on applying existing hashing techniques to memory in novel ways,
and have resulted in varying levels of success.
2.6.1 Hashing Techniques
In terms of disk forensics, the most commonly used hashing functions are those that are
classed as cryptographic hashes. These hashes provide three features that are useful in
disk forensics. Firstly, they are deterministic, as the same input will produce the same
output. Secondly, they are collision resistant, as it is di cult to find two inputs with the
same output. Lastly, they exhibit the avalanche e ect, as a small change in the input
will produce significant change in the output. These features of cryptographic hashes
have made them very useful in disk forensics, and are commonly employed to check the
integrity of files and the presence of known files. Which particular hashing algorithm is
used for this purpose is typically not important, as long as it adequately fulfills these
three features.
There do exist however, a class of algorithms known as similarity hashes, that are
designed to expand upon cryptographic hashes to provide a method to determine how
di erent two pieces of data are based solely upon the hash output. Such similarity hashes
include ssdeep [Kornblum, 2006b] and sdhash [Roussev, 2010]. These algorithms are
e ective at providing a measure of how close two pieces of data are, without requiring
the pieces of data to be present during the comparison process, making them ideal when
dealing with large data sets.
Ideally, such algorithms would be able to be used to locate code in memory from their
versions on disk, without specifically accounting for the di erences between them. In
practice however, aspects such as paging prevent such an approach from working. Even
when attempting to hash in memory versions of the code however, the issue is that such
algorithms are essentially an approximation, as it is not possible to see aspects such
as which parts of the two pieces of data do not match. While this makes them ideal
in scenarios such as finding di erent versions of a document, the lack of being able to
determine how the files have changed makes them unsuitable in other purposes, such as
verifying the integrity of data.
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2.6.2 Memory Hashing
Some attempts have been made to utilise hashes in memory however. The first of these
was a tool to filter out known pieces of memory from a memory image created by Walters
et al. [2008]. This tool focused exclusively on code, and was composed of two parts, one
to build the hashes, and one to test the hashes against the memory image.
Building the hashes was achieved by taking PE files, such as those on the disk of the
machine in question, and processing them to build hashes for each page of the PE as
it would occur in memory. This process took into account many of the aspects of the
Windows PE loader, the behaviour of which was described in Section 2.4.1. In order to
overcome the parts of the PE that change in memory, such as the relocations and the IAT,
each hash was stored in conjunction with a list of locations that needed to be normalized
in order to achieve the correct hash value for that page of the PE. This allowed hashing
to occur by taking a page, normalizing the appropriate locations and then hashing the
page.
The limitation with this approach however was the way in which these hashes were
tested against the memory image. Attempts at hashing were made linearly across physical
memory and did not take into account virtual address space layout. Each page of physical
memory was tested against each hash value in the hash set. Since each potential hash
value required changing di erent parts of the page however, each hash had to be tested
individually, making the approach scale poorly with both memory size and hash set size.
Each page was also only marked “known”, “zero” or “other”, as information about which
file the hash belonged to was not recorded. Additionally, since calculating each hash
e ectively meant ignoring parts of the actual data, this led to an increased possibility
of false positives, particularly if a large number of changes were required. The results
of this approach were also less than expected, with only 5% of the contents of memory
“known” or “zero” for a 2GB memory image. The various limitations with the application
of these hashes, in particular the potential for false positives, limits the usefulness of this
approach.
Another approach to using hashes of memory has been used on running systems to
verify running code [Oerting et al., 2010]. This approach took the PE files from in memory
and reverted the changes made by the PE loader to compare them directly to their
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counterparts on disk. Such an approach is only applicable on a live system as it requires
access to the relocations of the PE while it is running, and such information is typically
discarded from memory after the PE is loaded. Since it is running on a live system,
such an approach is also susceptible to malicious modification, both of the contents of the
memory it attempts to access and the contents of the files on disk it compares the memory
to. Additionally, since this approach simply compares the contents of disk to memory, it
is incapable of detecting the addition of new malicious files on disk which are then loaded
into memory. As this approach is intended to be implemented by the operating system, it
is also reliant on the code to verify being loaded through the appropriate operating system
interface, making it unable to detect injected code. This limits the integrity verification
that can be achieved with this approach.
A similar approach was taken by another tool, known as the System Virginity Verifier
(SVV) [Rutkowska, 2005], which is designed to output an indication of whether the system
can be trusted. SVV runs on a live system and compares the code sections of executable
files on disk to the code sections of system DLLs and drivers in memory, in order to verify
the integrity of the code stored in memory. As with the previous approach, it uses the
information from the PE on disk in order to allow the modification of either the code on
disk or in memory to a state with which one can be compared to the other. This makes
the SVV su er from the same limitations as the last approach, in that the access of the
tool to memory or disk can be maliciously altered to subvert analysis. Hooking access to
the disk can prevent new malicious files on disk from being detected, and hooking memory
access can prevent injected code from being detected. Additionally, this technique limited
itself to focusing on determining how trustworthy the kernel was, ignoring the contents
of user space memory. As with the last approach, these weaknesses limit the amount of
integrity verification that can be achieved with this tool.
The last approach to using hashes in memory has focused on the reconstruction of the
files in memory to create versions as they would be on disk. This approach, known as
MemD5 [Butler and Murdock, 2011], exploits the Image Section Object data structures
to be able to combine the contents of memory and the page file to reconstruct the file as it
would exist on disk. As this approach is only concerned with rebuilding the file however,
it is not applicable to PE files, but only files that are simply mapped into memory for use,
such as documents and images. While this potentially allows the ability to locate known
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data files in memory, it cannot be used to determine the integrity of any code running on
the system.
As can been seen from the existing approaches, no one technique is capable of deter-
mining the known and unknown code present in memory. This limits their usefulness in
any attempts to reduce the amount of memory requiring analysis, or highlight any memory
that has been suspiciously altered. The most successful technique requires the tool to be
part of the operating system itself, which e ectively prohibits its use in forensic scenarios.
This has left a gap in the literature for techniques which are capable of identifying known
and unknown code in memory, in particular a technique able to be used in traditional
forensic scenarios. A technique which achieves this is detailed in Chapter 5.
2.7 Summary
Memory forensics has proven itself to be an invaluable tool for the extraction of useful
evidence from physical memory. Advancements in memory forensics have allowed access
to and the recovery of certain types of key forensic information that are never stored
on disk, such as encryption keys and network sockets. Such analysis has typically been
achieved through a focus on the recovery of specific data structures, particularly those
defined by the kernel.
The focus on the kernel however has left user space memory for the most part unex-
plored, making it di cult to analyse the memory of a process running on the system.
Attempts to recover data from specific programs has required reverse engineering of
program behaviour, rather than exploitation of the information available in user space
memory. Being able to identify the common components of user space memory would
reduce the amount of the memory requiring analysis in order to find key data structures.
A method of achieving this is described in Chapter 3
Having a better understanding of user space memory would also limit the ways in
which unknown code such as malware could hide in the context of a process. Current
techniques to locate malware in memory are heavily focused on the detection of specific
artifacts, and limited by not completely understanding the way in which memory works
on the Windows operating system. The lack of such understanding thereby prevents any
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generic approaches to malware detection, as there is no established model of operation
from which malicious deviations can be observed. To facilitate the development of such
generic techniques, a method of discriminating between code and data is presented in
Chapter 4, which is later used extensively in Chapter 5.
The di culties of understanding memory has also led to the frustration of tools investi-
gating the code within memory. While the underlying basis of each of the techniques have
been sound, the way in which they have been applied to memory has been suboptimal.
This has led to numerous limitations in the success of each tool, which has prevented their
widespread use. Being able to successfully discriminate between known and unknown
code would significantly reduce the amount of memory requiring analysis, particularly in
investigations involving malware. A technique that achieves this is presented in Chapter 5
These deficiencies highlighted in this literature review have guided the contributions
that are described in the rest of this work.
Chapter 3
Surveying User Space Memory
As shown in Section 2.3.2, the techniques used to analyse the user space memory of a
process are limited. Although a method of determining the layout of user space memory
is available, it has not been utilized in any analysis techniques. Current techniques of
recovering data from a process require the reverse engineering of that process, instead of
using the information already within user space memory. This has left the contents of
user space memory for the most part unexplored.
This chapter introduces a theory of operation for the common structural components of
user space memory, which allows the creation of a model which identifies and distinguishes
allocations containing these components. This is achieved through the use of metadata
created as a result of normal Windows operation. Exploitation of this information allows
the model to describe the contents of a significant percentage of user space memory,
addressing the gap in the literature identified in Section 2.3.2. The contribution made by
this chapter has been used extensively in the development of the contributions described
in Chapters 4 and 5.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 provides a broad overview of why
such a model is needed and how it was achieved. Section 3.2 introduces the concept of
user allocations upon which this model is based. Section 3.3 describes the ways in which
the metadata in memory can be used to identify the common structural components.
Section 3.4 outlines the implementation of this theory of operation as a Volatility
plugin. Section 3.5 evaluates the e ectiveness of this approach in describing the contents
of user space memory, showing it significantly improves upon existing approaches. The
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implications of these results are discussed in Section 3.6. Two example applications of
this approach to scenarios of forensic relevance are presented in Section 3.7. The chapter
is then concluded in Section 3.8.
3.1 Introduction
Memory forensics provides a valuable way of analysing the contents of physical memory,
in order to obtain transient information that would not necessarily be present on disk.
Previous research in this area has focused on understanding and interpreting the layout
and contents of the kernel portion of memory, in order to facilitate the development
of memory analysis tools that recreate the capabilities of previously used live response
tools. While this work has been invaluable, allowing the examination of processes, drivers,
network sockets and other useful artifacts, it has not been taking into account the full
picture.
Previous research has focused almost exclusively on the data the operating system
itself is using, not the data of the user applications running on that operating system.
As a result, the common structural components used by these applications have not been
examined, resulting in a lack of methodologies for understanding and interpreting the
allocations containing application data. Without such methods, it is not possible to
extract useful information from the memory of an application, such as user credentials
and chat logs, without first undertaking significant reverse engineering of the application
itself.
Understanding the contents of an application’s memory without reverse engineering
requires a model for how user space memory operates, such that the behaviour behind
the creation of forensic artifacts in memory can be inferred. This chapter presents such
a model, by using the Virtual Address Descriptors (VADs) proposed by previous re-
search [Dolan-Gavitt, 2007] to identify all memory allocations in use. The purpose of these
allocations is then determined using numerous sources of kernel and user space metadata.
This theory of operation and subsequent model presented are based on extensive analysis
of both the Windows XP SP3 32-bit and Windows 7 SP1 32-bit operating systems and
their inner workings. Unless otherwise stated, all findings apply to both of the operating
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systems being studied.
3.2 User Allocations
Each process within Windows has its own virtual address space, and this virtual address
space is divided into two parts, the user space, and the kernel space [Russinovich and
Solomon, 2005]. As the names suggest, the user space is where user application code and
data is stored, and the kernel space is where code and data used by the kernel is stored.
Windows manages the use of user space memory by allocating memory in chunks of
contiguous virtual address space ranges, which have been termed user allocations. The
memory ranges which these user allocations occupy are described within a process by
Virtual Address Descriptors (VADs). These VADs are stored in a self balancing binary
tree, and each time a new user allocation is made, a new VAD is added to the tree to
describe the memory ranges used by that allocation [Russinovich and Solomon, 2005].
These user allocations are the highest level of abstraction possible within the user space
of a process, and serve as a suitable framework within which to further explore the user
space. An experiment to verify the suitability of VADs for locating these user allocations
is described in Section 3.5.1.
While previous work by Dolan-Gavitt [2007] has shown how these user allocations
can be identified, techniques to determine the purpose of these allocations, such as those
containing common structural components, have been limited. Knowing the roles of
these user allocations makes it possible to determine which allocations are relevant in a
particular line of inquiry. For example, if the value of a user variable is the goal of the
examination, knowledge of where the application data is stored would significantly reduce
the number of allocations requiring analysis. Without such knowledge, all the allocations
used by the application would require analysis, including allocations which are not even
relevant to the execution of the program.
Table 3.1 provides a comparison of which common structural components of a process
have been identified by previous research, and those newly identified in this research.
The next section is dedicated to describing how each of these new components can be
identified.
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Existing Research This Research
Mapped Files Sections
Process Parameters (XP) Environment (XP)
Stacks Heaps
Process Environment Block Heap Segments








Table 3.1: Common structural components capable of being identified and distinguished
3.3 User Allocation Metadata
In order to identify previously unidentified structural components within user space,
references to these components had to be located. Although several previously identified
data structures were used for this purpose, previous research had not interpreted the
significance of many of the fields of these data structures. Through the analysis of these
data structures, the metadata within these structures was able to be located, allowing the
identification of additional common structural components.
These metadata sources can be divided based on whether they exist in the kernel space
or the user space. Each of these metadata sources can be located from an EPROCESS
structure, the data structure Windows uses to represent a process. The fields of an
EPROCESS structure relevant to finding these metadata sources are shown in Figure 3.1.
Each process will have a single instance of each of these data structures, and the infor-
mation that can be obtained from each of them is described in this section. Unless
otherwise stated, the information about these metadata sources has been determined
through manual analysis of Windows systems.









Figure 3.1: Overview of metadata sources
3.3.1 Kernel Space Metadata Sources
The first source of metadata for a user allocation is of course the VAD that describes
that allocation. A diagram of the information that can be located from a VAD and its
related data structures is shown in Figure 3.2. The MMVAD data structure and the data
structures it connects to provides up to four pieces of metadata about an allocation.
The first is the memory range of the allocation, of which the StartingVpn and End-
ingVpn give the lower and upper bounds. The second is the permissions of that user
allocation, given in the Protection field of the MMVAD FLAGS object contained within
the u field. These permission values can take on a variety of values, and are defined within
WinNT.h.
The third piece of metadata is whether there is a pointer in the ControlArea field. If
there is a valid pointer, the allocation is a mapped allocation, meaning that it exists in
more than one address space. These multiple address spaces could be the user and kernel
portions of the same address space, or multiple virtual address spaces. When there is no
pointer, this indicates the allocation is private, and only exists within this address space.
The last piece of metadata is the FilePointer field in the CONTROL AREA of
mapped allocations. If a valid reference to a FILE OBJECT exists in this field, this
indicates that the allocation represents a mapped file, as identified by Dolan-Gavitt [2007].
A mapped file indicate that the memory allocation contains a file from on disk, and the
FileName field of the related FILE OBJECT provides the full location of this file on













Figure 3.2: Information found from a single VAD
disk.
When an allocation is mapped and does not represent a mapped file, it typically
represents a section. Sections are the mechanism used by Windows in order to manage
memory that is shared between two or more processes. Unlike file objects however, there
is no way to locate the section object for an allocation starting from the VAD, another
source of information must be used.
Identifying section objects can be achieved by parsing the Object Manager, the part of
Windows responsible for managing the creation and deletion of kernel objects [Russinovich
and Solomon, 2005]. Although each process contains a reference to the object handle tables
for the kernel objects in use by that process, locating section objects requires parsing the
object handle tables for every process. This is due to the fact that the process that created
the section may be di erent to the process currently being examined.
Each section object takes the form of SECTION OBJECT. Although this data struc-
ture contains a variety of fields, only one of these is used to link a section to an allocation.
This field is the Segment field, which although the Windows symbol files indicate should
point to a SEGMENT OBJECT, in fact points to a SEGMENT instead.
A SEGMENT is a data structure that operates in tandem with a CONTROL AREA
to manage a mapped allocation. While a control area is responsible for tracking how many
address spaces an allocation has been mapped to, a segment is responsible for tracking
the page table entries used by a mapped allocation. These page table entries are tracked















Figure 3.3: Finding shared memory
so that for each address space a mapped allocation exists in, the same physical pages of
memory are always used. As each of these data structures require the other in order to
operate, they each contain a reference to the other.
This reference to the other object in the control area and segment pair is what allows a
section object to be linked to an allocation. The VAD of an allocation and a section object
can be shown to reference the same control area and segment pair, demonstrating that
they both represent the same mapped allocation. This process of relating an allocation
and a section is shown in Figure 3.3.
Unlike the file object, the section object by itself provides limited information about
the allocation, however it does facilitate the retrieval of two useful pieces of information.
The first is the name of the section object, which is recorded in the object manager and can
be determined while finding the section object. While the name of the section may reveal
some information about its contents, it can instead contain a blank string or a string filled
with non-printable characters. These types of section names are quite common, which
could indicate that these non-printable characters are being used to store some other sort
of information.
The second piece of useful information is the process that created the section. When
a segment is pointed to by a section object, the u1 field represents the CreatingProcess
field. The value of this field is a pointer to an EPROCESS structure, and as the name
suggests, this allows the process that created the section to be determined. Since such
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sections are generally used for inter-process communication, it is often the case that the
creating process is a di erent process to the process being examined. When the creating
process is the same process, this could indicate that this section is being shared with other
processes, or that the process is sharing information with part of the kernel.
One point to note is that it is possible for a VAD to have an associated file object
and section object at the same time. Such an occurrence is commonly the case with the
natural language support (.nls) files which are mapped as read-only into every process.
The significance of this is that the same view of the file is being shared between multiple
processes, not a unique view of the file as is typically achieved with the copy-on-write
style permissions used for DLL files.
While a VAD entry describes what part of the virtual address space a user allocation
occupies, it is the metadata of this entry obtained from file and section objects that
allows the role of the allocation to be determined. Even though the description of these
allocations is at a high level, with no explicit knowledge of the underlying data structures,
the information can still be used in a variety of ways.
An example would be inferring the behaviour of a process based on the file and section
objects present within its user space. If a process loads a DLL namedWINHTTP.dll from
the system root into the address space, one may hypothesise that the process is using
the HTTP protocol. Likewise, if a section named ShimSharedMemory is being loaded,
this would indicate that the Windows Shim Engine is being used, a part of Windows
responsible for providing compatibility to older programs.
3.3.2 User Space Metadata Sources
In addition to the common structural components that can be identified using metadata
from within kernel space, there are also sources of metadata in the user space. These
two main sources of metadata are the Thread Environment Block, TEB and the Process
Environment Block, PEB. While the common structural components identified from
kernel space are mostly related to shared memory, the common structural components
identified through user space are mostly concerned with the default components that
are created with the process. These components include those that are required for
the application to function, and those that are designed to be used as required by the








Figure 3.4: Locating TEBs and Stacks
application.
Each thread running within a process has a Thread Environment Block (TEB) which
resides within its own user allocation. This structure, as the name suggests, contains
information about the environmental information required for the thread to run. One of
these pieces of information is the location of the stack unique to that thread, which also
resides in its own allocation. While the way in which these components can be located
has previously been described by Arasteh and Debbabi [2007], the fact that each TEB
and stack reside in their own user allocation has not.
The way in which these TEBs and stacks are located is shown in Figure 3.4. The
KPROCESS data structure is responsible for tracking the scheduling related information
of a process, including the list of threads, which is given by the field ThreadListHead. Con-
tained within this field is a LIST ENTRY which can be followed to locate all KTHREAD
objects for that process. Each thread has a KTHREAD object which in addition to
containing thread specific scheduling information, has a pointer in the Teb field to the
TEB in user space for that thread. Once the TEB has been located, a pointer in the
DeallocationStack field can be followed to locate the stack for that thread.
While previous work has described how the Process Environment Block (PEB) can
be used to list the modules loaded by a process and find the process parameters [Betz,
2005], the PEB still contains numerous fields for which the significance has not previously
been identified in the literature. The remainder of this section describes the fields of the
PEB which allow the identification of common structural components. These PEB fields
are summarised in Fig. 3.5. This information has been taken from the Windows XP SP3
symbol files, and updated with some type specific information for some of the fields.
The ImageBaseAddress, Ldr and ProcessParameters fields were all fields first used by
the Memparser tool [Betz, 2005]. These fields can be used to find the virtual address
of the process executable, list the loaded modules and retrieve the process parameters
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ntdll!_PEB
...
+0x008 ImageBaseAddress : Ptr32 Void
+0x00c Ldr : Ptr32 _PEB_LDR_DATA
+0x010 ProcessParameters : Ptr32
_RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS
...
+0x018 ProcessHeap : Ptr32 _HEAP
...
+0x04c ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase : Ptr32 _HEAP
+0x050 ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap : Ptr32 _HEAP
+0x058 AnsiCodePageData : Ptr32 Void
+0x05c OemCodePageData : Ptr32 Void
+0x060 UnicodeCaseTableData : Ptr32 Void
...
+0x088 NumberOfHeaps : Uint4B
...
+0x090 ProcessHeaps : Ptr32 Ptr32 _HEAP
+0x094 GdiSharedHandleTable : Ptr32 Void
...
+0x1e8 pShimData : Ptr32 Void
...
+0x1f8 ActivationContextData : Ptr32 Void
...
+0x200 SystemDefaultActivationContextData : Ptr32 Void
Figure 3.5: Relevant Fields of the PEB (XP)
respectively. Although the list of loaded modules could potentially be identified using
file objects from the VAD, this provides an alternative method with which to verify that
information.
There are two key pieces of information which have not been noted by previous work
about the process parameters. The first is that the data structure it uses, RTL USER-
PROCESS PARAMETERS, always resides within its own user allocation. The second
is that the Environment field of this data structure can be used to find another user
allocation, which contains a series of strings relating to environment variables. While
this allows two additional allocations to be explained on Windows XP, the same does not
apply to Window 7. Although Windows 7 continues to use the same data structures to
store this information, these data structures are stored in the default heap rather than in
their own allocations.
The way in which heaps are located is shown in Figure 3.6. The ProcessHeap,
NumberOfHeaps and ProcessHeaps allow the location of the heaps used by the process,
each of which reside in their own allocation. These heaps are found from the ProcessHeaps
field, which is a pointer to a list of pointers to heaps, the size of which is given by
NumberOfHeaps. The first heap of this list is also referenced by the ProcessHeap field,
which is the default heap which occurs in every process, even if it the program itself



















Figure 3.6: Locating Heaps on XP
does not use a heap. There is also one heap that does not appear in this list, which is
the read-only shared heap, pointed to by the values of ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase and
ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap, which is in every process by default.
Each of these heaps begin with a HEAP object, which contains two fields that can
be used to describe further user allocations. The first is the field which gives the heap
segments. On Windows XP, this is the Segments field, which is an array of pointers
to HEAP SEGMENT data structures on Windows XP, whereas on Windows 7, this
is the SegmentListEntry field, which is a double linked list of the same data structure.
These heap segments provide the heap management information for the current allocation.
While the first heap segment will exist within the same allocation as the original heap,
any additional heap segments will exist in a new user allocation.
The second is theVirtualAllocdBlocks field, which is a double linked list of HEAP VIR-
TUAL ALLOC ENTRY data structures. A heap virtual alloc entry is used when a heap
receives a request for memory exceeding a threshold size, at which point rather than the
data being stored in the existing heap allocation it is stored within its own separate user
allocation. While the location and parsing of a heap potentially allows the content of
even more user allocations to be determined, only some heaps will expand beyond one
allocation.
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Returning to the PEB shown in Figure 3.5, the next significant fields are the AnsiCode-
PageData, OemCodePageData and UnicodeCaseTableData fields. These fields all point to
di erent locations within the same user allocation, which is the code page. This code
page is present in every process, and contains a series of tables containing information
relating to ANSI, OEM and Unicode character encoding information. While the specific
data structure used to store this information is not known, it is likely to be a simple array.
If a process has a GUI element, it will have a GDI shared handle table, which is pointed
to by the GdiSharedHandleTable field of the PEB. This user allocation is a simple array
of GDITableEntry data structures [Nasarre, 2003], and as the name suggests, is shared
between all processes with a GUI element. Since these entries give both a virtual memory
address and an owning process for each GDI object, it is possible to parse these entries
to determine which allocations of the process contain local GDI information.
When a process uses the Windows Shim Engine, the PEB will potentially contain a
valid pointer in the pShimData field. This field will point to a private allocation containing
a small amount of data relating to the Shim Engine in an unknown data format.
Towards the end of the PEB are the ActivationContextData and SystemDefaultActi-
vationContextData fields. These fields store an activation context, which is a mechanism
used by Windows to redirect an application to load specific versions of resources, such
as DLL files. An application can potentially have two user allocations as a result of this
functionality, one for the system default activation context, and one for the activation
context specified by the process. Although the data structure used for this purpose is not
known, it begins with a distinct magic value of Actx.
While Windows 7 adds numerous new fields to the PEB, only two commonly provide
useful metadata. These are the pContextData and WerRegistrationData fields. Although
the name of the first field would suggest it is related to activation contexts, this does not
seem to be the case, as it does not start with the magic value of Actx. As such, the purpose
of this allocation is not known. The second field relates to data used for Windows Error
Reporting functionality, and while the data structure used for this purpose is unknown,
it is commonly paged out or for the most part unpopulated.
As demonstrated by the vast amount of metadata the PEB provides, it is an invaluable
source for determining the content of user allocations. Although a portion of these
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allocations relate to default data structures located in every process, this knowledge allows
the exclusion of these allocations when their information is not required. Many of the
allocations identified however are directly related to application data, such as the heap,
allowing these allocations to be searched for key pieces of user information, such as login
credentials.
One key point to note about the metadata contained in both the kernel and user space
is that they may be subject to malicious modification. For example, a piece of malware
could modify a pointer for a default allocation to point to a malicious allocation, in order to
hide the allocation during analysis. Additionally, there is the potential for the metadata to
be erased entirely, to complicate the entire analysis of the process. Determining the ways
in which such metadata could be maliciously altered would require a fuzzing approach
similar to that used by Dolan-Gavitt et al. [2009], and is beyond the scope of this research.
3.4 Implementation
The interpretation techniques discussed in the previous sections have been implemented
as a plugin for the Volatility Framework [Volatile Systems, 2011]. Volatility was chosen
for the implementation as it not only provides the base functionality required for memory
analysis, such as memory address translation, but also provides numerous plugins covering
functionality covered in previous research. This allowed the development to focus only
on implementing new functionality, rather than spending time reimplementing previous
research.
The created plugin, Userspace.py, identifies all the common structural components in
user space memory located by previous research, and the newly located components as
described in Section 3.3. This makes Userspace.py a superset of the existing approaches.
Pseudocode describing the overall steps taken by Userspace.py is shown in Figure 3.7.
Given a process, the first step is to locate all known user allocations. This is achieved
by parsing the VAD Tree, enumerating all accessible memory pages, and locating the
KSHARED USER DATA allocation, as described in Section 3.5.1. The accessible pages
of user space memory and the user allocations are then compared, and any pages found
to exist outside of user allocations recorded. Such pages are termed unreferenced pages.
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Function main(E)
input : E = eprocess object
output: display allocations with component information
V Ω≠ vads(E)
P Ω≠ pages(E)
k Ω≠ kshared user data(P )
add k to V
U Ω≠ P ≠ V // Find unreferenced pages
C Ω≠ components(E) // Get user space components
S Ω≠ parse obj manager() // Get section objects
for v œ V do
output(v)




for s œ S do
if s.Segment = v.ControlArea.Segment then
output(s) // Output related section
remove s from S
end
end
for c œ C do
if addr(c) = addr(v) then
output(c) // Output related component




if U ”= ÿ then
output(U)
end
Figure 3.7: Pseudocode of main function of Userspace.py
The second step taken by Userspace.py is to find any common structural components.
This is achieved by identifying all user space components and section objects, such that
they can be connected to allocations later on. Since the file objects are found using the
VAD of an allocation, these file objects are not found in advance like the other components,
but rather as each allocation is evaluated.
The third step is to output the allocation information, and check to see if any com-
ponents exist within that allocation. The section objects are related to an allocation as
described in Section 3.3.1, and the remaining components linked to allocations if the start
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address of the component and the allocation match. When a component is found to exist
within the allocation, the information of this component is added to the output.
The last step is to output any unreferenced pages. These unreferenced pages are
pages that are accessible but not described by the VAD Tree. Such pages are described in
Section 3.5.1, and are highlighted as they are potentially indicative of malicious behaviour.
One detail hidden by the pseudocode in Figure 3.7 is the way in which the user space
objects are examined to locate the common structural components in user space. The
way in which the extraction of these details, as described in Section 3.3.2, is implemented
is shown in Figure 3.8. This figure shows the pseudocode of the components function
referenced in the previous figure.
The components function takes the process being examined as a parameter, and begins
by locating the Process Environment Block (PEB) of the process. This PEB, a common
structural component itself, is then examined in order to locate the many components that
it references. Although the heaps are located via the PEB, these are handled separately,
as each of these heaps must be examined individually in order to locate any heap-related
components. Once all the allocations that can be located using the PEB as a starting
point have been identified, the process object is consulted once again to locate all the
Thread Environment Blocks (TEBs). A process contains a TEB for each thread running
within the process, and each of these threads have a stack that must be located. As each
component is located, it is added to an array that is returned once all known common
structural components have been identified.
The development of this tool was conducted in parallel with the research, in order
to provide an easy way of testing and validating hypotheses formed by the theory of
operation about the contents of various data structures. Small, custom programs with
known functionality were created to analyse the Userspace.py tool, before moving onto
more complex, existing applications. One of the programs created was malloc.exe, a
simple C application that allocates a few KBs of memory, fills it with data and then
sleeps. Various versions of this program were created during development to investigate
the di erent ways in which a process could allocate memory.
Windows XP SP3 and Windows 7 SP1 were the versions of Windows on which this
research was based, and as such numerous memory dumps of these operating systems were
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Function components(E)
input : E = eprocess object
output: all user space components
C Ω≠ ÿ
P Ω≠ E.Peb
add P to C
// Parse PEB fields not related to heaps
F Ω≠ peb fields(P )
for f œ F do
add f to C
end
// Parse PEB for all heaps
H Ω≠ P.ProcessHeaps and P.ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase
for h œ H do
add h to C
// Parse heap for segments and virtual allocs
S, V Ω≠ parse heap(h)
for s œ S do
add s to C
end
for v œ V do
add v to C
end
end
// Locate TEBs and parse for stacks
T Ω≠ tebs(E)
for t œ T do
add t to C
sΩ≠ t.DeallocationStack
add s to C
end
return C
Figure 3.8: Pseudocode of components function of Userspace.py
made to facilitate development. These memory dumps were all created using multiple
virtual machines, with a variety of di erent memory sizes. Each memory dump created
was captured by pausing the virtual machine and copying the saved memory image created
by the virtualisation software.
An example of the output produced by the plugin, created by running it against the
Windows 7 version of notepad.exe, is shown in Fig. 3.9. Each line of the output represents
a single user allocation. The first two columns, start and end, provide the address space
used by the user allocation. The next two columns, used and size, detail how much
of the user allocation is paged into memory, and the total size of the user allocation.
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Permissions links the value of the Protection field with its associated constant, and the
type column indicates whether the allocation is shared. Lastly, the description column
details any available metadata associated with that user allocation, such as file objects,
sections or any specific allocation types. At the bottom, there is a list of any pages
which are accessible but are not described by a user allocation, the reasons for which are
described in Section 3.5.1.
The plugin consists of ≥630 lines of python code, and is available at http://github.
com/a-white/.
3.5 Model Evaluation
The evaluation of the aforementioned implementation of the theory of operation as a
model was undertaken in three ways. Firstly, the assumption exposed by previous work
that a VAD tree completely describes a user space was tested, as the model relies on
the VADs when identifying the user allocations. Secondly, the correctness of the model
was validated by manually comparing the components identified by the approach to the
results generated by several live response tools. Lastly, once the results were known to be
accurate, the model was then compared against existing approaches in order to investigate
the benefit obtained from the use of the model.
The following sections describe each of these three methods of evaluation. All evalu-
ations took place using Windows XP SP3 and Windows 7 SP1 virtual machines and the
memory dumps made using these virtual machines. Windows XP memory dumps were
256MB, while Windows 7 memory dumps were 1GB. These memory images were created
using VMWare Fusion 4.1.1, either by suspending the virtual machine or by creating a
crash dump from within Windows. Each of these operating systems were installed from
media containing these service packs and no further updates were applied.
3.5.1 VAD Tree Completeness
Existing research has put forward the theory of operation that the accessible memory in
user space is completely described by the VAD tree [Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009, Russinovich
and Solomon, 2005]. This significantly simplifies the process of finding valid memory in
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Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00010000 0001ffff 00001000 00010000 READWRITE Mapped Heap 1
00020000 00022fff 00003000 00003000 WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\en-US\notepad.exe.mui
00030000 00033fff 00004000 00004000 READONLY Mapped SystemDefaultActivationContextData
Section PID 356 Name ‘’
00040000 00041fff 00002000 00002000 READONLY Mapped ActivationContextData
Section PID 356 Name ‘’
00050000 00050fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private pContextData
00060000 00060fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private (GDI Data)
00070000 00070fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private (GDI Data)
00080000 00080fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Mapped Section PID 308 Name ‘window[...]counters’
00090000 00091fff 00002000 00002000 READONLY Mapped Section PID 356 Name ‘’
000c0000 001bffff 00027000 00100000 READWRITE Private Heap 0 (GDI Data)
001d0000 0020ffff 00003000 00040000 READWRITE Private Stack of Thread 0
00210000 00276fff 00030000 00067000 READONLY Mapped \Windows\System32\locale.nls
00280000 00347fff 00005000 000c8000 READONLY Mapped
00390000 0039ffff 00001000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 3
003a0000 0041ffff 00001000 00080000 READWRITE Private
00440000 0044ffff 00003000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 2
00450000 00550fff 0000b000 00101000 READONLY Private GdiSharedHandleTable
00560000 0063efff 00053000 000df000 READONLY Mapped Section - PID 308 Name ‘’
00700000 0073ffff 00010000 00040000 READWRITE Private Heap 4
00830000 0086ffff 00014000 00040000 READWRITE Private Heap 5
00870000 00b3efff 0001f000 002cf000 READONLY Mapped \Windows\Globaliz[...]\SortDefault.nls
00c00000 00c2ffff 0000f000 00030000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\notepad.exe
00c30000 0182ffff 0000e000 00c00000 READONLY Mapped
01830000 0215ffff 0003e000 00930000 READONLY Mapped \Windows\Fonts\StaticCache.dat
Section PID 308 Name ‘’
72e00000 72e50fff 00013000 00051000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\winspool.drv
73a00000 73a12fff 00009000 00013000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\dwmapi.dll
73d30000 73d6ffff 0001c000 00040000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\uxtheme.dll
73eb0000 7404dfff 0003c000 0019e000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\winsxs\[...]\comctl32.dll
74420000 74428fff 00007000 00009000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\version.dll
74e70000 74e7bfff 00008000 0000c000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\cryptbase.dll
74fd0000 75019fff 0001d000 0004a000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\KernelBase.dll
75220000 752bcfff 00043000 0009d000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\usp10.dll
752c0000 7536bfff 0001c000 000ac000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
75370000 754cbfff 00019000 0015c000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\ole32.dll
754d0000 7551dfff 00015000 0004e000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\gdi32.dll
75520000 75576fff 00010000 00057000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\shlwapi.dll
758f0000 75990fff 00013000 000a1000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\rpcrt4.dll
75a00000 75ad3fff 00029000 000d4000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
75ae0000 75b6efff 0000b000 0008f000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\oleaut32.dll
75b70000 767b9fff 00017000 00c4a000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\shell32.dll
767c0000 76888fff 00028000 000c9000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\user32.dll
76a90000 76b0afff 00008000 0007b000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\comdlg32.dll
76cb0000 76d4ffff 00011000 000a0000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\advapi32.dll
76d50000 76d59fff 00007000 0000a000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\lpk.dll
76d60000 76d7efff 0000a000 0001f000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\imm32.dll
76dd0000 76f0bfff 0005d000 0013c000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
76f10000 76f28fff 00008000 00019000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\sechost.dll
76f30000 76ffbfff 00025000 000cc000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\msctf.dll
77010000 77010fff 00001000 00001000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Windows\System32\apisetschema.dll
7f6f0000 7f7effff 00005000 00100000 READONLY Mapped Heap 6 (Shared)
Section PID 356 Name ‘SharedSection’
7ffb0000 7ffd2fff 00013000 00023000 READONLY Mapped Code Page
7ffd4000 7ffd4fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private PEB
7ffdf000 7ffdffff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private TEB (Thread 0)
7ffe0000 7ffe0fff 00001000 00001000 N/A N/A KSHARED_USER_DATA
Unreferenced Pages
Start Size
Figure 3.9: Userspace.py running against notepad.exe on Windows 7.
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user space, as previously all possible page table entries had to be evaluated to achieve
this. In addition, these VAD entries provided the logical grouping of memory pages,
rather than simply having a set of pages which were valid and a set that were not.
The issue with this theory of operation however is that it was never evaluated to
determine whether it reflects actual behaviour. Although the existence of the VAD tree
would suggest that this is the case, intended behaviour and implemented behaviour are
often not the same. For this reason, this existing theory of operation was evaluated to
determine its validity.
This evaluation was achieved with a simple experiment to test the inverse of the theory
of operation, to see if any valid memory pages existed outside those described by the VAD
tree. A basic Volatility plugin, VadCompleteness.py was created for this purpose, which
compared the results of the two methods of finding accessible memory. This would allow
any accessible pages indicated by the page tables but not in the VAD tree to be identified.
The plugin was then used against a series of Windows XP and Windows 7 memory images
created from idle virtual machines and the results recorded.
The surprising result of this analysis was that the VAD tree never completely described
the user space of a process, making the previous theory of operation inaccurate. All
processes running on a Windows XP SP3 or Windows 7 SP1 system were found to have
a single page mapped at the address 0x7FFE0000 which was not described by a VAD.
In addition to being mapped at the same virtual address in every process, this virtual
address always corresponds to the same physical page, meaning it was identical in each
process.
This page is in fact the KUSER SHARED DATA data structure, which is shared
between all virtual memory address spaces. Numerous system wide variables are stored
within this structure, such as the system time, the timezone, and the location of the
system root. While it is possible that malware could attempt to use this allocation to
store shellcode such that it is available in every process, testing as to whether this would
be possible is outside the scope of this research.
Aside from this one page however, the VADs correctly described which virtual memory
ranges mapped to physical memory pages for every process. This allows the existing theory
of operation to be reworked to include this default behaviour. Given that this page was
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Component VMMap WinObj WinDbg
Stack Y N Y
TEB Y N Y
Mapped Files Y N Y
PEB Y N Y
Heap Y N Y
Shared Heap Y N N
Heap Segments N N Y
Heap Virtual Alloc N N Y
Section N Y N
Table 3.2: Built-in support for locating components in live response tools
able to exist outside the VAD tree however, this suggests that other pages could potentially
do the same. While this means that the VAD tree can be used to provide a starting point
within which to analyse user space memory, the memory ranges outside those described
by the VAD tree must still be checked to ensure they do not map to valid pages. For this
reason, Userspace.py essentially includes the functionality of VadCompleteness.py, and
checks to see if any virtual addresses that are not described by a VAD map to a physical
address, and outputs any such addresses.
3.5.2 Model Validation
Once the correctness of the VAD based approach had been evaluated, the validation
process then turned to the model itself. This required corroborating the results generated
by the model with any other available data sources. Since no previous memory analysis
research had identified many of the components, the results had to be compared against
those generated with a variety of live response tools. The tools chosen for this purpose
were WinDbg, VMMap and WinObj. An overview of the components able to be validated
through basic usage of these tools is shown in Table 3.2
VMMap is a live response tool from the Sysinternals Suite [Russinovich, 2012] that
provides an overview of the user space memory of a process. It provides similar information
to what is able to be retrieved by Userspace.py, but is not capable of retrieving the same
level of component information. Given that it is capable of identifying user allocations and
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numerous common structural components however, it served as an easy way in which to
verify that this information was retrieved correctly. Comparing the results was achieved
by starting a process, attaching VMMap to that process, and creating a memory image.
This allowed the results returned by Userspace.py to be compared to the results from
VMMap for that process at a specific point in time. Given that VMMap displays the
memory used by the KUSER SHARED DATA structure as a normal allocation, the fact
that this was initially missing in the Userspace.py output is what led to the investigation
into the completeness of the VAD tree.
WinObj is another live response tool from the Sysinternals Suite that provides a way of
exploring the contents of the Object Manager. While this tool allows the section objects
in use to be listed, it does not provide su cient information to link the object to an
address in memory or a particular allocation in user space. This information did ensure
that section objects were being retrieved correctly however.
The tool that performed most of the validation was WinDbg [Microsoft, 2010], a
Microsoft debugging program, that is commonly used to analyse the data structures
contained within Windows memory. WinDbg contains many commands that allowed
the location of numerous common structural components to be identified, such that
the components located by Userspace.py could be validated. One limitation of WinDbg
however is that it only operates on crash dumps, a Windows specific memory image
format. In order to compare the results from Userspace.py with WinDbg, crash dumps
were created with the help of NotMyFault, another tool from the Sysinternals suite.
While it is now possible to convert existing memory dumps into crash dump format, such
functionality was not available when this evaluation was performed.
Although the combination of the tools as shown in Table 3.2 allowed a number of
common structural components to be identified, there were still numerous components not
able to be identified in this way. Validating the location of these remaining components
took advantage of another feature of WinDbg, the ability to overlay a Windows data
structure at a specific location in memory. This allowed the approach taken to identify
these components to be completed manually by walking the various data structures. Since
the definitions for these data structures are taken from the Windows symbol files, this
ensures that they are correct for that version of the operating system. Although a time
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consuming process, this manual analysis allowed any implementation errors or logic errors
in locating these components to be identified. The combination of this manual approach
and the built-in functionality supported by the three tools used allowed the validation of
the proposed theory of operation and subsequent model for identifying common structural
components in memory.
3.5.3 Model Comparison
In order to compare the proposed model to the existing research, this required a tool
that distinguished all the previously identified common structural components as listed in
Table 3.1. Unfortunately, no such tool existed, although the majority of the functionality
required for these approaches had already been implemented in Volatility. This meant a
plugin to replicate this behaviour could be easily created. For the purposes of this section,
Existing.py was created. This plugin is implemented in a similar fashion to Userspace.py,
except that it only identifies the common structural components that have been identified
by previous research. A comparison of what types of allocations can be described using
Existing.py and Userspace.py is shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11
Since the plugins locate the common structural components of user space memory
for a particular process, a set of processes were required for analysis. Four processes of
increasing complexity were chosen for this purpose. The first, malloc.exe, was a simple
C program created during development of the plugin. This program allocates a few KBs
of memory, fills it with constant values, then sleeps for 20 seconds. The source code
for malloc.exe is shown in Figure 3.12. The second, calc.exe, is the default calculator
program for Windows. For each memory image, the calculator was opened, and a simple
calculation performed. The third, notepad.exe, is the simple text editing program that
comes preinstalled with Windows. In each captured memory image, notepad was used
to open a new document, enter a paragraph of text, and then save the file. The final
and most complex program chosen was iexplore.exe, the preinstalled web browser on
Windows, which was was opened and allowed to completely load the default home page
for each memory image. For the programs included by default on Windows, the default
version after installation was used, no updates were applied.
To create the memory images for each of the programs specified above, a Windows
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Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00010000 00010fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private
00020000 00020fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private Parameters
00030000 0012ffff 00002000 00100000 READWRITE Private Stack (Thread 1)
00130000 00132fff 00002000 00003000 READONLY Mapped
00140000 0023ffff 00004000 00100000 READWRITE Private
00240000 0024ffff 00003000 00010000 READWRITE Private
00250000 0025ffff 00002000 00010000 READWRITE Mapped
00260000 00275fff 00005000 00016000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\unicode.nls
00280000 002c0fff 00001000 00041000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\locale.nls
002d0000 00310fff 00000000 00041000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\sortkey.nls
00320000 00325fff 00004000 00006000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\sorttbls.nls
00330000 0033ffff 00005000 00010000 READWRITE Private
00340000 00342fff 00002000 00003000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\ctype.nls
00350000 003d0fff 00081000 00081000 READWRITE Private
00400000 0040efff 0000e000 0000f000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Documents and Settings\xp\malloc.exe
7c800000 7c8f5fff 0002b000 000f6000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
7c900000 7c9b1fff 0002f000 000b2000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
7f6f0000 7f7effff 00002000 00100000 EXECUTE_READ Mapped
7ffb0000 7ffd3fff 00005000 00024000 READONLY Mapped
7ffd7000 7ffd7fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private PEB




Figure 3.10: Existing.py running against malloc.exe on Windows XP.
Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00010000 00010fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private Environment
00020000 00020fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private Parameters
00030000 0012ffff 00002000 00100000 READWRITE Private Stack (Thread 1)
00130000 00132fff 00002000 00003000 READONLY Mapped SystemDefaultActivationContextData
Section PID 584 Name ‘’
00140000 0023ffff 00004000 00100000 READWRITE Private Heap 0
00240000 0024ffff 00003000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 1
00250000 0025ffff 00002000 00010000 READWRITE Mapped Heap 2
00260000 00275fff 00005000 00016000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\unicode.nls
Section PID 584 Name ‘NlsSectionUnicode’
00280000 002c0fff 00001000 00041000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\locale.nls
Section PID 584 Name ‘NlsSectionLocale’
002d0000 00310fff 00000000 00041000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\sortkey.nls
Section PID 584 Name ‘NlsSectionSortkey’
00320000 00325fff 00004000 00006000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\sorttbls.nls
Section PID 584 Name ‘NlsSectionSortTbls’
00330000 0033ffff 00005000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 3
00340000 00342fff 00002000 00003000 READONLY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\ctype.nls
Section PID 584 Name ‘NlsSectionCType’
00350000 003d0fff 00081000 00081000 READWRITE Private Virtual Alloc of Heap 3
00400000 0040efff 0000e000 0000f000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \Documents and Settings\xp\malloc.exe
7c800000 7c8f5fff 0002b000 000f6000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
7c900000 7c9b1fff 0002f000 000b2000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
7f6f0000 7f7effff 00002000 00100000 EXECUTE_READ Mapped Shared Heap
Section PID 584 Name ‘’
7ffb0000 7ffd3fff 00005000 00024000 READONLY Mapped Code Page
7ffd7000 7ffd7fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private PEB
7ffdf000 7ffdffff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private TEB (Thread 1)
7ffe0000 7ffe0fff 00001000 00001000 N/A N/A User Shared Data
Unreferenced Pages
Start Size
Figure 3.11: Userspace.py running against malloc.exe on Windows XP.
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#inc lude <s t d i o . h>
#inc lude <s t d l i b . h>
#inc lude <windows . h>
i n t main ( )
{
i n t ú ptr = mal loc (512 ú 256 ú s i z e o f ( i n t ) ) ;
i f ( ptr == NULL) {
p r i n t f (” Unable to a l l o c a t e memory\n ” ) ;
r e turn 1 ;
} e l s e {
i n t i ;
i n t constant = 0xCCCCCCCC;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 512 ú 256 ; i++) {
ú( ptr + i ) = constant ;
}
p r i n t f (” S l e ep ing f o r 20 seconds \n ” ) ;
S leep (20 ú 1000) ;
}
f r e e ( ptr ) ;
ptr = NULL;
p r i n t f (” Ex i t ing \n ” ) ;
r e turn 0 ;
}
Figure 3.12: malloc.exe source code
Program OS Total Allocations Existing.py Userspace.py Percentage
malloc.exe XP 22 11 22 100
calc.exe XP 52 28 46 89
notepad.exe XP 95 52 79 83
iexplorer.exe XP 149 77 111 74
malloc.exe Win7 19 9 19 100
calc.exe Win7 118 42 67 57
notepad.exe Win7 187 135 174 93
iexplorer.exe Win7 268 146 202 75
Table 3.3: Average total allocations per program and average number determined as
containing common structural components by each tool
virtual machine was booted, the program run, any specified interactions undertaken, and
then the virtual machine paused to create a memory image. This process was repeated
five times for each individual program on each version of Windows studied, generating a
total of 20 process instances to study for each operating system. Each virtual machine
used was installed from a disk already patched to the relevant service pack, and no further
updates were applied.
The results of comparing Existing.py and Userspace.py over these memory images
on both Windows XP and Windows 7 can be seen in Table 3.3. For each analysed
program, the average number of total user allocations for this program across the memory
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images is shown, followed by on average how many of those entries were determined to
contain common structural components by the Existing.py and Userspace.py plugins. The
last column then provides a percentage of how many allocations in the program were
determined to contain common structural components.
3.6 Discussion
As can be seen from Table 3.3, Userspace.py provides a significant improvement on the
existing approaches in terms of determining the common structural components of a
process. Since this plugin implements a superset of the existing approaches, there is no
scenario in which the existing approaches could outperform Userspace.py. In each process
tested, the results demonstrate that by identifying the common structural components of
a process, it allows a high percentage of the allocations of that process to be described.
Comparing the results across the two operating systems provides some interesting
results. Since the default version of each Windows program was used in the experiments,
this meant that the custom malloc.exe program was the only program to remain identical
for both operating systems. For this simple program, the number of memory allocations
decreased, partially due to the lack of dedicated allocations for the environment and
process parameters data structures and partially due to reduction in loaded .nls files.
For the default Windows applications however, the number of allocations doubled for
calc.exe and notepad.exe, and increased by 80% for iexplorer.exe. As is quite obvious from
running both versions of Internet Explorer on the two operating systems, iexplorer.exe has
changed dramatically between the two versions of Windows, and can almost be treated
as a di erent program. Despite the di erences in code between these versions however,
the results for both versions remained almost the same.
Unlike iexplorer.exe, notepad.exe seemed identical between Windows versions save for
the updated visual theme on Windows 7, making the increase in allocations seem as
purely the result of additional operating system complexity introduced by Windows 7.
Even with this additional complexity however, the results favoured the Windows 7 version
of notepad.exe with a 10% increase in identified allocations for Userspace.py over the
Windows XP version. Given the similar increase in the results for Existing.py however,
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this is likely due to an increase in the DLL files required for the Windows 7 version.
While for iexplorer.exe and notepad.exe the identified allocations both improved across
versions of Windows, the Windows 7 version of calc.exe demonstrated a significant drop.
While like notepad.exe, the visual theme of calc.exe was updated for Windows 7, unlike
notepad.exe it also introduced new functionality. Since none of this new functionality was
used when taking the memory images however, it is unlikely that this is the cause of the
increase in unexplained allocations. Instead, this would suggest that an alternate method
is being used to allocate memory which does not employ common structural components.
Being able to accurately identify the common structural components of a process allows
a significant reduction of the search space when looking for specific information. Instead
of analysing the whole user space, only a small subset now requires analysis. Depending
on the information being searched for, this subset could range from a few allocations right
down to a specific data structure.
In addition, this approach facilitates the development of new examination techniques.
For example, by focusing on an allocation not containing a common structural com-
ponents, some new data structure could be identified that allows the understanding of
artifacts previously overlooked. Alternatively, new methods of examining the shared
memory between processes could be determined, to reveal information about how two
process interact.
3.6.1 Limitations
While the tool is capable of providing information about the contents of a high percentage
of user allocations, it can not explain every possible allocation. With the increase in
the complexity of the application, it can be seen that the percentage of allocations that
contain common structural components decreases. Since it was not clear how the increased
complexity of the program was a ecting the results, a small experiment focusing on
notepad.exe was performed.
For each memory image, as before, notepad was opened and a paragraph of text
was entered. This time however, a memory capture was taken prior to saving the file,
then another memory capture taken after the file had been saved. The results of this
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Program OS Total Allocations Existing.py Userspace.py Percentage
Notepad.exe pre-save XP 54 29 49 90
Notepad.exe post-save XP 94 52 78 83
Notepad.exe pre-save Win7 54 33 52 96
Notepad.exe post-save Win7 187 135 174 93
Table 3.4: Average total allocations per program and average number determined as
containing common structural components by each tool before and after saving a file
experiment can be seen in Table 3.4.
As can be seen from the results, saving the file caused significantly more user alloca-
tions to be made, particularly on Windows 7. After saving the file, in terms of common
structural components, more files were mapped, more threads created and one additional
section was allocated when compared to before saving. Additional unknown user alloca-
tions were also created. In terms of functionality, saving required significantly more GUI
activity, such as selecting where on disk to save the file, and filesystem interaction, in
order to save the file to the disk.
When comparing these results to malloc.exe, which as a terminal application has no
GUI component, it can be seen that increased GUI activity is potentially one reason for
the decrease in the percentage of allocations containing common structural components.
Manual analysis of unknown allocations would appear to confirm this, as GUI related
terms such as Combobox appear in many of them. This suggests that there exist GUI-
related common structural components that have yet to be identified.
It is also possible that other common structural components exist that have yet to be
identified. One potential justification for this is with mapped allocations. Although the
vast majority of these mapped allocations can be explained through the use of a file object
or section object as described in Section 3.3.1, there exist VAD structures, which point to
a valid pair of control area and segment objects, for which no file or section objects exist.
This could potentially be caused by two factors, either a type of object that has not been
accounted for is referencing the segment, or an unknown source of section objects has
not been examined. More research into the internals of the Windows memory manager
would be required to determine if common structural components exist here that can be
identified.
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Aside from concerns about unidentified types of structural components, there are
also other potential causes of user allocations not containing common structural com-
ponents. The most obvious reason would be that the process creates allocations which
are completely managed by the process itself, and as such contain no common structural
components. Although there may exist metadata in Windows which would be capable
of providing more information about the allocation than is currently available, it is also
possible that such metadata will exist within the process in a way that is specific to the
process itself.
Another possibility is that the metadata indicating the presence of a common struc-
tural component was unavailable at the time of examination. As with any sort of memory
analysis, paging is an issue. Since Volatility does not support accessing an accompanying
page file, this means that any data that has been paged to disk is inaccessible. While the
majority of the metadata sources will always remain in memory, there are some sources,
such as TEBs and heaps, that can be paged to disk, preventing the extraction of their
related metadata. Combining the page file with the memory image would allow this
problem to be overcome, but would likely introduce new inconsistency issues between the
state of the two data sources.
The last possibility is that common structural components were not identified as the
data structures describing them were being modified when the memory image was created.
Although virtual machines were being used, which are capable of taking a snapshot of
memory at an instantaneous point in time, it is likely that at this point, some part of
memory was in the process of being freed. Since there are potentially many data structures
that require modification to remove a single user allocation, the lack of information could
potentially be the result of a lack of consistency between these data structures. For
example, although rare, instances of control areas were found where the segment pointer
did not point to a segment but pointed to some other unknown data structure. The
same kind of inconsistency could potentially occur with the virtual to physical address
translation process. While these sorts of inconsistencies can be detected through sanity
checks of the object references, there is not enough redundancy in the metadata to allow
their correction.
3.7. CASE STUDIES 85
3.7 Case Studies
Although from the previous sections it can be seen that userspace.py is e ective in
describing the content and roles of user allocations, it has only been evaluated in an
abstract nature. In this section, the e ectiveness of the plugin in scenarios of forensic
relevance is evaluated. This is achieved by analysing the potential use of the plugin in
two case studies, one focused on data recovery, and the other on malware analysis.
3.7.1 Data Recovery
The major limitation of previous research into the behaviour of certain programs is that
they have not utilised the knowledge of how user space memory works, instead relying
on reverse engineering the program or tracking changes to the whole address space. In
this scenario, how the userspace.py plugin can be used to quickly find information of
forensic significance from a process will be demonstrated. This will be achieved through
the analysis of the notepad.exe process on Windows 7 to find a list of usernames and
passwords that was open in notepad at the time of capture.
The most basic approach to attempting to find the important strings would be to
use the strings tool on the address space of the process. This can be achieved by using
Volatility to dump the address space of the process, and then run the strings tool on the
process dump. Since the format in which the strings are stored is not known, the tool
should be set to also search for unicode strings.
Such an approach produces over 18MB worth of strings. Refining this approach by
increasing the minimum length of the strings from 4 to 8 still yields 15MB of strings.
Even though this potentially risks missing the usernames and passwords entirely, it
still produces too many strings for manual analysis. Although such an approach could
potentially be refined by more knowledge of the text, such as searching for specific words,
let us assume that the contents of the notepad at the time of capture are unknown.
The output from userspace.py for an instance of notepad.exe is shown in Figure 3.9.
Although there appears to be no text file object mapped possibly containing the contents,
knowledge about the memory allocations can still guide further analysis. Allocations
containing DLL files or common Windows allocations can safely be ignored as they
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Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00010000 0001ffff 00001000 00010000 READWRITE Mapped Heap 1
000c0000 001bffff 00027000 00100000 READWRITE Private Heap 0 (GDI Data)
001d0000 0020ffff 00003000 00040000 READWRITE Private Stack of Thread 0
00280000 00347fff 00005000 000c8000 READONLY Mapped
00390000 0039ffff 00001000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 3
003a0000 0041ffff 00001000 00080000 READWRITE Private
00440000 0044ffff 00003000 00010000 READWRITE Private Heap 2
00700000 0073ffff 00010000 00040000 READWRITE Private Heap 4
00830000 0086ffff 00014000 00040000 READWRITE Private Heap 5
00c30000 0182ffff 0000e000 00c00000 READONLY Mapped
Figure 3.13: Excerpt of Userspace.py running against notepad.exe on Windows 7.
are unlikely to contain any application specific data, leaving the allocations shown in
Figure 3.13. This dataset could be narrowed down further by potentially removing the
mapped allocations, as the data should be specific to the address space of this process,
but without knowing exactly how the program operates this risks missing the data in
question.
By making individual dumps for each of these allocations using the vaddump plugin,
this reduces the output of strings to only 32KB, a far more manageable amount. Trimming
the search space even more, by taking out less likely candidates, such as the stack, which
should only contain function parameters, and the mapped allocations, reduces this figure
to 10KB. At this stage, manually reviewing the strings generated for each allocation
reveals that the usernames and passwords are stored in heap 0.
As this scenario has demonstrated, leveraging the model of how user space memory
operates can greatly reduce the search area for items of forensic significance, and in turn,
the data requiring examination. In this simple example, the search space was reduced
from a 169MB process dump to a collection of allocations totaling 2.1MB, and reduced
the strings to examine from 18MB to 10KB, without any detailed knowledge of how the
program worked or what was being searched for. This shows just how e ective the use
of the userspace.py plugin could be as a framework for analysing the memory dump of
a program for data of interest. Without such an approach, locating such information
would require brute force examination of the data, or significant reverse engineering of
the program.
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3.7.2 Process Hollowing
One of the common techniques used by modern malware is process hollowing. This
technique involves loading a known executable in a suspended state, and replacing the
code of the executable with malicious code. The existing executable’s process acts as a
container, providing an address space within which the malicious code can be executed,
while appearing to be something else. This method of maintaining execution on the system
is becoming quite common, and in this scenario its use in the well-known stuxnet [Falliere
et al., 2011] malware on Windows XP will be analysed.
Stuxnet uses process hollowing to hide itself as an instance of the Local Security
Authority Subsystem Service, better known as lsass.exe. While to a trained examiner the
presence of additional lsass.exe processes would be immediate cause for alarm, determining
exactly what is happening within the additional process requires examination of its user
space memory. Since both processes are supposed to be instances of lsass.exe, and one
instance of lsass.exe should be legitimate for Windows to function, comparing the user
space memory of both processes using userspace.py will highlight the di erences between
them.
While numerous di erences will occur between two instances of the same process,
due to the e ects of dynamic library loading and ASLR, the key di erence between the
two processes is shown in Figure 3.14 and 3.15. At the virtual address 0x01000000, it
can be seen that the legitimate lsass.exe process has a file object for the executable of
the process with the expected EXECUTE WRITECOPY permissions. In the infected
lsass.exe process however, this address contains a section object owned by the parent
process, and has the permissions EXECUTE READWRITE. Further inspection of the
infected process would reveal that no allocation is backed by the file object for lsass.exe,
as the PEB indicates that the allocation at 0x01000000 should contain it. As such, it can
be seen that in this instance of process hollowing, the existing allocation containing the
executable has been replaced with a new allocation of the same size, but with di erent
permissions and a di erent object backing it.
This gives us two artifacts with which this type of process hollowing could be de-
tected. Firstly, the use of the EXECUTE READWRITE permissions make this allocation
instantly suspicious, as no allocation should ever have write and execute permissions.
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This permission artifact is what existing tools such as malfind [Ligh, 2009] use to de-
tect injected code. If the malware were able to use a di erent permission, such as
EXECUTE WRITECOPY, this would render the process hollowing invisible to existing
detection tools.
Secondly, the fact that this allocation should contain a file object, as indicated by
the PEB, but instead only contains a section object, is an inconsistency that makes this
allocation suspicious. This absence of the executable of the process is an artifact that
demonstrates that process hollowing has occurred. No tools currently use this artifact for
detection purposes however. Avoiding this artifact would require the process hollowing
to occur by overwriting the contents of the previous allocation, rather than replacing
it with a new allocation of the same size. Such an approach could also preserve the
original permissions, avoiding the creation of the other artifact used for detection. If a
section object were used to achieve this however, the malware would have to ensure it was
correctly freed to avoid the section object becoming evidence of process hollowing.
This scenario has demonstrated that userspace.py can be a useful tool in the process
of understanding malware and malware techniques. The plugin been shown to be capable
of detecting current process hollowing techniques, and has been used to discover a new
artifact that could be used in detecting future process hollowing. Should malware improve
the way in which process hollowing is performed to remove the identified artifacts however,
it can be seen that all existing approaches would be incapable of detecting the malware.
An approach for overcoming such a technique is presented later in Chapter 5.
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a theory of operation and subsequent evaluation of a model
to identify and distinguish the common structural components of a process. Section 3.2
introduced the concept of user allocations and how they can be used as a framework with
which to describe the user space. Section 3.3 introduced the associated metadata that
can be used to identify and distinguish the allocations containing any common structural
components, in terms of metadata located in the kernel and in user space.
A sample implementation of this theory of operation as a plugin for the Volatility
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Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00d50000 00d8ffff 00001000 00040000 READWRITE Private Stack of Thread 22
00d90000 00dcffff 00001000 00040000 READWRITE Private Stack of Thread 23
01000000 01005fff 00004000 00006000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\lsass.exe
4d200000 4d20dfff 00002000 0000e000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\msprivs.dll
5ad70000 5ada7fff 0000e000 00038000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\uxtheme.dll
Figure 3.14: Partial output of Userspace on a legitimate lsass.exe
Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
00560000 00560fff 00001000 00001000 READWRITE Private (GDI Data)
00570000 0066ffff 00001000 00100000 READWRITE Private Stack of Thread 1
01000000 01005fff 00005000 00006000 EXECUTE_READWRITE Mapped Section - PID 00704, Name ‘’
77dd0000 77e6afff 00016000 0009b000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\advapi32.dll
77e70000 77f01fff 0001f000 00092000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\rpcrt4.dl
Figure 3.15: Partial output of Userspace on an infected lsass.exe
framework was presented in Section 3.4. This implementation was evaluated in Sec-
tion 3.5. The implications of the results of this evaluation were discussed in Section 3.6.
In the forensic scenarios described in Section 3.7 the ability to use the plugin in recovering
data from an unknown process and investigating cases of malware were shown.
This chapter has demonstrated how the identification of these common structural
components benefits the process of analysing user space memory. By using the theory of
operation behind the creation of these components, the memory requiring examination for
data of interest can be significantly reduced. Through the classification of the allocations
containing these components, new artifacts of forensic significance can be identified, such
as the evidence left behind by process hollowing. This model essentially facilitates an
improved understanding of the contents of user space memory, allowing the formation
and evaluation of new hypotheses. This aspect of the contribution was used extensively
in the development of the remaining contributions, in particular the approach used to
distinguish between code and data presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Distinguishing Between Code and Data in
User Space
With the current understanding of user space memory, it is not possible to accurately
distinguish between code and data. Being able to reduce the memory requiring analysis
to only code or only data will allow the creation of targeted approaches that only focus on
one type of information. Such a capability is a requirement when attempting to distinguish
between known and unknown code, as it requires that all code first be identified such that
it can be correctly categorized.
This chapter presents a theory of operation for distinguishing between potentially
executable code and data in user space memory. This is achieved through the analysis of
the permission framework employed by Windows, at both the hardware and software level.
The contribution presented in this chapter forms the foundation upon which contribution
of Chapter 5 is based.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the motivations for
the existence of executable permissions. Section 4.2 details how the exact way these
permissions are used within Windows. Section 4.3 describes how a model embodying this
theory of operation can be used to identify code and distinguish it from data.
Section 4.4 details the default incorrect use of permissions that causes Windows to
mark data as executable. Section 4.5 details the non-standard ways in which code is loaded
into user space by default on Windows. Section 4.6 then describes the implementation and
evaluation of an approach to automatically distinguish between code and data. Section 4.7
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discusses the implications of these results, before the chapter is concluded in Section 4.8.
4.1 Introduction
The exploitation of software has always relied on the ability to cause a program to execute
arbitrary code supplied by an attacker. This exploitation process is comprised of two main
tasks; supplying the program with the code to execute, and redirecting the control flow
of the program such that it executes that code. While naturally preventing the coding
errors that allow such exploitation to occur would be the ideal solution, the prevalence
of these vulnerabilities in software has produced a focus on making such vulnerabilities
more di cult to exploit.
Numerous hardening techniques have been devised, such as stack canaries [Cowan
et al., 1998] and address space layout randomization (ASLR) [PaX Team, 2003], to
harden operating systems. This chapter focuses on the use of executable permissions,
which are designed to prevent successful exploitation of software vulnerabilities. Such
permissions work by restricting execution only to memory which has been specifically
flagged to allow execution. This allows memory known to not contain code to be set as
not executable, preventing attacks such as the classical bu er overflow [Aleph One, 1996],
where shellcode is written to the stack and then executed. As the exploitation of many
types of vulnerabilities typically involved writing shellcode to a location containing data,
the correct use of executable permissions greatly increases the di culty of exploiting such
vulnerabilities.
Since classical exploitation techniques commonly rely on executing data as code, the
e ective use of executable permissions should see that only code is ever marked executable.
If only code is ever marked executable, then the inverse of this should also be true, in
that data should never be marked executable. In this chapter, the use of this permission
framework as a model for distinguishing between code and data is investigated. This
model builds upon the model presented in Chapter 3, in order to allow the location of
all code contained within user space. The correct identification of code in user space
will then allow the code to be divided into known and unknown code, as is presented in
Chapter 5. As with the previous chapter, this research focuses on the behaviour of the
4.2. USER SPACE PERMISSION MODEL 93
32-bit versions of the Windows XP and Windows 7 operating systems.
4.2 User Space Permission Model
As discussed in Section 2.4, memory permissions within user space memory occur at both
the allocation and page level. At the allocation level, these permissions are indicated by
the Protection field of the flags of the VAD, and at the page level, the various flags of the
PTE indicate the permissions of that page. While these are the observable artifacts with
which the value of the permissions can be retrieved, the important aspect is how these
permission values are set and enforced by Windows.
This section examines how permissions are assigned by Windows, how they have been
used in previous research and evaluates how they are actually enforced. The implications
of the results of this evaluation are then discussed. Although these permission values
have been used in previous research [Ligh, 2009], how they can be located in memory,
how they correspond to the Windows view of permissions, and how they operate has not
been previously defined.
4.2.1 Permission Assignment
The intended way for code to execute in user space memory on a Windows system is
through the use of the Portable Executable (PE) format. As discussed in Section 2.4.1,
the code and data within the PE file are stored in sections, and these sections are mapped
into memory when the file is loaded. The component of Windows responsible for placing
these PE files into memory is known as the PE loader, and performs all the tasks necessary
for the code in the PE to begin execution.
While the allocation created by the PE loader will always have EXECUTE WRITE-
COPY permissions, the permissions at the page level are dictated by the sections them-
selves. Each section has characteristic flags, such as whether the section contains code,
that determine the permissions of that section once loaded into memory. These permis-
sions are applied to the individual pages of those sections, such that all pages in a section
containing code will be marked executable, and those not containing code will be marked
not executable. By using page level permissions, this allows the allocation to contain both
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code and data, but only allow execution from the pages containing code.
The permissions of other memory allocations not created by the PE loader but through
the API, such as with VirtualAlloc, are dictated at the time the allocation is created. If
the allocation is created with executable permissions, all the pages within the allocation
will be marked executable, otherwise the pages will all be marked not executable. These
permissions can be changed after the initial allocation through the API with VirtualPro-
tect, as is commonly used by debuggers to set breakpoints on memory access, or by ROP
shellcode to change an allocation to be executable.
From the perspective of the API, the permissions returned through a command such
as VirtualQuery are stored as two values, AllocProtect and Protect. These two values
correspond to the permission values stored in the VAD and the PTE respectively.
4.2.2 Existing Interpretations
Existing interpretations of how the page and allocation level permissions interact would
suggest that both executable permissions are required in order for code to execute from
a page. This suggests that pages potentially containing code can be identified based on
whether the allocation is marked executable. The use of this theory of operation is best
evidenced by the malfind plugin [Ligh, 2009], which is designed to detect code that has
been injected into the address space of a process.
The malfind plugin works by searching for allocations within the address space of a
process that contain both EXECUTE and WRITE permissions, but do not contain the
default EXECUTE WRITECOPY permissions that are used when PE files are loaded.
Injected code is typically created through the use of the VirtualProtectEx function, which
allows the creation of an allocation within the address space of another process. The
approach taken by malfind works as this function specifically does not support the creation
of allocations with EXECUTE WRITECOPY permissions [Microsoft, 2012a]. This forces
injected code to use an alternative permission value, typically EXECUTE READWRITE,
allowing it to be distinguished from allocations containing PE files based on permissions
alone.
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The use of these allocation level permissions as the sole factor in determining alloca-
tions that potentially contain injected code suggests that memory potentially containing
code can be identified based on allocation permissions alone. Such a model would allow
allocations not marked executable to be disregarded, reducing the number of pages that
would need to be checked for executable permissions. As explored in the next section
however, this model is incorrect, as allocation level permissions in fact have no impact on
the ability of code to execute.
4.2.3 Permission Enforcement
Since pages within an executable allocation can be set to not be executable, logic would
dictate that it is the page level permissions that determine the ability of code to be
executed. As no existing research categorically states whether this is true, a small
experiment was devised to test this hypothesis that only page level permissions a ect
execution. This experiment involved directly altering the memory of 32 bit Windows XP
and Windows 7 virtual machines to determine how permissions a ected the ability of code
to execute.
With two sets of permissions, each containing an executable or not executable value,
this results in four permutations of permissions to test for a memory allocation. In
terms of memory allocations, although they can be allocated for a variety of purposes,
only two explicit types exist to Windows. These are private memory, which is memory
only accessible within the process, and mapped memory, which is memory that is shared
between processes. This creates a total of eight di erent scenarios to test.
For each scenario, the ability for code to execute on the page was tested by writing
shellcode to that memory page, altering the permissions of the memory page, and then
causing the shellcode to execute. The shellcode used was simple assembly code that
would cause an instance of calc.exe to be launched. This shellcode was triggered by
hooking an import address of the IAT and causing the process to call the imported
function. For example, when testing notepad.exe, the address of the imported function
SHELL32!ShellAboutW was replaced with the address of the shellcode, allowing the
shellcode to be triggered by opening the About dialog. The permissions were altered
by manually setting or clearing the bit used for the execution flag in that permission. For
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Private XP Success Success Failure Failure
Mapped XP Success Success Failure Failure
Private 7 Success Success Failure Failure
Mapped 7 Success Success Failure Failure
Table 4.1: Shellcode execution results for all executable and non-executable allocation
and page combinations
the allocation permission, this was bit 25 of the flags field of the allocation’s VAD, while
for the page permission, this was bit 63 of the page’s PTE.
Whether or not a new instance of calc.exe was created after the shellcode was triggered
indicated whether the shellcode executed successfully. This process was repeated multiple
times for multiple processes with multiple memory addresses, to ensure that no other
factors were influencing the ability of the code to execute.
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 4.1. A value of X indicates that the
permission was set to executable, and a value of NX indicates that the permission was set
to Not eXecutable (NX). As can be seen, the results for all the scenarios investigated are
the same, with only the value of the PTE executable flag a ecting the ability for code to
execute on the system.
4.2.4 Implications
Although there are two sets of executable permissions for a given page of memory, only
one of these truly a ects the ability of the system to execute code from that page. A PTE
that is set to be executable will allow execution from that page, regardless of the value of
the allocation level permissions. This proves the previous hypothesis that only the page
level permissions a ect the ability for code to be executed.
The fact that this is true highlights the key di erence between the allocation and page
level permissions. As indicated by the reference manuals, the flags in the PTE a ect
the execution of code at the hardware level, as the CPU itself will throw an exception if
the permissions are incorrect [Intel Corporation, 2013]. The allocation level permissions
however are managed by Windows itself, and as the results show, are not capable of
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influencing the ability of the processor to execute code.
Since executable pages can exist in non-executable allocations, this means that the
theory of operation used by malfind only reflects the way permissions are typically used,
not the way they are actually enforced. As a result, if malware injects code into a non-
executable allocation with executable pages, it will not be detected by malfind.
Although the allocation level permissions do not a ect the ability of the processor
to access memory, their existence would imply that they do in fact serve some purpose.
This purpose would appear to be the regulation of how the page level permissions are
applied by Windows itself. Such regulation is commonly observed in instances of shared
memory, as the page level permissions assigned must fall within the existing allocation
level permissions [Microsoft, 2012c]. No such stipulations are given regarding private
memory however, suggesting that the same restrictions do not apply.
4.3 Using Permissions To Identify Code
Since code needs to be executable in order to serve its purpose, this means that all code on
the system can be identified by searching for pages that are marked executable. Although
only the page level permissions actually indicate the possibility of execution, allocation
level permissions can be used to help determine how that code has been allocated, such
as whether it is part of a PE file. Any memory that is not marked executable can be
classified as data.
The issue with this approach however is that not all memory marked executable is
in fact code. Ideally there should be an explicit separation between memory that is
executable and memory containing data, such that only code is ever marked executable.
The reality of the implementation of permissions in Windows however is data is often
mistakenly marked executable, causing an intersection between these two sets. This
intersection is considered executable data, and henceforth referred to as such.
Distinguishing between code and data therefore becomes the problem of identifying the
intersection between these two sets, such that the executable data can be separated from
the actual executable code. As this executable data is not the result of the permission
model itself but the individual misuse of permissions, these idiosyncrasies in Windows
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behaviour can be identified and excluded from being classified as code. By combining
knowledge of these idiosyncrasies with the use of the page level permissions, this approach
will therefore allow all code within a user space process to be discriminated from data.
These idiosyncrasies are identified in the next two sections.
4.4 Executable Data
While Microsoft has made great strides in increasing the security of its operating system,
with features such as data execution prevention (DEP) and address space layout random-
ization (ASLR), it was never built from the ground up with such security considerations
in mind. This has resulted in a Windows system by default containing numerous alloca-
tions containing data that are marked executable at the allocation level and have every
page within each of the allocations marked executable. These default executable data
allocations are di erent for each version of Windows studied however, suggesting that
some attempts to rectify the inconsistent use of executable permissions have been made.
Each of these executable data allocations were identified by investigating all executable
allocations that exist by default on a Windows system that were not backed by a portable
executable (PE) file. Although manual inspections of the contents of these allocations
suggest they contain data instead of code, such a decision cannot be made categorically
without significant reverse engineering of the Windows operating system. For this reason,
to test if such allocations contained code, each page within each allocation was set to
have non-executable permissions, and the system interacted with to check for signs of
instability. While changing the permissions of these allocations had no visible side a ects,
the code coverage testing that would be required to prove that these allocations only ever
contain data is outside the scope of this research.
Apart from frustrating e orts to distinguish between code and data, such executable
data allocations also provide a potential location for an attacker to store malicious code,
whether it be as part of an exploit or part of a persistence mechanism. As will be
investigated in Chapter 5, the fact that such allocations typically contain data makes it
di cult to predict the contents of the allocation prior to runtime. As such, even though
such allocations can typically be classed as data, they still require manual inspection
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to ensure that they do not contain any code. This section details these instances of
executable data based on whether they apply to Windows XP, Windows 7 or both.
4.4.1 Windows XP Allocations
Although each process on Windows is allocated its own virtual address space, sometimes
data is required to be shared between multiple address spaces. The mechanism Windows
uses to achieve this is through sections, which allow the same physical pages of memory
to be accessible in multiple virtual address spaces. Since some data is required by every
Windows process, Windows maps numerous sections into each process address space by
default. The problem however is that some of these default shared sections, even though
they typically only contain data, are marked executable instead of being marked not
executable. This gives an attacker numerous locations to hide malicious code which could
then be executed from within any process.
The first of these executable shared allocations is the Read-Only Shared Heap, which
is mapped read-only in each process and can be located through a pointer in the Process
Environment Block [Ionescu, 2004]. Although the permissions on this allocation are read-
only by default, with su cient privileges or technical sophistication these permissions
could be changed.
The second of these executable shared allocations are the Desktop Heaps, each of
which are responsible for storing the data required to draw the graphical objects of its
corresponding desktop. To find the desktop heaps, one must first enumerate all the
tagDesktop objects which each represent a desktop [Ligh, 2012]. Using these tagDesktop
objects, one can then find the kernel address of the desktop heap using the pHeapDesktop
pointer, and the user space address within a process by matching the SECTION OBJECT
found using the hsectionDesktop pointer to a section backing an allocation. While these
desktop heaps are mapped as read-only, since their contents can be modified through API
calls, it is conceivable that malicious code could be inserted into the desktop heap from
unprivileged code.
The third and last executable shared allocation is one created by Win32k.sys, the
driver that implements windowing and the desktop. This allocation is unusual in that
it seems to be a composite of two data structures, the first 0xC0000 bytes appear to be
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a caching mechanism, while the last 0x8000 bytes are a heap, and although this heap
appears to contain user interface data, it is unique from the desktop heaps. Unlike other
section objects, the only reference to this section is found within the .data section of
Win32k.sys, typically located at Win32k.sys+0x1AA6DC. While like the other shared
allocations it is mapped read only, since it appears to contain desktop related data, it
is possible that like the desktop heap malicious code could be inserted using standard
Windows API calls.
Aside from the shared allocations, Windows XP also su ers from the use of 9 exe-
cutable and writable allocations to store what appears to be data in the address space
of winlogon.exe. Each of these allocations are 4 pages long, and appear to be sparsely
populated, allowing the insertion of malicious code without a ecting system stability.
The locations of these allocations can be found in an array within the .data section of
winlogon.exe, typically starting at winlogon.exe+0x72b0c.
4.4.2 Windows 7 Allocations
While Windows 7 has removed the executable permissions on the default shared alloca-
tions and the executable allocations in winlogon.exe, it has introduced a new set of issues
specific to behaviour exhibited by individual PE files. The majority of these new issues
are still the same case of allocations containing data being marked executable, however,
unlike the shared sections, many of these allocations are also marked writable.
The first of these executable allocations is caused by the use of ole32.dll, a library re-
sponsible for the support of Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology.
While not present in every process that imports this library, the use of a particular feature
results in the creation of a 2 page executable and writable allocation, containing data that
appears to be consistent across invocations on the system. A pointer to this allocation can
be found in the .data section of ole32.dll at ole32.dll+0x148A24 and ole32.dll+0x148A2C.
A second executable and writable allocation can be found in searchfilterhost.exe, part
of the Windows Search service responsible for indexing files and providing fast file search
results. This allocation contains a heap, that is typically for the most part unallocated.
The cause of this heap is within ntdll.dll, and a pointer to the allocation can be found at
ntdll.dll+0xD7514.
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Figure 4.1: PTE in transition [Kornblum, 2007]
The last executable and writable allocation is found within explorer.exe, the process
responsible for displaying the desktop. This allocation is usually 1 page and typically
contains an empty unknown linked list data structure. Unlike the other allocations,
pointers to this allocation only exist within the stack and the heap, making them di cult
to locate reliably. Since this allocation only appears within explorer.exe however, this fact
combined with the analysis of pointer values within the unknown linked list structure can
be used to locate this allocation.
4.4.3 Transition Pages
In addition to the executable data allocations that are unique for each operating system,
both operating systems can potentially have individual data pages that are marked
executable. The di erence with these pages however is that although based on the
executable flag of the PTE they appear to be executable, this is not necessarily the
case.
Further inspection of the PTEs of such pages reveals that they are not considered
valid, as they have the valid bit of the PTE set to 0. This indicates that no valid physical
address exists for that virtual address [Intel Corporation, 2013]. However, given that the
contents of such pages can still be accessed within a memory dump, this is evidently not
the case. This makes such entries similar to deleted files in a file allocation table, which
are marked as deleted but are not actually removed from the filesystem or the drive itself.
These pages are in fact transition pages, and an example of a PTE in transition is shown
in Figure 4.1. In addition to setting the valid bit to false, these pages use bits which are
ignored by the processor to indicate to Windows that the page is in transition [Kornblum,
2007]. This is achieved by setting bits 10 and 11 to 0 and 1 respectively.
Such transition PTEs are a special edge case defined by Windows, and still contain
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valid addressing information. Pages are typically set as in transition when they exist
in multiple address spaces and have been removed from the working set of each address
space, but have not yet been physically removed from memory. By setting the valid bit
to false, access to these pages by the CPU will cause a page fault, but by using flags 10
and 11, Windows knows that the page is still in fact in memory, allowing the page to be
made available again without copying the page from the disk.
The complicating factor is that while a page is in transition, it does not have correct
permission information, and will always be marked executable. After a page fault occurs
and the page is once again valid however, these permission values will be updated.
Evidently, during the page fault Windows is changing the permissions of the page, which
requires that these permission values are being stored elsewhere.
When a page is in transition, the permission information for that page is temporarily
stored in the Page Frame Number (PFN) database. The PFN database is a management
structure used by Windows to track usage of physical memory pages, such as whether
they are in use, free or available, and allow Windows to quickly retrieve or repurpose free
pages [Russinovich and Solomon, 2005]. In order to get the permissions for a page in
transition, the PFN database must be parsed and the PFN entry for that page found.
The data structures involved with retrieving the permissions from the PFN database
for a page in transition are shown in Figure 4.2. The KDDEBUGGER DATA64 data
structure stores the information required to perform debugging of the system, and forms a
common starting point for many memory analysis tools. The piece of information required
in this instance is the location of the PFN database, which is given by theMmPfnDatabase
field. Once the PFN database has been located, the PFN of the PTE can be used as the
index into this database to locate the relevant PFN entry. The PFN of a PTE is the
highest 20 bits of the physical address of a page, as shown in Figure 4.1.
Each PFN entry uses the data structure MMPFN, which contains a field called
OriginalPte. When a page is in transition, this field does not store the original PTE value,
as the name suggests, but rather a set of data that allows the PTE to be returned to its
original state, stored as a MMPTE TRANSITION data structure. This data structure
has a field named Protection, which stores the permission values for the page, such that
the permission flags for that page can be set once it is returned to being marked valid in










Figure 4.2: Locating permissions of a transition page
memory.
As such, although these pages appear to be executable when looking solely at the
executable bit of the PTE, these pages in transition actually derive their permissions
from within a field of the PFN upon being made valid in memory. This means that in
order to correctly identify such pages as code or as data, the correct permissions for these
pages must be retrieved from the page’s corresponding PFN entry. Only then will the
correct executable permission value of the page be known, such that it can be classified
as code or data.
4.5 Non-standard Code
In addition to data that has been incorrectly marked executable, there exist cases of data
that have been modified post-allocation to contain code. This section examines these
instances of non-standard code pages, dividing them based whether they occur within an
allocation containing a PE, or an allocation marked not executable. Although these pages
can be identified as code based on the page level permissions alone, as they are caused by
default and do not follow typical Windows behaviour, they are examined in depth. This
will allow other unknown instances of non-standard code, that is, code that exists outside
the executable sections of a PE file, to become more evident.
4.5.1 PE Allocations
In some cases, it is possible for pages from non-executable sections of a PE to later be
marked as executable when in memory. Unlike transition pages, these are valid pages that
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are actually marked executable. Although this can potentially occur on Windows XP, it
was only found to occur within the address spaces of searchindexer.exe, wmpnetwk.exe
and audiodg.exe on Windows 7 by default.
These pages are the result of intentional permission changes to the non-executable
sections of a PE after it has been loaded into memory. By changing a non-executable
section to be executable, this indicates that for some reason data is being repurposed as
code within a PE file.
Such behaviour is typically caused by the use of an obfuscation tool to protect the
contents of the PE when on disk. Obfuscation techniques work by storing the important
code of a program as data in a packed or encrypted format when on disk, and converting
the code back to its original form when in memory. This prevents the original code of a
PE from ever existing in a readable format when on disk. Such techniques are designed
to make reverse engineering of the program more di cult, in order to help prevent the
extraction of proprietary information or piracy.
On Windows 7, these pages commonly occur within components related to DRM, such
as blackbox.dll and wmdrmdev.dll within the address space of wmpnetwk.exe. These
pages can be identified by comparing the permissions for each section as listed in the PE
header to the actual permissions of those sections when in memory. If these pages are not
the result of an obfuscation technique, it is possible they have been used in generating
dynamic code, or had their permissions changed during the exploitation of that program.
4.5.2 Data Allocations
Although the existence of allocation level permissions would imply otherwise, executable
pages do occur in non-executable allocations by default on Windows. The instances of
default behaviour that cause such pages however are limited to csrss.exe on Windows XP
and searchindexer.exe on Windows 7, and are unique for each process. The fact that the
permissions of these pages are executable makes them likely to contain code, however,
the reasons for which they exist in non-executable allocations rather than executable
allocations are unknown.
In csrss.exe on Windows XP, many pages in the range of 0x00000000 - 0x000  f
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are marked executable, even though each of these pages exist within a non-executable
allocation. While the number of allocations and pages within this range vary depending
on the system, they appear to contain boot related information such as the MBR and parts
of the BIOS. Although mapped into memory, issues with imaging this memory means that
much of the BIOS related information is not accessible in memory images from physical
machines. Since many of the pages within these allocations do in fact contain code, even
though they may not be executed after the boot process has completed, the contents of
the a ected allocations are still labeled as such.
Although the BIOS related data may not be available on all systems, it would appear
that the MBR is. This provides an easy way of obtaining the MBR from a Windows
XP memory image, as it was observed to always occur at 0x00000600 in the address
space of csrss.exe. While the contents of the BIOS related allocations may not be
directly accessible from on the machine, the size and frequency of these allocations may
provide a method of fingerprinting the BIOS used, allowing the use of virtualisation to be
detected. The fact that an allocation is created at the address 0x00000000 also introduces
the potential to exploit null pointer dereferences, although protections to prevent such
allocations are not enabled by default on Windows XP and Windows 7 [Mandt, 2011].
Although an allocation exists by default on Windows 7 in the range 0x000000000 -
0x000FFFFF for csrss.exe, these pages would appear to never be present in memory.
On Windows 7, searchindexer.exe contains two non-executable allocations that poten-
tially contain executable pages. These allocations are 0x3f3000 and 0xc0000 bytes in size,
and occur sequentially in memory. Typically, these allocations will contain no executable
pages, and are otherwise unremarkable. Intermittently however, for reasons unknown,
these allocations will contain executable pages, coming in at just under 500 executable
pages between the two non-executable allocations.
When such pages are present, the larger allocation will contain the PEs of vsstrace.dll.mui,
ntprint.dll, searchindexer.exe and p2p.dll, while the smaller allocation will contain no PE
headers at all. Although the purpose of these allocations are not known, their unique
sizes, combined with the fact the smaller allocation can be found at esent.dll+0x181C90,
makes them easy to locate. The fact that the larger allocation contains PE files, and that
the smaller allocation appears to contain code upon manual analysis, leads any executable
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Figure 4.3: Code and data discrimination process
pages of these two allocations to be classified as code.
4.6 Evaluation
To evaluate the ability of the combination of page level permissions and the knowledge of
Windows idiosyncrasies to distinguish between code and data in memory, this approach
was implemented as a plugin for the Volatility Framework [Volatile Systems, 2011]. This
allowed the e ectiveness of this approach to be evaluated. The details of the implemen-
tation, evaluation and results of the evaluation are outlined in this section.
4.6.1 Implementation
The proposed approach was implemented in the Volatility plugin findcode.py. This plugin
follows the approach outlined in Sections 4.3, taking into account the idiosyncrasies
outlined in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. An overview of the decision making process made by the
tool is shown in Figure 4.3 and is followed for each page of user space memory.
The first step taken by the tool is to determine whether the page exists in an executable
data allocation, that is, one of the executable allocations known to contain data covered
in Section 4.4. If the page does exist in such an allocation, the page is marked as
data, otherwise the process continues. The second step is to determine whether the
page has executable permissions. Pages which are not executable are marked as data,
while executable pages move on to the third step.












Figure 4.4: Standard and non-standard code discrimination process
due to the fact that transition pages will always appear executable, but may not actually
be executable, as described in Section 4.4.3. If the page is not in transition, it is marked
as code. Pages that are in transition move on to the final step, checking whether the page
is marked executable in the PFN. Transition pages marked executable in their PFN entry
are marked as code, and pages not marked executable are marked as data, completing
the code and data discrimination process.
While this process determines whether a page contains code or data, pages containing
code can be further refined into standard and non-standard code using the information
described in Section 4.5. An overview of this process is shown in Figure 4.4.
Discriminating between standard and non-standard code begins with checking to
see whether the code page is within an executable allocation. If the allocation is not
executable, the page is labeled as non-standard code, otherwise the process continues. The
next step is to determine whether the allocation is a PE allocation, which is determined by
checking that the allocation is backed by a file object that is a PE and in the list of loaded
modules. If the allocation fails either of these checks, the page is labeled as non-standard
code. The last step is to determine whether the page is in a section of the PE that is
marked executable, in order to check if a data page has been changed to executable. This
is achieved by consulting the PE header in memory, to determine the original permissions
of the PE section that contains the page. If the PE section is executable, the page is
labeled as standard code, otherwise it is labeled non-standard code.
The implementation of findcode.py is compromised of approximately 400 lines of
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python code. This includes functionality in addition to the aforementioned decision mak-
ing processes for recording statistical information for the purposes of these experiments.
As no other techniques exist that attempt to distinguish between code and data in
memory, two other simple approaches were implemented for the sake of comparison. The
first of these, allocations.py uses only the allocation permissions to distinguish between
code and data. This plugin follows the approach taken by malfind, and represents the
naive approach taken as a result of incorrect assumptions. The second, pages.py, uses only
the page level permissions to distinguish between code and data. This plugin does not
take into consideration transition pages or the idiosyncrasies, and forms the best approach
prior to this research.
4.6.2 Experimental Setup
Each individual approach was evaluated against a series of Windows XP SP3 andWindows
7 SP1 memory images. A virtual machine of each operating system was created using
both VMWare Fusion 5.0.3 and VirtualBox 4.2.12, and five memory images taken for each
virtual machine, providing a total of 10 memory images per operating system. These
memory images were taken after booting the system and allowing the system to idle for
a random period within 1-10 minutes after the boot had completed.
The Windows XP virtual machines were configured with 256MB of memory, and
the Windows 7 virtual machines with 1024MB of memory. For each virtual machine,
the operating system was installed from media containing the operating system already
patched to that service pack, and no further patches or software was added, such as virtual
machine guest tools. Two di erent virtualisation packages were used to minimize the e ect
a particular virtualisation platform on this process. Memory images for VMWare were
created by suspending the virtual machine and using the resulting memory image, while
memory images for VirtualBox were created using the dumpguestcore command.
For each approach, the number of pages determined to be code and to be data
were recorded, and these results averaged across all the memory images created for that
operating system. When using findcode.py, additional information was also recorded to
determine the impact of factors such as transition pages on the results.
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Windows XP Windows 7
Approach Code Pages Data Pages Code Pages Data Pages
Allocation Permissions 13243 6107 27003 22644
Page Permissions 11442 7907 24885 24762
Proposed Approach 10522 8828 22040 27607
Table 4.2: Average pages classified as code and data under each approach, more data
pages are better
Page Type Windows XP Windows 7
Executable Data Page 136 2
Executable PE Data Page 0 43
Executable Page in Data Allocation 235 113
Non-executable Transition Page 784 2843
Executable Transition Page 66 186
Table 4.3: Breakdown of average number of special classifications from proposed
approach
4.6.3 Results
Table 4.2 shows the average results of the three approaches in attempting to distinguish
between code and data in memory. For each approach, the number of pages determined
to be code and data for each operating system is displayed. As can be seen, only using
allocation permissions is the least accurate approach, and while using the page level
permissions is closer to the proposed approach, it su ers from a lack of knowledge of
executable data and transition pages.
A breakdown of the average frequency of such special cases is shown in Table 4.3.
For each operating system, the number of executable data pages, executable pages in
data allocations, non-executable transition pages, and executable transition pages are
shown. For both operating systems, it can be seen that the low rate with which transition
pages were executable contributes the largest di erence between the proposed approach
and using the page level permissions. Modification of the page permission approach to
include transition pages would result in being on average within 1.7 pages of the proposed
approach on Windows 7. Due to the large numbers of executable data pages on Windows
XP however, this modification would not be as successful.
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From the number of executable pages in non-executable allocations on Windows 7, it
can be seen that the behaviour exhibited by searchindexer.exe was only observed in two
of the memory images created for this experiment. A similar frequency of occurrence was
observed for the test images created during development. As the cause of this instance
of behaviour is unknown, the reasons for which it appears in some images and not others
was not able to be determined.
4.7 Discussion
While the use of the page level execution permissions essentially guarantees that all code
is marked executable, as otherwise it will not execute, it does not necessarily prove the
inverse to be true. For this reason, there is the potential for data to be mistakenly marked
executable, to form the intersection of the executable and data sets. As such, correctly
distinguishing between code and data requires that these instances of permission misuse
are known, such that they can be treated separately.
The results shown in Table 4.2 demonstrate that page level permissions alone are
not su cient for distinguishing between code and data. Although the inclusion of the
handling of transition pages would significantly improve on this approach, there still exist
data pages marked executable that would otherwise be incorrectly labeled, particularly on
Windows XP. Once both of these factors are taken into consideration, as in findcode.py,
an accurate separation of code and data can be obtained.
The significant decrease in the number of executable data pages between Windows XP
and Windows 7 demonstrates that some emphasis on correct permission usage has been
made in more recent versions of Windows. Although allocations containing executable
data pages still exist on Windows 7, their frequency and size has significantly decreased.
Windows 7 did introduce the default usage of executable PE data pages however, which
is deviation from the normal PE code model it otherwise uses. This could potentially
be avoided however by simply unpacking or decrypting the code into a section of the
PE that is already marked executable, negating the need for any permission changes to
occur. Since this section would need to be writable in order to achieve this however, this
introduces the same issue that the use of permissions is trying to avoid.
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One issue with these executable data allocations however is that they may not always
contain data. Since all of these allocations are on the system by default, and in the case
of Windows XP are available within all processes, such allocations form an ideal place
for an attacker to hide malicious code. For this reason, the approach outlined can only
provisionally mark such allocations as data, as further manual examination would be
required to determine if they are free from any injected code. However, given that this
approach reduces the pages requiring manual analysis to distinguish between code and
data down to 1.7 pages from almost 50,000 pages for an average Windows 7 system, this
is still a significant improvement.
While improving upon this limitation could potentially be achieved using automated
code identification techniques, the ideal improvement would be to rectify the incorrect
use of permissions themselves. If these allocations are in fact only data, as their contents
suggest, marking these allocations and all pages within as non-executable would solve all
encountered issues. If these allocations do in fact contain code, the pages containing code
should be separated from the pages containing data, and the correct page level permissions
applied on a per page basis. This would return the separation of executable memory and
data to the ideal case. As to a developer incorrectly marking data as executable does
not have the immediate consequences the way marking code not executable does, such
executable data allocations are likely to continue to exist in the future.
Since the approach relies on the PTE being marked as executable, it is also conceivable
that an attacker could attempt to set the pages containing their malicious code to not
executable during the capture process. Such a capability would cause their code to
be mislabeled as data, and potentially prevent the pages from being subject to further
scrutiny. For the malicious code to resume execution after the capture process however,
there would need to be some way for the pages containing the code to be marked executable
once again, which could potentially leave behind artifacts that would be indicative of the
use of such a technique.
Although the allocation level permissions do not specifically allow the location of
code, the way in which they are typically used by Windows can be used to locate any
inconsistencies in the use of permissions. For example, any usage of executable pages in
non-executable allocations outside those already identified could be considered suspicious
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and worthy of further examination. As previously discussed, if malware were to use such
a technique, it would be able to circumvent existing malware detection techniques such
as malfind [Ligh, 2009].
One interesting aspect of these experiments not displayed in the results is the di erence
between memory images depending on the virtualisation software used. On Windows XP,
VMWare provided on average 5% more pages present in memory over VirtualBox, and
on Windows 7 2% more pages present in memory on average. This increase in the total
number of pages present in memory additionally caused a similar increase in the instances
of each category listed in Table 4.3 to occur. The frequency of transition pages under
Windows 7 di ered significantly under the two virtualisation packages however, with the
VMWare memory images containing over 10 times as many transition pages as VirtualBox.
While the reasons for this are unknown, they are likely due to a di erence in the memory
management or memory capture processes employed by the virtualisation software.
4.8 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a theory of operation for the use of permissions by Windows
on the x86 architecture, and has implemented this to provide an automated method of
distinguishing between code and data in user space memory. This was achieved through
the use of page level permissions, combined with the knowledge of inconsistencies such as
transition pages and executable data allocations.
Section 4.1 introduced the reasons for such executable permissions. Section 4.2 in-
vestigated how they are used in memory, examining how these permissions are assigned,
how they have been previously been interpreted, and how they are actually enforced.
Section 4.3 then described the way in which these permissions can be used to find code
in memory.
Section 4.4 described the ways in which Windows XP and Windows 7 fail to correctly
use such permissions by default by marking data executable, as well as how transition
pages may appear to be executable but in fact be non-executable. Section 4.5 detailed
instances of the non-standard ways in which code appears on these operating systems by
default.
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Section 4.6 then evaluated the use of this knowledge as a plugin for automatically
distinguishing between code and data in user space memory. Finally, Section 4.7 then
discussed the implications of these results, and the ways in which it could potentially be
subverted.
Identifying all the code in user space memory allows the search space for unknown code
to be significantly reduced. Separating the code from the data allows the application of
specific analysis techniques which were not before possible. The success of this approach
will be fully realised in the next chapter, where this model will be used to identify all
code within user space, such that the code can then be divided into known and unknown
code.
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Chapter 5
Identifying Known and Unknown Code in
User Space
A common defense when attempting to attribute the behaviour of the system is that some
unknown code, not the user, caused the behaviour in question. Being able to evaluate
such claims requires that all unknown code on the system be located, such that it can
be analysed to determine whether or not it caused the behaviour in question. Current
techniques of locating unknown code such as malware in memory are limited however,
relying on the presence of malicious artifacts rather than the location of the unknown
code itself. This adds significant complexity into the process of locating any unknown
code, and introduces the possibility of malware utilising new techniques which cannot be
detected via existing approaches.
This chapter introduces a novel approach for distinguishing between known and un-
known code in user space memory using a variation of existing cryptographic hashing
techniques. Such an approach is possible due to the use of the models formulated in
Chapters 3 and 4 which inform the way in which user space memory and the code within
it are stored. This approach detects the introduction of unknown code by comparing
the code as it should be in memory, learned through analysis of the disk, to the way it
actually is in memory. Such an approach allows unknown code to be generically detected
regardless of the malicious techniques used.
Section 5.1 briefly introduces the motivation behind this research and what it entails.
Section 5.2 details the approach used to distinguish known and unknown code. An
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implementation of this approach is presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 the way in
which this implementation was evaluated is described. The results of the evaluation are
presented in Section 5.5 and the implications of these results are discussed in Section 5.6.
Section 5.7 describes how this approach can be used to detect process hollowing and in
reducing the amount of memory requiring analysis, before the chapter is then concluded
in Section 5.8.
5.1 Introduction
The proliferation of the success of memory forensics in detecting system compromise has
led to an increase in the di culty of performing the analysis itself. With the introduction
of new techniques to detect malware and new malware techniques to subvert analysis, the
act of investigating a memory image has evolved from what was once the simple appli-
cation of a few Volatility [Volatile Systems, 2011] plugins into the successive application
and comprehension of many. This newfound maturity has exposed memory forensics to
the same issues encountered by other more established digital forensics disciplines, such
as the complexity and volume problems.
For this reason, this chapter proposes the use of a reduction technique, similar to
those used previously in disk forensics. This reduction technique is capable of verifying
the provenance of the executable contents of user space memory such that all known code
can be excluded from further analysis, an approach similar to that of the National Software
Reference Library (NSRL) [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012] used
in disk forensics. Cryptographic hashes of code from on disk are applied in a manner
that takes into consideration the unique challenges posed by code in memory, allowing
the identification of known code. This approach was found to indicate the presence of the
unknown user space code introduced by malware in all samples tested, highlighting the
areas which require further analysis.
5.2 Approach
The approach for distinguishing between known and unknown code utilises collision-
resistant cryptographic hashes to determine whether in-memory code is equivalent to
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code on disk, and this process is split into two distinct phases. The first is the way in
which the hashes are created from code on disk, and the second is the application of these
hashes to code in memory. These steps are described in detail in this section, before
examining the resistance of this approach to subversion.
This section describes the approach used to build hashes and apply hashes, as well as
the issues faced by such an approach. The way in which hashes are built is similar to
that used by Walters et al. [2008], and this process is summarized here to assist in the
comprehension of the remainder of the technique.
5.2.1 Building Hashes
The Windows operating system uses the Portable Executable (PE) file format to store
executable code. While code on disk and in memory are both stored according to the PE
file format, their layouts di er. When on disk, a PE file is stored according to its physical
layout, while in memory, a PE file is stored according to its virtual layout.
The Windows PE loader is responsible for converting a PE into its virtual layout for
use in memory, and updating all code references to reflect the run time state of the system.
This involves processing internal pointers to reflect the location of where the PE file itself
is loaded, known as relocations, and updating the Import Address Table (IAT), where the
addresses of imported functions from other PE files are stored. These internal pointers
and the IAT are instantiated with default absolute values, which are only correct if the
PE file and all imported libraries are loaded at their preferred base address.
The advent of Address Space Layout Randomization, which intentionally randomizes
the load address of PE files to increase the di culty of exploitation, means that PE
files are rarely loaded at their preferred base address. This causes the values of internal
pointers and the IAT to require updating to reflect the current run time environment
when loaded. As these values are dependent on the run time load address of other PEs,
their values cannot be known when building the hashes from on disk. As such, the hashes
must be constructed to take into account that parts of the code are not known until run
time.
For this reason, the values of any relocations and the values in the IAT are replaced
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with a constant value, a process known as normalisation, before the hashing occurs.
The details of these normalisations are saved with the hash value, producing a tuple of
normalised hash and list of normalised o sets. This allows hashes to be tested by taking
the in-memory page and normalising the same o sets before hashing. To deal with the
possibility of paging, these hashes are created on a per page basis. This was the approach
taken by Walters et al. [2008]. The amount of metadata saved with each hash under this
approach is minimal, limiting the amount of information that can be inferred from the
application of these hashes.
The approach proposed in this chapter achieves this by recreating the Windows PE
loader, transforming the PE into its virtual layout, and normalising the appropriate o sets,
allowing the creation of per page hashes for each PE file on disk. If any sections of the
PE do not reach the end of a page, the remainder is filled with null bytes before hashing.
This approach to building hashes was chosen as makes it simple to create a unique hash
set for a machine, such that the introduction of any unknown code for that machine can
be detected.
Building upon the existing approach, other key information is saved with this tuple,
such as the filename of the PE, the o set of this page in the PE, and whether this page
is in a section of the PE marked executable. This information allows the hashes to more
e ectively be applied to memory, as is described in the next section.
5.2.2 Applying Hashes
In the work of Walters et al. [2008], the created hashes are tested against the memory
image by testing each page in the physical address space against each hash in the hash
set until a match is found. This approach su ers from thee major limitations.
Firstly, as the o sets requiring normalisation are likely to be di erent for each hash,
this means that each hash must be tested against the page individually. The normalisa-
tions for that particular hash must be applied and the page hashed, before the page can
be checked against the next hash. This significantly increases the algorithmic complexity
of this approach, as the run time is dependent on both the size of the memory image and
the size of the hash set.
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Secondly, since each hash is tested against each page, and the calculation of each hash
e ectively requires ignoring parts of the input, this significantly increases the chances
of false positives. Some pages, particularly those containing an IAT, are likely to have
numerous o sets requiring normalisation. Since as the number of o sets requiring nor-
malisation increases, the amount of unique data used in hashing is reduced, such pages
can potentially match many more pages than intended.
Lastly, the approach is not capable of distinguishing between known and unknown
code. Through the combination of the lack of metadata in the hash set and the scanning
of the physical address space, no information other than if a match was found can be
determined. This prevents the detection of malicious alterations to known code and the
introduction of unknown code, as it is not known if a page that does not match is even
code or data. Additionally, of the pages that did match, no information beyond the
fact they were in the hash set can be determined, as there is no metadata to allow the
attribution of that match to a particular file. As such, this approach is only capable of
determining what percentage of memory matched known code in the hash set.
To overcome these limitations, the approach proposed by this research leverages the
metadata available in memory to cull the dataset to specific pages before hashing. Using
the work from Chapter 3, the contents of user space and the locations of PE files can be
identified, allowing the code that a page should contain to be known in advance. Building
upon this with the work from Chapter 4, the memory to examine can be limited such
that only pages containing code are subject to the hashing process.
The addition of this information allows the limitations previously identified in the
work of Walters et al. [2008] to be overcome. Under this new approach, only one hash
has to be tested on each page, reducing the algorithmic complexity and the potential for
false positives, and any specific pages containing code which fail hashing can be identified.
Without the contributions of Chapters 3 and 4, this would not be possible, as each page
in user space memory would be an anonymous page of memory, with no indication of
whether it contains code that requires hashing.
The improvements in this new approach are achieved by performing the hashing in the
virtual address space rather than the physical address space. Each process on Windows
resides within its own virtual address space, isolating it from other processes. The user































Figure 5.1: The hash application process
space portion of this virtual address space, where the programs code and data is stored,
is described by the Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) Tree. This VAD Tree contains
metadata about the contents and roles of each memory allocation, such as file objects and
the allocation’s permissions, as described in Chapter 3. By using the permissions and
file objects of these allocations, which of these allocations contain PE files which require
verification can be determined.
A diagram of this approach is shown in Figure 5.1. The first step of applying the
hashes to a memory image is to enumerate the list of processes running on the system,
through one of the many available methods. Then, the layout of that processes address
space is determined using the VAD Tree, and the location of all allocations are saved.
Executable allocations are checked for any file objects backing them, and the names of
these file objects are used to retrieve the hashes relevant for that allocation. The hashes
are then applied, page by page, by replacing the mutable parts of that code page with a
constant and comparing the resulting hash to the stored hash.
Allocations that are not executable are checked to ensure they contain no executable
pages. If such executable pages exist, they are highlighted for further analysis. As
determined in Chapter 4, since code can only be executed from pages marked executable
at the page level, only pages marked executable within known allocations are subject to
the hashing process.
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By using the filename and o set of the page within its allocation, this allows the exact
hash that a page should match to be retrieved from the hash set. This means that each
page will only ever be tested against a single hash value, rather than against the whole
hash set, significantly reducing the algorithmic complexity when compared to the previous
approach. Additionally, since each page is only checked against the hash that it should
match, this eliminates the possibility of any hashes inadvertently matching other pages.
The most significant improvement of this approach however is that it turns the ap-
plication of these hashes into a code white-listing tool. This allows any code that does
not match a hash in the hash set to be identified, whether it be due to the alteration
of existing code or the introduction of foreign code. By allowing the identification of
unknown code, this facilitates the use of this approach as a reduction technique to remove
all known code from further analysis. This allows all the limitations of the approach by
Walters et al. [2008] to be overcome.
While such an approach allows the verification of the majority of code running on a
Windows system, it does not overcome the issues caused by default Windows behaviour
raised in Section 4.4. The majority of these issues revolve around data being marked
executable when it should not be. Since data is typically only known at run-time, this
prevents a hash being created to verify such data in advance, meaning that such pages
must be dealt with separately. As such pages are not able to verified under this approach,
these are categorised as unverifiable.
To overcome cases where data in a PE is made executable in memory, such as when
the PE is packed or encrypted on disk, the permissions of each sections of the PE when
on disk are recorded. This allows such pages to be detected by checking to see if the
permissions of any pages of the PE in memory have changed from non-executable to
executable. Since the contents of such pages do not exist on disk, they are not verifiable,
and are labeled as Executable PE Data and placed in the unverifiable category.
The executable data allocations created by Windows by default, such as the shared
heap on Windows XP, are each located individually as described in the previous chapter.
When such an allocation is encountered, the entire allocation is labeled Default Windows
Behaviour, and placed in the unverifiable category. While such allocations are excluded
from the automated verification process, they should still be reviewed manually.
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Other allocations which are not verified can fall into one of two categories. The first is
failed, which occurs when a page within the allocation fails the verification process. This
indicates that a page containing code within the allocation has changed, and should be
treated as suspicious. The other category is unknown, which is for when the allocation
is executable, no file is backing the section and it is not a default windows allocation.
Such allocations are typically indicative of injected code, and should be treated as highly
suspicious. All allocations which do pass the verification process are put in the verified
category.
5.2.3 Unverifiable Default Behaviour
In addition to the executable and writable data allocations outlined in Section 4.4, there
exist two other instances of unique behaviour in Windows 7 that prevent verification. The
first of these is in blackbox.dll, a Windows DRM library, which contains di erent code
pages in memory than on disk. This di erence is caused by intentional obfuscation, as
upon loading blackbox.dll it decrypts DRM-related resources which are stored encrypted
on disk, likely in order to prevent reverse engineering. Since these pages are di erent on
disk to in memory, they are unable to be verified.
The second instance of this unique behaviour is in the address space of another
component of the Windows Search service, searchindexer.exe. Within the allocation
where shell32.dll should be loaded, there exists not 1 but 4 di erent PE files. While
this allocation for the most part contains shell32.dll, it additionally contains fdProxy.dll,
pnidui.dll and WPDShServiceObj.dll, which are loaded at di erent points within the
allocation. The reasons for which these libraries are all loaded within the same allocation
rather than their own individual allocations are unknown. Due to the design of the tool,
only the parts containing shell32.dll are able to be verified. This allocation can be found
by locating the allocation containing shell32.dll within searchindexer.exe, and checking
for the presence of additional PE headers at specific o sets.
As with the allocations previously identified in Section 4.4, each of these allocations
are placed into the unverifiable category, and should be verified manually.
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5.2.4 Potential for Subversion
Since in this approach the contents of specific o sets are replaced with a constant, it would
seem that these o sets would form an ideal place for malicious code to reside. Given that
each of these locations represents a pointer that is unknown until run time, each location
represents 4 bytes an attacker could potentially modify. The strategy that an attacker
might employ to abuse this is dependent on the distribution of these locations, whether
the numerous locations are non-consecutive or consecutive.
When there are numerous non-consecutive locations, an attacker is able to modify 4
byte pointers that are spread across the page without breaking the verification. If the
attacker were to replace a pointer with a pointer to where malicious code is stored, the
location of the malicious code would be flagged by this approach. If the pointer is replaced
with a pointer to existing code or 4 bytes of instructions, an attacker could attempt to
subvert the logic flow of a program. Achieving any useful functionality through this
approach without crashing the program however would be di cult.
When there are numerous consecutive locations however, an attacker is able to insert
arbitrary code. Such consecutive locations typically occur within the Import Address
Table (IAT) of the PE, as it is a continuous run of pointer values that require updating.
However, given that these pointers should point to valid addresses within other loaded
libraries, it makes them easy to verify through import resolution. A Volatility plugin,
apihooks, already exists with such functionality [Ligh, 2009].
One assumption made by this approach is that the contents of the disk can be trusted,
as if any malware resides on the disk, hashes will be created such that the malware is
validated in memory. While it is possible that hashes could be created via other means,
such as from the code in memory, these approaches still rely on trusting the dataset. As
such, the creation of such hashes relies on being able to access the code while it is in a
trusted state. The presence of a disk in a trusted state depends on the scenario being
examined.
For a consumer machine, having access to a version of the disk in a trusted state is
unlikely, as the chances that the user will have a backup which can be used are slim, and in
built recovery options such as system restores could also be compromised. When dealing
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with such a scenario, a machine that mimics the configuration of the potentially infected
machine would have to be created to achieve the ideal result. While a default Windows
install image could be used, this would miss many of the applications the user has since
installed. The restore images created by hardware vendors however could potentially be
of use.
In an enterprise environment however, there should exist a gold image which is the
standard image used to build each machine on the network. This gold image should
have all the applications pre-installed, making it a trusted disk image for which all the
hashes can be built. Although unlikely, care must still be taken to ensure that a malicious
attacker has not at some point infected the gold image.
5.3 Implementation
The implementation of this approach as a usable tool was carried out in two parts,
hashbuild.py and hashtest.py, which as their names indicate, build the hashes and test
the hashes against the memory images respectively. A copy of this implementation can
be found at www.github.com/a-white.
5.3.1 Hashbuild
Hashbuild is a standalone python script of approximately 430 lines of code that walks
through a filesystem and produces hashes for all PE files. This script takes two parameters,
a filesystem, and the name of the file to output the hashes to. The filesystem is accepted as
a mount point, allowing the use of disk images through FUSE or physically mounted disks,
thereby supporting almost any disk format. The SHA1 hashing algorithm was utilised for
the hashes due to its widespread availability, however the code could be modified to use
any other cryptographic hash function without issue.
Building the hashes is achieved by running each PE file through a virtual PE loader
as described in Section 5.2.1. The pseudocode for this process is shown in Figure 5.2.
Given a PE file, the process begins by converting the PE file to its virtual layout. This
is achieved by locating the section information and rearranging the physical layout as
required to produce the virtual layout. The next step is locate the import address table
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Function process(P)
input : P = PE file (physical layout)
output: Per-page hash output
// Build virtual layout
V Ω≠ expand(P )
// Locate IAT and relocations
I, RΩ≠ parse directories(P )
// Build list of locations to normalise
LΩ≠ parse normalisations(I, R)
// Split into pages
for v œ V do
// Normalise page and save locations
n, lΩ≠ normalise(v, L)




Figure 5.2: Pseudocode for building hashes from a PE file
(IAT) and relocations by parsing the relevant data directories. These data structures
can then be parsed to produce a list of locations within the virtual layout that require
normalisation.
These normalisations are then applied to the virtual layout on a per page basis. This
produces a normalised page and a list of locations that were normalised for each page.
Each normalised page is then hashed by putting the page through a cryptographic hash
algorithm. The resulting hash value and the list of locations normalised then forms the
output of the tool. Although other information also accompanies each hash value, such as
the filename and o set within the file, the steps for retrieving this information are trivial
and have been omitted from the pseudocode for the sake of readability.
An example of the information produced by hashbuild for each page of the virtual
layout of a PE is shown in Figure 5.3. For each page, the name of the file, the o set
within the file, the hash value of the normalised page, the executable flag and the list
of locations to normalise are recorded in a comma separated format. Since locations
to normalise may cross page boundaries, the list of locations to normalise also accepts
negative o sets to allow relocations that continue from previous pages to be processed.
For e ciency purposes, the locations to normalise are stored in hexadecimal, and the
hashes sorted alphabetically based on the filename and then by o set within the file.
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Filename Offset Normalised Hash Executable Flag Normalised Locations
--------- ------ ---------------------------------------- --------------- --------------------
ntdll.dll 32 0e04ac081fdd61f63a9efbf46154578da56d15cc 1 35D 4DF D3A
Figure 5.3: Sample output of hash building process for a single page
Since the PE file format has been around a long time, it can potentially contain
numerous di erent versions of PE files. This implementation only supports 32-bit Win-
dows PEs, excluding any MSDOS, NE and 64-bit versions of PE files. Also, since
only the loading process was implemented, this implementation does not deal with any
intentional obfuscation techniques such as packing. Dealing with intentional obfuscation
would require an approach that is capable of executing the code of the PE through some
interpreter, or by executing the PE on an actual system and creating hashes from the in
memory code.
5.3.2 Hashtest
The application of the hashes was implemented as a plugin for the Volatility Memory
Analysis Framework [Volatile Systems, 2011], allowing existing implementations for basic
functionality such as virtual address translation and process listing to be leveraged. This
implementation takes as options the hash file to use as the source of code hashes, and a
location to dump any pages which are not able to be verified. The current implementation
of the plugin consists of approximately 500 lines of python code which follows the approach
outlined in Section 5.2.2 and in Figure 5.1 for applying the hashes. This hashing process
is applied to every page in user space memory deemed to be code according to the
contribution in Chapter 4.
In order to facilitate prioritization of what memory requires further analysis, memory
that has not been verified is separated into three categories. The decision making process
for assigning these categories is shown in Figure 5.4. In this diagram, default behaviour
is defined as an instance of standard Windows behaviour that is unable to be verified as
described in Sections 4.4 and 5.2.3. As such, if a page has no hash information or fails the
hashing process, and is caused by standard Windows behaviour, it is labeled unverifiable.
For pages not caused by standard Windows behaviour, if they have no hash information

















Figure 5.4: Hash application result categorisation
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PID Verified Failed Unverifiable Unknown Name
------------ -------- ------ ------------ ------- ---------------------------------------------------
00004 1 0 0 0 System
00268 3 0 0 0 smss.exe
00372 17 0 0 0 csrss.exe
...
00764 85 0 1 0 svchost.exe
01110000 0 0 2 0 ole32.dll executable alloc (Unverifiable)
...
02376 100 0 6 0 wmpnetwk.exe
003a0000 0 0 2 0 ole32.dll executable alloc (Unverifiable)
6cd00000 47 0 11 0 msmpge2enc.dll (Executable Data)
6ced0000 103 0 26 0 blackbox.dll (Unverifiable / Executable Data)
6de80000 165 0 11 0 drmv2clt.dll (Executable Data)
6dfa0000 57 0 11 0 wmdrmdev.dll (Executable Data)
...
Totals
Allocations 2076 0 7 0
Pages 38788 0 73 0
Unverifiable Pages Breakdown
59 Executable Data
14 Default Windows Behaviour
Figure 5.5: Sample output of hash testing process
While memory labeled with any of these categories still requires manual examination,
it can be seen that memory labeled failed or unknown would be more likely to contain
unknown code than memory labeled unverifiable.
An example of the output can be seen in Figure 5.5. For each process in the memory
image, a single summary line is displayed for that process. This summary contains the
process ID, the number of allocations which were verified, unknown, unverifiable or failed
verification, and the name of the process. If a process contained any allocations that
were not verified for any reason, a summary of the o ending allocation in question is
displayed. This summary is the same as for the process, except it deals with pages, lists
the allocation o set instead of the process ID and outputs any information regarding why
the allocation was not verified.
An overall summary of the results is provided at the bottom, which gives the totals
for the results at both the allocation and page levels. Additionally, it breaks down the
unverifiable pages into two categories, those caused by PE data being marked executable,
and those caused by default Windows behaviour. If more detail is required, the imple-
mentation contains an option to instead output the results for every allocation within
every process, even if it was completely verified.
5.4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 129
5.4 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the e ectiveness of the proposed approach in distinguishing between known
and unknown code, two experiments were devised. The first experiment tested the
approach against memory images containing malware, to test the ability to identify
unknown code. The second experiment tested the approach against memory images
containing common applications, to test the ability to identify known code. These
experiments allowed each capability of the tool to be evaluated separately.
In order to run these experiments, four datasets were created. Each dataset consisted
of a clean install of an operating system with no further patches applied, and a collection
of memory images after running various executables. For each operating system tested,
Windows XP SP3 32-bit and Windows 7 SP1 32-bit, one dataset consisting of memory
samples containing malicious code and one with memory samples containing common
Windows programs were created. These datasets were created using a virtual machine,
so each memory image is an atomic snapshot of the contents of memory at that point in
time. VMWare Fusion 5.0.3 was used for this task. The hard disk images of the virtual
machines were included with the datasets, for the purposes of building the hashes required
for verification.
The creation of the malware dataset involved creating an uninfected baseline on a
virtual machine, and then infecting this baseline with a piece of malware, while directing
all network tra c to a honeypot to prevent any unwanted activity. For each piece of
malware examined, the virtual machine was restored to the uninfected baseline, the
malware sample executed, the machine rebooted and then a memory image taken, with
a few minutes of idling in between each step to ensure the malware executed correctly.
While the use of pausing a virtual machine to image memory potentially causes the loss of
network related information, such information was not required in this approach. Lastly,
each memory sample generated was manually examined prior to analysis with the tool,
to ensure that the malware did in fact execute correctly and persist through the reboot
process. One memory image was created for each malware sample on each operating
system. A list of the malware samples used and their hashes are provided in Table 5.1.
For the creation of the common program datasets, a similar process was taken. The
di erences with the application datasets however were that all programs were installed












Table 5.1: Hashes of malware samples used
before creating the baseline, and the virtual machine was not rebooted after each program
was executed. When creating the memory images, each application was opened and no
further input provided. To facilitate the use of some these programs, normal internet
connectivity was provided. The applications used and their version numbers are provided
in Table 5.2. The default settings for the application both during and after the install
were used. As the web browsers were installed first, this resulted in browser plugins being
added to Firefox and Internet Explorer to handle new filetypes. Since none of these new
filetypes were opened however, the code within these plugins was not executed.
To run the experiments, a hash file was created from the hard disk image accompanying
each data set using hashbuild, and then that hash file was used to verify the code in each
memory image using hashtest. The results of these experiments are shown in Section 5.5.
For the malware datasets, the tool was run against the entire memory image for each
sample. Since in the application dataset however individual applications were being tested,
the tool was only run against processes from that application.
In terms of the selection of malware and programs used in these datasets, two di erent
approaches were taken. For the malware, selection was determined by the use of user space
components, and the ability for the malware to execute correctly on both Windows XP
and Windows 7. While numerous other malware samples were tested, only those included
in the results were found to fulfill both of these criteria.
As for the common program selection, no reputable sources of program usage were
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OS Application Version
XP / 7 7zip 9.20
XP / 7 Adobe Reader 11.0.0
XP / 7 Chrome 23.0
XP / 7 Excel 12.0
XP / 7 Firefox 17.0.1
XP / 7 Google Talk 1.0.0
XP Internet Explorer 6.0
7 Internet Explorer 8.0
XP / 7 iTunes 11.0.1.12
XP / 7 Notepad++ 6.2.3
XP / 7 Outlook 12.0.
XP / 7 Pidgin 2.10.6
XP / 7 Powerpoint 12.0.
XP / 7 Skype 6.0.0
XP / 7 Thunderbird 17.0
XP / 7 Winamp 5.6.3
XP Windows Media Player 9.00
7 Windows Media Player 12.0
XP / 7 WinRAR 4.20
XP / 7 Word 12.0
XP / 7 Wordpad 5.1
XP / 7 Wordpad 6.1
XP / 7 VLC 2.0.5
Table 5.2: Versions of applications used













No Sample 18701 0 100.00 0 25 0
Cridex.B 18808 38 99.80 0 25 4
Cridex.E 16964 28 99.83 0 25 3
Dexter 37506 0 100.00 0 25 2
NGRBot 19700 332 98.31 0 25 44
Shylock 19583 30 99.85 0 25 7
Spyeye 18564 107 99.42 0 25 23
TDL3 19719 14 99.93 0 25 49
TDL4 19911 14 99.93 0 25 52
Vobfus 18322 0 100.00 0 25 3
ZeroAccess 19644 0 100.00 0 25 10
Table 5.3: Windows XP SP2 Malware Dataset Results
available, so what was believed to be the most common freely available programs under a
variety of categories were used. This was done to ensure diversity between the applications
being tested. Although not quite free, given the widespread popularity of Microsoft O ce,
a trial version of this suite was also included.
5.5 Results
The results of these experiments are outlined in this section, with one set of results for
each dataset.
5.5.1 Malware
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the results of running the tool against the Windows XP and
Windows 7 malware datasets respectively. For these datasets, each entry in the results
shows the result of running the tool against the entire memory image containing the
sample. This allows the impact of the introduction of the malware on the system to be
seen.
The Executable Pages column shows the number of memory pages marked executable














No Sample 38463 0 100.00 43 7 0
Cridex.B 38607 27 99.93 43 7 2
Cridex.E 39080 27 99.93 43 7 4
Dexter 48366 0 100.00 43 7 2
NGRBot 36799 60 99.84 43 6 8
Shylock 40058 35 99.91 43 7 8
Spyeye 38970 24 99.94 44 7 7
TDL3 39063 12 99.97 43 8 59
TDL4 41225 12 99.97 43 9 59
Vobfus 38090 2 99.99 43 7 2
Zeroaccess 40751 0 100.00 43 9 16
Table 5.4: Windows 7 SP1 Malware Dataset Results
number of these pages that failed verification. The successfully verified pages as a
percentage is shown in the next column. The remaining three columns show information
about memory that was not subject to the verification process. In the Executable PE
Data column the number of pages from data sections of the PE that were later marked
executable, and as such, were not able to be verified, are displayed. The Unverifiable
Allocations column shows the number of allocations that contained executable pages but
were known to be unverifiable due to being caused by standard Windows behaviour as
described in Section 4.4. The last column, Unknown Allocations, displays the allocations
containing executable pages that were not able to be verified due to no hash information
being available in the hash set.
For Windows XP, Table 5.3 shows that without any malware, the system typically
has a 100% match of executable code, with 25 unverifiable allocations caused by default
Windows behaviour. By comparing the infected samples to this baseline, the e ect the
malware had on the system can be seen. Each infected sample introduced unknown
allocations, and additionally some also altered the code in existing allocations.
Windows 7, as shown in Table 5.4, on an uninfected system has a 100% match of
executable code, with 43 executable data pages and 7 unverifiable allocations caused by
default Windows behaviour. As with Windows XP, each malware sample introduced
unknown allocations, and most also altered existing allocations. This allows the e ects












7zip 583 0 100.00 0 3 0
Adobe Reader 3478 42 98.79 0 4 11
Chrome 11370 6 99.95 0 5 25
Excel 1883 6 99.68 0 3 1
Firefox 5606 5 99.91 0 3 5
Google Talk 1560 0 100.00 0 3 1
Internet Explorer 3151 0 100.00 0 3 1
iTunes 13869 0 100.00 0 3 0
Notepad++ 1288 0 100.00 0 3 0
Outlook 4148 12 99.71 1 3 3
Pidgin 2334 0 100.00 0 3 0
Powerpoint 2276 519 77.20 1192 3 3
Skype 6571 4216 35.84 262 3 2
Thunderbird 5651 6 99.89 0 3 7
VLC 1645 0 100.00 0 3 0
Winamp 2626 0 100.00 0 3 18
Windows Media Player 833 0 100.00 0 3 1
Winrar 835 0 100.00 0 3 11
Wordpad 899 0 100.00 0 3 0
Word 3113 8 99.74 0 3 1
Table 5.5: Windows XP SP3 Application Dataset Results
of the malware samples to be easily identified.
When comparing the results on Windows XP and Windows 7, one can see that
default Windows behaviour causes more unverifiable allocations on Windows XP, and
more executable data pages on Windows 7. Across all the samples, the number of
executable data pages and unverifiable allocations remained consistent with slight fluc-
tuations, demonstrating that they indicate typical Windows behaviour. For the same
sample on di erent versions of Windows, most samples reported consistent results. Some
malware however, such as NGRBot and Spyeye, reported large discrepancies in results
between the two versions of Windows, indicating that they employ di erent persistence
techniques depending on the operating system. The results from the Dexter samples
contain significantly higher numbers of executable pages in memory, indicating that some
behaviour was causing more pages to be loaded into memory. Given that Dexter is
designed to scan memory for credit card data, this suggests that this scanning activity













7zip 583 0 100.00 0 0 0
Adobe Reader 3478 42 98.79 0 0 17
Chrome 10867 9 99.92 32 0 25
Excel 2419 6 99.75 0 0 2
Firefox 4480 5 99.89 0 0 5
Google Talk 2951 0 100.00 0 0 0
Internet Explorer 3794 27 99.29 0 1 1
iTunes 5991 0 100.00 11 0 0
Notepad++ 1651 0 100.00 0 0 0
Outlook 6981 11 99.84 1 0 4
Pidgin 2720 0 100.00 0 0 0
Powerpoint 3558 2023 43.14 972 0 10
Skype 7320 4216 42.40 262 0 2
Thunderbird 4247 5 99.88 0 0 5
VLC 2073 0 100.00 0 0 0
Winamp 3810 0 100.00 0 0 18
Windows Media Player 3160 1 99.97 0 0 1
Winrar 1457 0 100.00 11 0 11
Wordpad 1545 0 100.00 0 0 1
Word 3403 9 99.74 0 0 2
Table 5.6: Windows 7 SP1 Application Dataset Results
5.5.2 Common Applications
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show the results from running the tool against the Windows XP
and the Windows 7 application datasets respectively. For these datasets, each entry in
the results shows the result of running the tool against the processes created as a result of
running that program. While for most programs this involved running the tool against one
process, programs employing sandboxing techniques created multiple processes, requiring
the tool be run against each process created by that program. This allows the impact of
that particular program on the results of the tool to be seen.
The results from Windows XP shown in Table 5.5 indicates that numerous programs
exhibit behaviour that complicated the verification process. Of a total of 20 programs,
only 6 can be considered to have been verified completely. All of the 14 remaining
applications introduced 1 or more unknown allocations. In addition, some of these
applications introduced changes into their own code upon loading, making some pages fail
verification. Each application from the Microsoft O ce suite exhibited this behaviour, and
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is likely a remanent of their anti-piracy measures. Skype and Powerpoint were the most
prolific in this regard, having low page verification rates and high numbers of executable
PE data pages. This would indicate that the programs are packed when on disk, to help
prevent reverse-engineering of their proprietary formats.
For Windows 7, the results in Table 5.6 show that the number of applications that
were verified were the same. The overall results between Windows XP and Windows 7 are
similar, except that the results from Windows 7 have far fewer unverifiable allocations.
One interesting trend however was that some applications, which under Windows XP had
no executable PE data pages, had executable PE data pages under Windows 7.
5.6 Discussion
For the results outlined in the previous section, it can be seen that this research was able
to detect the introduction of running malicious code to the system in all examined cases.
As can be seen from the application dataset however, the introduction of other pieces of
software can potentially add some noise to this process, increasing the amount of memory
requiring further examination. This amount of memory that requires further examination
is only a fraction of the original memory however, making this approach highly suitable
as a reduction technique to direct further analysis.
From the malware results, it can be seen that all samples examined were able to be
detected due to the fact that the code must exist in memory somewhere in order to
execute. As discussed in Section 5.2, even if the pointers are maliciously altered, they
have to point somewhere else to where the code resides. If malicious code is entered in
place of the pointers, it would have to somehow perform its own malicious tasks while at
the same time not crashing the original process, making such an attack unlikely.
One possible method of circumvention would be what is considered a “Type-2” rootkit
[Rutkowska, 2006], that is, a rootkit which only modifies data structures. Such a rootkit
would be able to freely modify pointers and other data without detection under this
approach. However, the malicious payload of such a rootkit would still have to exist
somewhere in memory, meaning the rootkit would need to be able hide its executable
memory. Another possibility would be a piece of malware that is completely implemented
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using Return-Orientated Programming (ROP), as this would mean the malware’s “code”
only ever exists as data, however such malware has yet to be seen.
If the malware is not concerned with allowing the process it inhabits to continue
running however, a PE file’s Import Address Table (IAT) provides an ideal place to
conceal malicious code. This is due to the fact that the IAT is typically a continuous
run of pointer values which are changed at run time, making them unverifiable with this
approach. Tools that can correctly validate the IAT however already exist [Ligh, 2009],
and should be used alongside this research.
Although each malware sample was able to be automatically detected using hasht-
est.py, some malware exhibited behaviour that was not detectable even with existing
manual approaches such as malfind. Both Cridex.B and Vobfus on both Windows XP
and Windows 7 created executable pages in non-executable pages in order to hide their
code. Given that malfind only checks executable allocations, as discussed in Section 4.2.2,
such code would not be detected using malfind.
While it would be possible to investigate the unknown allocations caused by the
applications examined, every application likely causes such allocations in its own unique
way. For example, many of the unknown allocations caused by Adobe Reader are due
to “.api” plugin files being loaded, which is a file extension given to plugins for Adobe
Reader. These plugins are in fact simply PE files with a di erent extension, making it
trivial to include them in the hashset and verify them correctly.
There are however simply too many applications to attempt to support in this manner,
each of which would introduce its own additional complexity to the tool. For this reason,
such special considerations are only supported for built-in default Windows behaviour,
which will apply to every system being examined. If the unknown allocations created by
an application are of particular importance in an investigation, it is always possible to take
a clean version of the application and perform a comparison to address any uncertainties.
5.6.1 Limitations
This approach su ers from the following limitations. Since only user space memory is
examined, this means that any malware which hides in the kernel space via a driver
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or similar cannot be detected under this approach. While a similar approach could be
applied to kernel memory, it would require the mapping of all locations in kernel memory
in which code could potentially execute, as has been done for user space memory, which
is beyond the scope of this research.
This approach also relies on being able to accurately replicate what the code will look
like in memory for hashing purposes. This means that any PE files that have been packed
or obfuscated will not be able to be verified correctly. In addition, any code that comes
from outside the PE file that influences execution, such as interpreted code or just-in-time
compiled code, are unable to be hashed. Being able to successfully overcome such issues
would require the implementation of a virtual machine capable of loading and running
such code, or a system of building hashes of the code from in memory rather than on disk.
As the hashing process involves normalisation, this means that parts of the page
are e ectively ignored under this approach. Although as previously described, creating
malicious behaviour by only altering these normalised locations is di cult, it is still
possible. Improving upon this would require some method of evaluating these normalised
locations, similar to how apihooks can be used to verify the IAT.
Another way in which this hash creation process is limited is the necessity of a trusted
disk image to build the hashes from. Although in a corporate environment the presence of
a gold image makes this less of an issue, it is still a concern for consumer devices. While
it would be possible to create a hash set and distribute it, similar to what is done with
the NSRL [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012], such an approach is
reliant on the data set being frequently updated. Additionally, having multiple versions
of files in the hash set could potentially cause problems with incorrect hash matching,
particularly if key resources such as the IAT move dramatically within the PE.
5.7 Case Study: Advanced Process Hollowing
In Section 3.7.2, the technique of process hollowing, the practice of using a benign
process as a host for malicious code, was examined. While the techniques currently used
by malware were detectable, the possibility that more sophisticated process hollowing
techniques exist that did not leave behind the same artifacts was introduced. In this case
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Start End Used Size Permission Type Description
-------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------- -------- ------------------------------------------
...
00430000 00532fff 00007000 00103000 READONLY Mapped GdiSharedHandleTable
00840000 008bffff 00001000 00080000 READWRITE Private
01000000 0101efff 00015000 0001f000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\calc.exe
5ad70000 5ada7fff 0001b000 00038000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\uxtheme.dll
5cb70000 5cb95fff 00013000 00026000 EXECUTE_WRITECOPY Mapped \WINDOWS\system32\shimeng.dll
...
Figure 5.6: Partial output from userspace.py on calc.exe
PID Verified Failed Unverifiable Unknown Name
------------ -------- ------ ------------ ------- ---------------------------------------------------
01512 93 1 0 0 calc.exe
01000000 0 12 0 0 calc.exe (Failed matches)
Figure 5.7: Output from hashtest.py on calc.exe
study, a scenario using advanced process hollowing with some benign executables will be
examined.
Code that is able to perform what what has been termed advanced process hollowing
has existed publicly since 2004 [Keong, 2004]. In most scenarios, this code will perform
the rudimentary process hollowing as is used by malware. If however the host executable
is loaded at the preferred base address, and the executable to inject shares the same
preferred base address, the code will perform process hollowing without leaving behind
any of the usual artifacts. An example of such process hollowing is shown in Figure 5.6,
where the executable for calc.exe has been hollowed and replaced with notepad.exe.
As the sample output from userspace.py demonstrates, the two artifacts used previ-
ously to detect process hollowing are no longer there. The permission on the allocation is
the normal EXECUTE READWRITE, and there is no section object indicating that
allocation has been accessed by another process. The only unusual factor is that a
rather large proportion of the allocation is currently paged into memory. This makes
the process hollowing undetectable to previous techniques, even though the allocation
originally containing calc.exe now contains notepad.exe instead.
Detecting such process hollowing by verifying the code of user space memory however
instantly reveals the presence of process hollowing. The sample output of running hasht-
est.py on this process is shown in Figure 5.7. This output reveals that the code pages
contained within the allocation within for calc.exe failed to match the hash values from
the hash set, as to be expected when the allocation actually contains notepad.exe.
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From this example it can be seen that even though such process hollowing is unde-
tectable to existing approaches, verifying the code in user space quickly reveals it. Prior to
this research, an examiner would have to rely on the hollowed process performing unusual
activity in order for the process to even rate as suspicious, such as network sockets being
opened by an instance of calc.exe. Without such artifacts however, an investigator would
have to manually dump each executable from memory and verify that pages match the
code on disk.
For the 256MB Windows XP memory image within which this process hollowing has
been demonstrated, there are approximately 38,000 executable pages, or 148.4MB of
memory, that requires verification. According to Vidas [2006], this 148.4MB of data
would equate to just under 40,000 pages of A4 text if printed. Given that aspects such as
relocations and the di erences between physical and virtual layout would prevent basic
matching techniques such as hashing from being used, manually verifying these pages
would be a very time consuming task.
With the use of hashtest however, the amount of memory that required manual
examination was reduced to the 12 executable pages which failed the hashing process.
These 12 executables pages are equivalent to 48KB or 12.5 A4 pages of text if printed,
providing a significant reduction in the amount of memory requiring manual examination.
For this reason, it can be seen that this approach provides an e ective method of reducing
the amount of memory requiring examination for evidence of subversion.
5.8 Conclusions
This chapter provided a novel approach for examining code in user space memory, demon-
strating that hashing is an e ective technique in distinguishing between known and
unknown code. By limiting the application of the hashes to memory known to contain
code, the limitations in the previous approach by Walters et al. [2008] were able to be
overcome. The evaluation of this approach demonstrated that it detected the introduction
of user space malware in all samples examined.
Section 5.1 provided the motivations behind such research and gave a broad indication
of how it was achieved. Section 5.2 detailed the approach with which memory was
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verified, including the challenges it faces. Section 5.3 explained how this approach was
implemented. The way in which this tool was evaluated was outlined in Section 5.4, and
the results of this evaluation were presented in Section 5.5. The implications of these
results were discussed in Section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 presented an example of how
this tool could be used to detect advanced process hollowing techniques and reduce the
amount of memory requiring analysis.
The success of this approach in detecting the introduction of malware has reinforced
the validity of the model presented in Chapter 4, and proven that using hashes to
distinguish between known and unknown code in memory is a viable approach. In
particular, these results and the included case study have demonstrated the success of
such an approach as a reduction tool, in filtering out irrelevant memory to focus on
allocations containing evidence of potential subversion. Such filtering techniques have not
been applied to memory before, and have been shown to be highly e ective in directing
analysis of memory images.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Malware continues to increase in complexity and quantity, making the process of detecting
malware more di cult each day. As the techniques that malware authors use increase
in sophistication, so too must the techniques with which such malware is detected.
Relying on specific artifacts for detection of malware allows these artifacts to be modified,
subverting the detection process. Without generic approaches of detecting malware, it is
not possible to determine whether or not a machine is infected.
Being able to detect unknown code such as malware in a generic fashion requires
the way in which code normally operates to be modeled, such that di erences from the
norm can be successfully identified. The creation of such a model however first requires
a definitive understanding of the theory of operation of Windows memory, such that the
reasons behind and implications of any particular artifact can be explained. As such,
without such a theory of operation and subsequent model, it is not possible to distinguish
between what is known and unknown code.
For this reason, the research presented in this dissertation has defined the theory of
operation and subsequent model of user space memory in order to facilitate the develop-
ment of a technique that is capable of discriminating between known and unknown code
in memory. This was achieved through the analysis of the common system components
of user space memory, the operation of permissions within user space memory, and the
application of hashes to code in memory. The development of this technique has allowed
the generic detection of unknown code such as malware in user space memory, without
any knowledge of the methods employed by the unknown code.
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6.1 Summary of Contributions
As previously described in Section 1.3, the contributions presented by this dissertation
are as follows:
A model for identifying the common structural components of user space
memory
Chapter 3 provides a theory of operation and subsequent model for identifying the common
structural components of user space memory. While previously it was possible to see the
address ranges of user allocations and whether they represented a memory mapped file,
this model allows the classification of the allocations containing these components such
that their contents can be described. As the case studies demonstrated, this improved
understanding of the contents of user space memory allows a significant reduction in the
memory requiring examination for information of interest, as well as the ability to identify
new artifacts of forensic significance. This particular aspect of the contribution was used
extensively in the development of the other contributions.
An approach for automatically distinguishing between code and data in user
space memory
Chapter 4 presented a model with which the contents of user space memory can be
divided into code and data, such that code or data specific analysis techniques can be
applied. In addition, it demonstrated that previous approaches to locating unknown code
were incorrect, and that even Windows itself does not use permissions correctly. The
descriptions of these idiosyncrasies in the use of permissions not only allows code and
data to be correctly distinguished, but additionally allows other non-default instances of
the incorrect use of permissions, such as those used by malware, to be identified.
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A technique for distinguishing between known and unknown code in user space
memory
Chapter 5 presented a technique to distinguish between known and unknown code in user
space memory, facilitating the automated detection of the introduction of unknown code
such as malware. This approach was shown to be capable of detecting the introduction
of a variety of malware samples, without knowledge of any of the specifics of how they
operated on the system. By separating the code in memory into known and unknown
code, such an approach can significantly reduce the amount of memory that requires
manual examination in an investigation, allowing a decision as to whether the machine is
infected to be more easily reached.
6.2 Avenues for Future Work
In this section, the way in which this research could be expanded upon are detailed.
6.2.1 Other Windows Versions
One area for future work is the application of the contributions to additional versions
of the Windows operating system. This includes versions of Windows which were not
analysed, such as Windows Vista and Windows 8, as well as the 64 bit versions of all
applicable Windows operating systems. Individual service packs of each operating system
may also require separate analysis to ensure compatibility.
While the application of the approaches to other versions of Windows only requires
testing and examination of data structures that have changed, expanding the approaches
to 64 bit Windows is significantly more complex. Although changing pointer values from
32 bit to 64 bit seems like a simple change, there are numerous complications that arise
as a result. One such example is the backwards compatibility Windows o ers, allowing
32 bit executables to run on a 64 bit system, a non-trivial change that would increase
the complexity required for the success of the approach presented in Chapter 5. With
the introduction of ARM versions of Windows, the applicability of the contributions to a
di erent computing architecture could also be examined.
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6.2.2 Kernel Memory
Upon review of the ways in which user space memory has been advanced through this
research, it can be seen that kernel memory could benefit from a similar approach.
Although significantly more research exists that focuses on kernel memory, there have
been no e orts made to survey the contents of kernel memory. Instead, existing techniques
[Dolan-Gavitt, 2008, Dolan-Gavitt et al., 2009, Ligh, 2012, Schuster, 2006b, van Baar
et al., 2008] only attempt to locate specific data structures of interest. The techniques
used to locate such data structures may in fact benefit from a better way of determining
the exact layout of kernel memory.
Being able to better locate the contents of kernel memory would then allow an approach
for determining which parts of the kernel are code and which parts are data. This would
allow these aspects of kernel memory to be analysed separately, as was done with user
space memory in this thesis. With such a capability it may be possible to apply a similar
code hashing approach to kernel memory, to distinguish between known and unknown
code. Although such hashing techniques have been attempted before in memory, they
have only been able to examine kernel code that is known to be present [Rutkowska,
2005]. As such, the ability to detect injected code in the kernel would be a significant
contribution.
6.2.3 Resilience to Malicious Modification
Since all of the techniques presented by this research are for the purposes of further-
ing malware detection, it would be logical to test the resilience of these approaches to
malicious modification. Such research could take an approach similar to the one used
by Dolan-Gavitt et al. [2009], by fuzzing the data structures to see what data can be
altered without a ecting the execution of a process. There are numerous data structures
that could be examined in this way, although the most useful target of examination would
arguably be the VAD Tree, as it is a key aspect of the contribution presented in Chapter 3.
Additionally, it would be useful to attempt to circumvent the approach outlined in
Chapter 5. Intentionally attacking the approach with full knowledge of how it operates
could identify a way in which the approach could be improved. One such improvement
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would be a method of assessing the validity of the content of normalized locations.
Alternatively, if malware cannot be constructed that circumvents the hashing process,
it would demonstrate the e ectiveness of the approach.
6.2.4 Further User Allocation Analysis
Although the contribution described in Chapter 3 is capable of determining the contents
of many user allocations, it is not capable of describing all of them. More research is
required to locate the reasons for these unexplained user allocations, such that they can
be correctly described in the future. This could involve the investigation of other parts of
the kernel, such as those responsible for the GUI, or the analysis of program specific run
time data.
Given that the structure of the heap is well known, another possibility would be to
analyse the allocations made at the heap level. By parsing the heap and utilising the
metadata contained within, it may be possible to understand the contents of the heaps at
a more granular level. Such research however would be unlikely to expand directly upon
this research, but rather function separately to complement further analysis of user space
memory.
6.2.5 Alternative Hash Building Methods
While the method used to build hashes in Chapter 5 allows per system hash sets to be
easily created, it does not deal well with packed or encrypted portable executable (PE)
files, or the use of interpreted or just-in-time compiled code. Being able to create hashes
for such code would require the use of a method that is capable of executing such files.
This could be achieved through the use of an interpreter that simulates the execution of
such files, or by building hashes from the memory images of machines after running these
files.
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